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
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY READING

**PREPARING LEADERS
FOR THE FIELDS OF STRIFE**



COLONEL S. DAN JOHNSTON
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"Each officer will consult the enclosed list of books and choose one to read each month. This effort will not only contribute to the officer's professional development, but it will also provide us the opportunity to share ideas and philosophies at our weekly officer calls. In pursuit of this goal, each company grade officer will coordinate with the executive officer to schedule each month at any one of our officer calls a book about which he or she would like to lead the discussion."

We have all seen or issued instructions of this sort. They are common because we all know that a knowledge of military history, blended with an understanding of the profession of arms, is key to the fulfillment of our obligations as officers. While the aim is admirable, the execution is often faulty. This breakdown is most often caused not by the failure of the officers to read the books, but by the lack of guidance the officers receive about what is key in each of the books. The result is poor discussions. It is one thing to tell an officer to read a book, but quite another thing for that officer, in most cases a company grade officer of limited practical experience, to grasp some of the important concepts of these books and be able to determine what is in them that might spark those noble discussions of military philosophy we seek. The officer who publishes these instructions seldom has the time to provide such guidance to each and every officer. It is the attempt of this guide to relieve some of that shortfall.

Please understand that I have no distinguished literary or historical credentials nor the intellectual insights that many of my peers enjoy. I am just a soldier who has been disappointed by sessions in which junior officers dutifully recite the plot or general tenor of a book and then conclude with the sophomoric phrase, "I recommend that you all read this book." I have thought at these times that I wished I had had the time to sit down with each officer as he or she chose his or her book and point out key items which they should glean from the book to use to elicit discussion among the officers.

That time is now. Contained herein are pieces on selected books. Highlighted in each piece are lessons to be learned and discussion points which are key to the basic understanding of our profession of arms and of the philosophy of command basic to all units. As such, these points are certainly worthy of discussion among any group of officers. The opinions expressed are certainly not espoused as the view, but only one view, and in themselves should

provide a starting point for discussions. I also offer questions which should garner the interest, enthusiasm, and reflection of professional soldiers. In this format, the guide is intended as a primer or lesson plan for professional development sessions based on notable literary works.

The result of this approach is that this guide is more of a reference document with a piece on each book than a paper to be read at a sitting. Since it is more a reference document, there is no attempt to make any one topic or its discussion points and questions unique to an individual piece. Some topics (i.e., a leader's relationship with subordinates) and their discussion points appear in more than one piece simply because they are of considerable interest and importance and appear in more than one book.

The books were selected based on my personal experience, the recommendations of peers and mentors, and a review of professional military reading lists. These books are renowned as military, literary, or leadership classics, in large part for their ability to impart the principles of our profession and influence the professional development of leaders. Coincidentally, they are readable and enjoyable. Many notable books are excluded simply because of the limits of time and space.

My deepest appreciation to Colonel Mike Byrnes (USA) for his help and counsel in the structure of this guide and for his patience as an office-mate during our fellowship year; to Colonel Steve Staley (USAF), a member of the Naval War College faculty, for his devotion to the art of writing and the English language and his endless patience in helping me to translate my Texan into something coherent; and to Lieutenant Colonel (P) Dennis O'Keefe for interrupting his studies during his War College year to conduct a final sanity check of this guide.

Take advantage of this guide as best you can. Good reading and good soldiering!

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June, 1991

ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT. Remarque, Erich Maria. New York, New York: Ballantine Books (Fawcett Crest), 1958 (first published in U.S. by Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1929).

This is a gripping, moving, brutally real depiction of life in the German trenches in France in World War I. And because it is so realistic, it inevitably paints clear lessons for soldiers that follow its legacy in the profession of arms; lessons in leadership, comradeship, and training - soldiering at its most basic level. Remarque wrote this book in 1929, yet it survives the passage of time as a timeless masterpiece. Learn from it, make your unit better because of it, and pray that we never have to repeat it.

(NOTE: Other books in this guide that deal with World War I are The General [Forester], Generalship [Fuller], Once an Eagle [Myrer], The Face of Battle [Keegan], Mask of Command [Keegan], and A Short History of World War I [Stokesbury].)

* - Battle Buddies.

p. 15. "But how can a man look after anyone in the field!"

- Is this not the concept of "Ranger buddies" and the purpose of "battle buddies"? There may be inevitable confusion amid the hysteria and din in the fog of war, but the assignment of pairs of soldiers to watch over one another remains sound. Its purpose: to ensure that some comfort of brotherhood exists and that each soldier has another pair of eyes and another heart watching out for him or her. Does your unit have a formal "battle buddy" system? Are there other strengths or any weaknesses in that system? Is it practiced, especially in live fire situations? Does it logically follow the chain of command and structure of the unit?

* - Communication (of mission).

p. 207. "The national feeling of the tommy resolves itself into this - here he is. But that is the end of it; everything else he criticizes from his own practical point of view."

- The irrelevance to the soldier of anything beyond the immediate (time and place) is difficult to dispell. While the importance of the cause may be relevant to their presence in a battle zone, it has little to do with their

day-to-day survival, so they do not especially care about it. But it is still the leaders' responsibility to keep it in perspective for them (see a related item under the same topic in Webb).

* Comradeship.

pp. 26-27. "But by far the most important result was that (the tough training) awakened in us a strong, practical sense of esprit de corps, which in the field developed into the finest thing that arose out of the war - comradeship."

p. 94. "We sit opposite one another, Kat and I, two soldiers in shabby coats, cooking a goose in the middle of the night. We don't talk much, but I believe we have a more complete communion with one another than even lovers have...formerly we should not have had a single thought in common - now we sit with a goose between us and feel in unison, are so intimate that we do not even speak."

p. 201. "I could almost weep. I can hardly control myself any longer. But it will soon be all right again back here with Kat and Albert. This is where I belong."

p. 212. "They are more to me than life, these voices, they are more than motherliness and more than fear; they are the strongest, most comforting thing there is anywhere: they are the voices of my comrades."

p. 272. "It is a great brotherhood, which adds something of the good-fellowship of the folk-song, of the feeling of solidarity of convicts, and of the desperate loyalty to one another of men condemned to death, to a condition of life arising out of the midst of danger, out of the tension and forlornness of death..."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is

an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Death (randomness).

p. 10. "It might easily have happened that we should not be sitting here on our boxes to-day; it came damn near to that."

p. 101. "The front is a cage in which we must await fearfully whatever may happen. We lie under the network of arching shells and live in a suspense of uncertainty. Over us, Chance hovers. If a shot comes, we can duck, that is all; we neither know nor can determine where it will fall...No soldier outlives a thousand chances. But every soldier believes in Chance and trusts his luck."

p. 222. "The dead man might have had thirty more years of life if only I had impressed the way back to our trench more sharply on my memory. If only he had run two yards farther to the left, he might now be sitting in the trench over there and writing a fresh letter to his wife."

- Many veterans will say, "When it's your time to go, it's your time to go." That may seem to be fitting in some cases, but is it in all "random" cases? How can training and discipline affect the apparent randomness? How do exhaustion, hunger, and physical discomfort affect "randomness"?

Notice from the Index of Topics that this "random death" phenomenon is common to several of the books in this guide; the observations and discussion points above apply to most of them.

* - Feedback.

p. 90. "'Why didn't someone report the matter, then?' asks Bertink. We are silent: he must know himself how much use it is in reporting such things. It isn't usual to make complaints in the army."

- A unit is near death if the leaders close themselves off from feedback from the soldiers. Feedback on unit operations and administration from subordinates is usually more important to the health of an organization than feedback from higher headquarters on these very same matters. What have you established to ensure that subordinates are comfortable in providing you this critical feedback?

* - The Front.

pp. 54-56. "It is the front, the consciousness of the front, that makes this contact [in our blood]...It often seems to me as though it were the vibrating, shuddering air that with a noiseless leap springs upon us; or as though the front itself emitted an electric current which awakened unknown nerve-centres...We march up, moody or good-tempered soldiers - we reach the zone where the front begins and become on the instant human animals."

p. 129. "Although we need reinforcement, the recruits give us almost more trouble than they are worth. They are helpless in this grim fighting area, they fall like flies."

- The tenor of these excerpts is consistent with that of an excerpt from the World War II narrative of Sajer, and the observations which follow here are the same. It takes only one introduction to "the front" for a soldier's instincts to be as refined as described in this excerpt. But unless a leader has so dutifully and expertly trained soldiers to achieve a keen awareness of "the front," those soldiers may not survive the initial introduction. This lack of awareness is part of the reason why "cherries" were such outcasts during their first few days at "the front" in Vietnam; their inexperience made them vulnerable to the hazards and a risk to themselves and their fellow soldiers. If your training is not yet achieving in soldiers this critical awareness of how "the front" is different from their normal experience, how can it be improved to accomplish this?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 106. "We must watch (the recruits), (shell-shock is) catching, already some lips begin to quiver."

p. 107. "Our Company Commander scrambles in and reports that two dug-outs are gone. The recruits calm themselves when they see him."

p. 132. "Another wave of our attack had just come up. A lieutenant is with them. He sees us and yells: 'Forward, forward, join in, follow.' And the word of command does what all my banging could not. Himmelstoss hears the order, looks round him as if awakened, and follows on."

- The testimony of these excerpts is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evident in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

These excerpts show why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 6. "The lieutenant looked at us. He knew what we were thinking. And he knew many other things too, because he came to the company as a noncom and was promoted from the ranks."

- Officers who first serve as enlisted soldiers do enjoy a certain advantage of having lived the "experiences of the led." Even though officers who receive their commission by other means are offered in their

pre-commissioning training experiences likened to those of enlisted soldiers, these do not measure up to the real thing. Since it is commonly held that a good leader must fully appreciate the led, what can you do as a leader to ensure empathy with your subordinates? How can you ensure that you have an open line of communication with your subordinates so that no disruptive barrack rumors interfere with the accomplishment of your missions?

pp. 21-22. "At first astonished, then embittered, and finally indifferent, we recognized that what matters is not the mind but the boot brush, not intelligence but the system, not freedom but drill. We became soldiers with eagerness and enthusiasm, but they have done everything to knock that out of us...We had fancied our task would be different, only to find we were to be trained for heroism as though we were circus-ponies. But we soon accustomed ourselves to it. We learned in fact that some of these things were necessary, but the rest merely show. Soldiers have a fine nose for such distinctions."

- This is a too-often heard comment from our soldiers today. They enlist for the challenge, to serve under great leaders, and to mature into solid citizens; they are disappointed by boredom, by compromising, weak-kneed "leaders," and by unfulfilled expectations. Leaders must be strong enough to accept the mantle of leadership that soldiers want them to wear. And leaders must be perceptive enough to hear the concerns of their subordinates; to separate the legitimate concerns from the whining of the faint of heart; to set a course which aims to travel the high road rather than the lower road which the vocal whiners prefer but of which the good soldiers despair; and to express their guidance and orders in such a way as to invoke in their subordinates the confidence and motivation to succeed. How well do leaders of your unit measure up to this task? How about you?

p. 138. "Thus momentarily we have the two things a soldier needs for contentment: good food and rest."

- It is said that a good leader does not let the sun set on hungry or unpaid soldiers. Their wants and needs are pretty basic, and it is the leaders' obligation to care for those needs.

* - Leaders (stature).

pp. 44-45. "'(The power of authority) goes to the heads of (all leaders), you see. And the more insignificant a man has been in civil life the worse it takes him.'"

- A leader must be cautious to use authority judiciously, to be seen as competent, fair, and reasonably demanding. Subordinates are quick to detect the dishonorable abuse of power; the leader judged to do so is doomed to failure because those to be led will refuse to follow. Leaders must also be cautious of the latter observation in this excerpt, especially in regards to subordinate leaders who may emerge from achievements of a stature unknown to them before with an inflated sense of ego (graduates from Ranger School are infamous for this type of response). Is it possible for leaders to establish among their peers a "power abuse" watch to counsel each other in this regard? What is a recent example of the abuse of power by a leader that you have observed? And the results?

* - Leave.

p. 179. "What is leave? - A pause that only makes everything after it so much worse."

p. 185. "I ought never to have come on leave."

p. 200. "'What was it like on leave?' he asks, 'pretty good, eh?' 'In parts,' I say. 'Yes,' he sighs, 'yes, if a man didn't have to come away again. The second half is always rather messed up by that.'"

p. 210. "I try to pull myself together. It is not my first patrol and not a particularly risky one. But it is the first since my leave..."

- Some soldiers returned to the U.S. for leave during their tours in Vietnam. Several of these expressed the same regret described in these excerpts. Once a soldier has "seen the elephant" and is adapted to the situation, it is often best to see it through.

* - Lifer.

p. 207. "To make matters worse, we have to return almost all the new things and take back our old rags again. The good ones were merely for the inspection."

- Though the term "lifer" was not used in World War I, it could have been in situations like this one where selfish motives for career purposes dominated over care for the soldiers. See a related item under this topic in Webb for an amazingly similar situation: soldiers issued new gear for an inspection and then, despite its value to the soldiers and their survival, the equipment is returned to supply house shelves. What is a recent example in your

experience of a senior soldier more interested in form than substance?

* - Mercy Killing.

p. 72. "'Shouldn't we just take a revolver and put an end to it?'"

- Is the situation depicted here, given the medical exigencies of the day, one in which a "mercy killing" is justifiable? Under what circumstances is mercy killing justifiable on the battlefield? What guidance do you offer your subordinates on the subject? Or do you just leave it up to their individual preferences and conscience? Note a similar situation in Sajer.

* - Staffs.

p. 5. "No one felt kindly toward him, for it was his fault that the food often came up to us in the line too late and cold. Under shellfire he wouldn't bring his kitchen up near enough, so that our soup-carriers had to go much farther than those of the other companies."

- Support staffs are obligated to provide the support for which they were constituted. It is the leader's responsibility to ensure that that is accomplished. The example here precisely describes the importance that such support holds for the soldier. As a leader, do you personally check on the support services your soldiers receive? If not, have you delegated that responsibility to a trusted subordinate? How would you improve the support services your soldiers receive?

* - Training.

p. 26. "We became hard, suspicious, pitiless, vicious, tough - and that was good; for these attributes were just what we lacked. Had we gone into the trenches without this period of training most of us would certainly have gone mad. Only thus were we prepared for what awaited us."

- The best training is the hardest training. Though it is a challenge to leaders to plan and conduct and sometimes a misery on both leaders and soldiers to undergo, that training is what is valued highest and reaps the greatest benefits. Consider only the rigors and resultant benefits of Ranger School and Airborne School and the training at the Combat Training Centers, and the argument is self-evident. General Patton stated, "Sweat more in peace and bleed less in war." Can you look at your unit and

confidently state that you and your soldiers are ready to go to war? How would you improve the training in your unit to attain the benefits of this wisdom?

p. 45. "Everyone knew that drill ceases only in the front-line and begins again a few miles behind, with all absurdities of saluting and parade. It is an Iron law that the soldier must be employed under every circumstance."

- A soldier's training is never done. It is for the good of the soldier and the good of the unit, even in a war zone. The challenge for leaders is to make the training meaningful and make the soldiers understand its necessity. It was a mystery to some of us during the Vietnam war when, after two weeks on patrol in the field, we were subjected to training periods during our three-day "stand-downs" "in the rear". The fault in our perception of that training being a mysterious waste of time lay partially in our selfish naivety, but mostly in a "drill-by-the-numbers" hierarchy who were not successful in translating to us the very real need for us to remain sharp in our field skills. The other side of the ledger is the very real need of soldiers for rest and recreation. That must also be provided to every extent possible and in balance with the required training. Do your soldiers complain about some of the "concurrent" training they receive in the field? Do these complaints originate from the pitiful nature of the training or from your failure to depict the real need for the training? How can you make it better?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

5 - Staffs.	6 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
10 - Death (randomness).	15 - Battle Buddies.
21 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
26 - Comradeship.	26 - Training.
44 - Leaders (stature).	45 - Training.
54 - Front.	72 - Mercy Killing.
90 - Feedback.	94 - Comradeship.
101 - Death (randomness).	106,107 - Leaders (courage).
129 - Front.	132 - Leaders (courage).
138 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
179,185,200 - Leave.	201 - Comradeship.
207 - Communication (of mission)	207 - Lifer.
210 - Leave.	212 - Comradeship.
222 - Death (randomness).	272 - Comradeship.

BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM. McPherson, James M. New York, New York: Ballantine books, 1989 (first published by Oxford University Press, Inc., London, 1988).

More a story than a history book, this depiction of the Civil War is probably the best one-volume portrayal of that epic American struggle, an emotion-strained event framed by the Union view that the "Confederacy was built on the twin pillars of slavery and treason" and the Confederate view that "it is our sacred duty to rebel." Given this range of emotions, it is understandably difficult to present an impartial account which examines the political, economic, diplomatic, and military factors of the Civil War, but this is what McPherson achieves. That the book is exceedingly readable is a wonderfully enjoyable bonus. Presented in this piece are questions keyed to the decisive factors and impacts of the war and discussion points which will contribute to a better understanding of the conflict.

(NOTE: Books in this guide that cover the Civil War include The Killer Angels [Shaara], The Mask of Command [Keegan], and The Red Badge of Courage [Cranell].)

* - What caused the Civil War?

- Slavery? States rights or the perception of state sovereignty? Economic differences or pressures? Impact of Manifest Destiny? Imbalance among political parties?

- Was conflict and/or war really inevitable between two "sides" which had so much in common (language, heritage, the Constitution, legal system, and republican institutions)?

- Did President Lincoln have any options short of war which could have brought the seceding states back?

+ Propose a Constitutional amendment concerning slavery in the territories and in the South?

+ Withdraw Union forces from the South, particularly Fort Sumter?

+ Do nothing?

* - How would a neutral observer have assessed the prospects of the opponents in 1861? Compare these factors, as a minimum, in making an assessment of both the Union and the Confederacy:

- GEOGRAPHY (relative size of territory; natural obstacles; network of rivers; number, location, and vulnerability of urban centers; vulnerability of coastline).

- POPULATION (manpower available for war service; impact of immigration; impact of slaves on Southern manpower base).

- INDUSTRY (manufacturing capability, especially of steel, clothing, shoes, firearms, munitions, ships and locomotives; location of manufacturing centers; access to raw materials).

- TRANSPORTATION (nature and quality of highway, canal, and railroad systems; in regards to railroads, number and location of hub stations, compatibility of double- and single-tracked lines, and geographic orientation of lines; ability to move war materiel from manufacturers to the soldiers).

- FINANCE (amount of gold to back currency; trade with foreign nations [war materiel, King Cotton, King Corn]; legal basis and precedent to finance war [taxation, legislation]).

- DIPLOMACY (foreign assistance and support for the war effort).

- MORALE (elan and esprit; security of the "rear area"; internal anti-war sentiment; moral "high ground").

- LEADERSHIP (central direction; cooperation of constituents with central direction; Lincoln and Davis, their individual character and their cabinets).

- MILITARY (relative strengths of the armies and navies; relative merits of the offense by the Union and the defense by the Confederacy; source of officers; methods of recruitment of service members; age and experience of leadership; status of the national staff and their plans for operations and mobilization; training of units and individuals for battle; impact of changing technologies on Napoleonic tactics of the day).

(NOTE: As this assessment is made, keep in mind that almost as important as the assets themselves is the ability to bring the assets to bear in the conflict.)

* - Why was the allegiance of the border states of critical importance to both the Union and the Confederacy?

- Consider in this question an assessment of the security of Washington, D.C.,; the industrial, population, and livestock base of the regions; and the transportation network of the regions, especially railroads and rivers.

- How did President Lincoln approach these four key border regions (Maryland, western Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri) in four different ways to achieve successful alignment for the Union?

* - Why did the claim that the Civil War was a "rich man's war, but a poor man's fight" arise in the South and why did it later also surface in the North? Was the claim justified? What effect did this claim have on the war? Consider in this assessment the impact of these factors for both sides:

- Inflation.
- Exemption from the draft.
- Substitute policy in the draft.
- Shortage of staples, especially corn and salt.
- Impressment of food.

* - Why is it thought that the absence of the Southern Democrats from the 37th Congress (1861-62) allowed that body to carry out a legislative revolution which changed America forever? Consider in this assessment these items:

- Legal Tender Act.
- Internal Revenue Act.
- Homestead Act.
- Pacific Railroad Act.
- National Banking Act.
- Morrill Act.

* - What were the declarations and effects of the Emancipation Proclamation? Address these items:

- Refinement of Union war objectives.
- Isolation of the Confederacy.

- Strength of the Republican Party.
- Strength of the Confederate economic and manpower infrastructure.
- * - What were major turning points in the North's favor? Consider significant military events in the Summer of '62, Fall of '62, Summer of '63, and Summer of '64 and their impact on and relationship to the following:
 - Operational momentum of either side.
 - National morale of both sides.
 - Elections in the North.
 - European recognition of the Confederacy.
 - Allegiance of the border states to either side.
 - Will and ability of either foe to invade the territory of the other.
 - Political support for the war for both sides.
 - National and military leadership and their interrelationship on both sides.
- * - How did the Union and the Confederacy finance the war and what political measures did each enact to help execute it? How successful were these measures? Consider the following:
 - Taxation.
 - Borrowing.
 - Fiat money.
 - Martial law.
 - Conscription.
 - Recruiting.
 - Habeas corpus.
- * - What were the economic consequences of the Civil War? Consider for both the Union and Confederacy these items:
 - Per capita income and relative national wealth.

- Agricultural and Industrial capacity and productivity.
- Transportation networks.
- Capital assets.
- Availability of raw materials and precious minerals.

* - What were the political consequences of the Civil War?
Consider changes in these areas:

- Legislation authored by Congress (especially Constitutional Amendments).
- Political power.
- Supreme Court membership and rulings.

* - While there were certainly external factors which affected the outcome of the war, what factors internal to the South were determinants of Confederate demise? Consider these factors:

- Relationship of Jefferson Davis with Confederate state governors.
- Support of the war by non-slaveholders.
- Reaction of the populace to conscription and the suspension of habeas corpus.
- Relative commitment to the war by all sectors of the Confederacy.
- Relative loyalty of the slaves.
- Strength of the Confederate belief in the justice of the institution of slavery.
- Lack of a formal political (party) structure.

* - What were possible means the South could have used to win? Consider:

- Better trade space for time (thereby attacking Northern will through the extension of the war).
- Commitment of the central strategy to an unlimited war.
- Strengthening of the Confederate government.

- Conduct of an offensive into the northwest United States.

- Weakening of the Union blockade.

* - What were possible ways the North could have ended the war sooner? Consider these possibilities:

- McClellan's Penisular Campaign.

- McClellan's actions after Antietam.

- Aggressive foreign diplomacy concerning Confederate quest for foreign recognition.

- Assaults on Confederate bases of supplies (i.e., Wilmington).

(NOTE: The caution here is to remember that a Confederacy defeated earlier and not so decisively would not be the same Confederacy later readmitted to the Union sure to never break away again.)

THE CHALLENGE OF COMMAND; Reading for Military Excellence.
Nye, Roger H. Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group,
1986.

Colonel Nye's work serves as the flagship for this guide. It explains why officers should read professionally related books, when this study should be undertaken, and which books are best read by what officers. It further outlines the vital characteristics which officers must possess and which literature expounds and enlightens - characteristics such as judgment, initiative, honor, loyalty, and service. This guide assumes an interest in self-development on the part of officers and seeks to assist in that effort by providing the basis for the fraternal discussion of key principles of our profession of arms. Colonel Nye goes one step farther by obligating officers to undertake such study and by giving wonderful examples of literary sources for these key principles. He best summarizes it all on p. 128: "The duty of self-development for commanders seems to call for three study objectives. First is the acquisition of knowledge and skills associated with the several roles of the commander - leader, manager, tactician, warrior, strategist, and moral standard bearer. Second is the acquisition of knowledge, insights, and values associated with the virtuous human being, perhaps best stated in Plato's Ideal of the man of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Third is the acquisition of insights gained from thought about oneself and the personal style that is suited best to a commander's role in the twentieth century Army environment." That is our challenge; good reading!

* - Communication (of mission).

p. 73. "More important is the strong belief that a battlefield populated with commanders who are creating their own doctrine and organization is a battlefield of total chaos."

- The Army's training programs and well documented doctrine establish a strong, solid foundation which is a start toward eliminating this chaos. Then, the communication of the commander's intent to the lowest possible echelon (two echelons below, as a minimum) should squelch most of the rest of the preventable chaos reflected by this excerpt. When leaders are aware of how they and their unit fit into this intent and battlefield developments subsequently cast the original plan into a dust bin so deep that addenda to the orders cannot be passed, those leaders should feel comfortable using their initiative to produce the victory anticipated by the original orders. Chaos will

exist on any battlefield, but it should not exist in the mind of leaders concerning their role in the mission. How routinely and effectively is the commander's intent communicated in your organization? How is this intent integrated into your plans? How do you communicate your intent to subordinates? How do you check to confirm that these subordinates received your intent, understand it, and plan to execute it?

* - Discipline.

p. 43. "If soldiers are to give the unit that necessary part of themselves that will provide such cohesion, they must feel that they will gain, in return, something very important to them, such as comradeship, trust, security, and a certain pride of accomplishment."

- And the source of all these important gains is the discipline existent within the organization. Some of it goes back to the old adage that "sometimes the best thing you can do for a good soldier is get rid of a bad soldier." Of course, the qualifier here is that all other courses of rehabilitation for the bad soldier have been exhausted. But at the bottom line is the very real fact that good soldiers will cease to be good soldiers if they are not recognized for their work or if bad soldiers get away with being bad soldiers. Lowering standards to meet the performance of the lowest denominator of the bad soldier is a sure formula for failure. It takes courage to discipline, but the benefits of exercising this courage surely do outweigh the costs of inaction. Would your senior support an action on your part to eliminate a bad soldier? What would you have to do to convince your senior that it is time to take such a step? What measures must you accomplish before elimination of such a soldier could be accomplished?

p. 84. "...the best guarantee of the warrior spirit, of courage in combat, is the discipline imposed on soldiers' minds by a tight military organization, where orders are given and obeyed in a crisp fashion and the habit of carrying out tasks and functions is ingrained through constant practice."

- This harks back to General Patton's caution that "If you cannot get a soldier to salute or wear his uniform properly, how can you get him to die in combat?" And it reaffirms the importance of the warning to leaders in the old adage that "If you walk by a deficiency, you've automatically set a new standard, a lower one." Establishing solid discipline first entails setting and communicating standards and then exercising the courage to constantly

enforce them. How do you communicate standards in your unit? How do you know that all soldiers, especially newly assigned soldiers, know and understand these standards? Who enforces the standards?

* - Duty.

p. 119. Listed on this page are eight "varieties of the soldier's duty." All of them are worthy of consideration for inclusion in a leader's philosophy of command. With which do you find exception? Why? Which would be your "top 3"? Why? Which are violated most frequently in your present unit and in your past military experience? How can you as leader prevent yourself from being placed in a position to violate any of these?

* - Education (military).

pp. 2-3. "The focus of lieutenant learning is properly on what an officer does. But, more needs to be said about what an officer is and should be. Very few junior officers have any clear sense of themselves as military men with responsibilities and opportunities that are unique in American life. They seem to plod along day to day, working hard and developing the essential skills of their profession. But many - if not most - miss a critical step: that of developing a sense of how their growing confidence and competence relate to the essence of what a soldier is meant to be. I don't believe it's naive or unrealistic to expect junior officers to read. It wouldn't take all that much time or effort, and doing so would help them gain a much richer and fuller image of themselves as soldiers. What they need is a template, a guide, a vision of what being a soldier today is all about, and what it may come to be in the future."

- This quotation from General Dawkins encapsulates the importance of professional military reading programs in units; and it highlights the principal aim of this guide, to make these reading efforts more productive. Who in your unit is in charge of the professional development program? How would you improve it?

* - Fitness.

p. 84. "We also know that soldiers in good physical condition can more easily fight off the fatigue that breeds fear and defeatism."

- Physical fitness is often emphasized for the value it provides in withstanding the physical trials of the

battlefield, but here is mentioned its value in combatting the psychological hazards of the conflict. How do you develop mental and psychological toughness in your subordinates?

* - Goals.

pp. 29-30. Listed here are five criteria for success in command. That they resemble what are often stated as goals for an organization is no coincidence. The reader will recognize that in unit objective statements and on officer efficiency report forms often appear statements similar to these five criteria. Are there better criteria to judge success? If so, what are they? Which of these five criteria is the most important for you to accomplish in the eyes of your senior? Should it be the most important? If not, which one should be and why?

* - Leaders (Intelligence).

p. 9. "(General Patton observed) that a man's military life is lived for about three minutes, parcelled out in bits and pieces of decision making that he alone can make correctly, because of his unique experience and learning."

- This assessment should cause the reader to consider how well he/she is being prepared or is preparing himself/herself to meet these critical "three minutes." Will you have ingested enough of the experiences and thoughts of others to make insightful decisions when the time comes? Will you be able to take advantage of the lessons learned by others and not make mistakes which have already been made by others in like circumstances? Are you prepared to do the next jobs you will be assigned in the future?

* - Leaders (stature).

pp. 9-10. "...Wellington would open his officers' calls with the statement that he expected them to be gentlemen and officers, 'and in that order.' He would then point out that gentlemen do not accept bribes from Indian princes, nor do they falsify reports, nor indulge in whatever practices he felt obliged to condemn on that particular day."

pp. 22-23. "Overall, (then Lieutenant Colonel) Wes Clark measured battalion commanders on their ability to achieve high standards of wartime readiness, while sustaining moral standards in their daily acts and statements."

- We are all, it is said, officers and gentlemen, by definition. These excerpts cut to the heart of that sentiment. Among an officer's first obligations is to act in all his/her dealings in a completely honorable way, to never say or do anything which could not be willingly made public. How do you stand on this evaluation criteria? What obligation do you have to your calling as an officer to police the ranks of those who are "less than honorable," to report the dishonest acts of officers?

p. 102. "...the military problem is one of coaxing people of good character to act in accordance with their beliefs when operating in situations of great pressure and very little moral support."

p. 108. "The commander also demonstrates his feelings toward honesty by taking actions that are visible to his people. It is not enough for a commander to be quietly honest. His beliefs must be overt, so that others can follow his example."

- The commander of a unit or leader of an organization has tremendous, perhaps the ultimate, influence on the moral climate of the unit or organization. Simply living and performing duties in view of the soldiers in compliance with the ideals espoused in the philosophy of command and promptly and justly dealing with noncompliance by others will set the high moral tone to which we all aspire. Deviation from the straight and narrow, however, sets the opposite example and duplicity, dishonesty, and moral collapse are sure to follow. This chapter presents some excellent case studies with moral implications for leaders. Choose a couple for discussion. Or discuss examples where you have witnessed the effect a commander's high or low moral standing had on the unit. How have you communicated your standards to your subordinates? For what does your senior stand and what will he/she not permit?

p. 106. "...a deceptive act may bring some good to the unit and troops, but the perpetrator fails to calculate the long-range impact on the trust of the troops, who are quick to observe, 'If he lies to them, when will he start lying to me?'"

- This excerpt presents the question which subordinates are bound to ask should they observe a senior commit a dishonest act. And under no circumstances can any leader place even a seed of doubt in the mind of subordinates about his/her moral standing. A leader cannot expect subordinates to maintain high standards if they are presented an example to the contrary. A subordinate's

trust in seniors must be inviolate. There can be no such thing as situational ethics, that is, it is okay to lie, cheat, or steal sometimes with some people. Do your subordinates trust you? Do you trust your senior? If that trust is violated, how can it be recovered? How do you check to see if your subordinates are truthful with you? When are "midnight requisitions" from a neighboring unit's motor pool permissible?

* - Philosophy of Command.

pp. 39-40. "By the late seventies, the company commander was involved in such directives as where, when, and how to train, maintain, supply, pay, feed, and lead his force according to the general's wishes. His job was to lead the troops in prescribed directions, with standards and conditions established by superiors rather than him. The power to command was retained at battalion and above, for it was in those realms that creative decision making was located, along with the power to establish the moral climate that would prevail."

- This excerpt reflects a restrictive philosophy of command imposed on company commanders. Is it your opinion that such impositions still exist on company commanders? Should such an environment exist (perhaps because not all company commanders could handle the freedom the alternative implies)? Or should more freedom to command be granted company commanders? A like question could be asked for any echelon in any organization. How much freedom to command do you enjoy? How should the level of freedom be altered? How should a leader decide how much freedom to grant subordinate leaders?

p. 130. "Command is so unique a blend of personality and task that no two commanders should mirror each other. To the extent that they share common qualities, it is in their common search for courage, truth, duty, and justice."

- And this excerpt eloquently illustrates why it is important for a commander's philosophy to be written not only to expressly define where he/she stands on critical issues, but also to define why this stand makes this commander command in a way that only he/she can and will.

* - Tactics.

p. 72. "All these reading objectives remain secondary to that of achieving the special vision that marks the master tacticians, that 'acute sense of the possible' which strikes them when they seek to make a decision. Napoleon

referred to this as 'coup d'oeil,' that glance of the eye across a piece of terrain - that glance that brings into focus all the tactician's knowledge and experience, and sets in motion a series of quick decisions concerning how and where to deploy forces."

- This excerpt perfectly describes John Buford's actions on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg when he seized and held the high ground along Seminary Ridge long enough for the Union forces to occupy decisive Cemetery Ridge on the opposite side of the valley above Gettysburg and seal the fate of the offensive-minded Confederate forces (see Shaara and McPherson). How are you preparing yourself to possess this talent?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

2 - Education (military).	9 - Leaders (Intelligence).
9,22 - Leaders (stature).	29 - Goals.
39 - Philosophy of Command.	43 - Discipline.
72 - Tactics.	73 - Communication (of mission).
84 - Discipline.	84 - Fitness.
102,106,108 - Leaders (stature).	119 - Duty.
130 - Philosophy of Command.	

CLAUSEWITZ. Howard, Michael. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Karl von Clausewitz' On War is the unexcelled study of the military art of war. It was written in the early 19th century as instruction for fellow professional Prussian officers on how best to wage the next inevitable war, probably against France. It is the principal source of much of our fighting doctrine and should be studied at some point in time by all officers. But the book by Michael Howard on Clausewitz is a better place to start that study. Howard places Clausewitz into context, developing his biographical sketch, explaining some of his most basic and widely held thoughts, and preparing the reader to tackle On War. How do these tenets of Clausewitz apply to us today?

* - Center of Gravity.

p. 39. "...one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of those characteristics a certain (center) of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should be directed...If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be struck in the same direction; the victor, in other words, must strike with all his strength, and not just against a fraction of the enemy's. Not by taking things the easy way - using superior strength to filch some province, preferring the security of the minor conquest to a major success - but by constantly seeking out his (center) of power, by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy."

- Clausewitz writes here of centers of gravity as being an enemy's leadership, his army, his capital, and/or his allies. What turned out to be the center of gravity for the U.S. in the Vietnam war? Does the center of gravity principle exist only at the levels of operational art or strategy? Does not a squad with the objective of taking out a bunker consider the enemy's center of gravity? In making your operational plans, are there any more important considerations than the enemy's center of gravity?

* - Citizen Soldiers.

p. 7. "The success of the French armies...was closely connected with the transformation of the society that lay behind them, with the emergence of the idea of a French Nation."

- The armies of Napoleon were closer to citizen armies than the largely mercenary or impressed forces used by the other European powers of the 18th and 19th centuries. Those French soldiers who were volunteers were actually fighting for an idea and a principle, a factor which wove into the fabric of the French army indomitable strength. Is ours an army of soldiers of such strong belief in the principles of our nation? How well does our recruiting strategy ensure that soldiers of such high ideals and principles enlist? How can a draft system ensure that such soldiers are drafted? Or do we even need to care about the principles of our soldiers so long as they are smart, fit, and can do their jobs?

* - Culminating Point.

p. 55. "... (the) assailant, whose supply problems grew greater, his forces weaker and the environment more hostile the further he advanced. Eventually the balance of advantage would tip, when the attacker had touched his lowest point of weakness and the defender had amassed his optimum strength. This moment Clausewitz described as the 'culminating point' when the flashing sword of vengeance should be drawn and the counterattack unleashed. The skill of the strategist lay in discerning when the right moment had come."

- How can a leader determine when the foe has reached his culminating point? What tactics can you use at your level to accelerate the arrival of this decisive point? Or does this concept even exist at your level?

* - Education (military).

p. 30. "One could only learn how to conduct war...by learning, and learning from, what had already been done; by studying war not in the abstract but in the reality."

- The premise behind most professional reading programs and, in turn, the importance of this guide rest on this belief. The best way to learn about war is to experience it. In the absence of that opportunity, reading of fiction drawn from military experiences and study of military history and the biographies of military leaders are critical to understanding the profession of arms and the conduct of war. How do you relate this to your subordinates? Is it important for officers and NCO's to combine their efforts and learn together, sharing perspectives? How would you structure such study in your unit?

* - Friction.

pp. 25-26. "If war was the realm of uncertainty and chance, even more was it the realm of suffering, confusion, exhaustion and fear. All these factors combined to create the element that Clausewitz termed 'friction'; the environment in which all military action took place...It was this friction...that 'distinguishes real war from war on paper', and an understanding of its importance had to be the starting point for any theorist."

- Veterans of battles and firefights recount in assorted fashion the chaos and confusion of the experience, stating the effect in different terms, but all describing the friction of war. Realistic training exercises create this phenomenon as well. Recount the most significant experience you have had with the negative effects of friction. How did you deal with it to accomplish your mission? How can a leader prepare to overcome friction? How can a leader impose the negative effects of friction on the enemy?

* - Insurgency.

p. 57. "... (guerrilla warfare) could be realistically considered only 'within the framework of a war conducted by the regular army, and coordinated in one all-encompassing plan.'"

- How did the unconventional tactics of the Viet Cong fit into the overall plan of North Vietnam in the Vietnam war? Was their employment consistent with this statement? Are there cases in history where unconventional tactics alone succeeded, or do conflicts which begin as guerrilla wars always culminate in conventional battles, as suggested by Mao?

* - Maneuver.

p. 16. "Military maneuver (is) pointless unless it (is) designed to culminate in battle; and battle (is) pointless unless it (is) designed to serve the ultimate purpose of the war."

- Does this mean all military maneuver? What about that maneuver associated with deception operations or that maneuver required to demonstrate a show of force, as in the early stages of Operation Desert Shield?

* - Mass.

p. 40. "...the best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point."

p. 41. "...the forces available must be deployed with such skill that even in the absence of an absolute superiority, a relative superiority is attained at the decisive point."

- It is important to realize that a leader's presence and exertion of his/her moral will at the decisive point is also critical to success. How can a leader determine where this decisive point will be so he/she does not miss that critical time and place? (related topic in other pieces under Leaders [courage])

* - Moral Forces.

p. 26. "...war is a trial of moral and physical forces by means of the latter."

- Among these moral forces are the military virtues and spirit of the army and the intuition and determination of the army's leaders. It is argued that moral factors are the ultimate determinants of war and that the synchronized chemistry of these factors is critical for success. Do you agree? Can a superior leader overcome the disadvantages of a spiritless army? Can a spirited army win despite a leader of little moral strength? How do you nurture a unit to create the spirit described here? Can a leader train to become determined or intuitive, or are these precious natural attributes?

* - Resignation.

p. 9. "...in the spring of 1812 the King whose uniform (Clausewitz) wore and whose claims on his loyalty he had never questioned concluded an alliance with the French enemy Clausewitz so detested. It was too much. In company with some thirty other officers Clausewitz resigned his commission..."

- Resignation has long been held as the ultimate form of protest by a professional military officer, the ultimate moral statement. Recent cases of such resignations include those by officers during the Vietnam war in protest over the strategy and conduct of the war. It is important to note that it is resignation, not retirement, which offers the most dramatic moral effect. When is an officer justified in resigning? Give an example of a justifiable case in today's context. Can an officer disobey a direct order and still stay in the service in good conscience?

Does it serve a better purpose to resign or to stay in and try to make the situation better, more closely akin to the perceived "right way to do things"?

* - Strategy.

p. 54. "...although (the defense's) object (is) negative, it (is) a stronger form of war than the attack...a defense (is)...an active shield, one 'made up of well-directed blows.'

- Clausewitz hereby argues his belief in the defense being the stronger form of war. It is a defense characterized by what we know today as spoiling attacks, counterreconnaissance and deception operations, and the use of all other combat multipliers available. But the bottom line in most cases remains that destruction of the enemy's force precedes victory. Do you agree? Does your unit "prefer" defense to the attack, or vice versa? In which are you the most comfortable or competent?

* - Training.

pp. 31-32. "...the further one descended the hierarchy of command, the more limited the range of factors became and the less scope there was for the intrusion of the contingent, the unpredictable; until at the level of minor tactics it really did become possible to prescribe specific routines to deal with specific situations, to produce manuals and drills which, if scrupulously followed by obedient and unimaginative subordinates, had a very high probability of success."

- Teams and squads and platoons practice drills continually to prepare them for execution of the most likely courses of action in various situations. Are these drills similar to Clausewitz' thinking here? Do these drills destroy or suppress the initiative of junior leaders (as we often claim happens under similar circumstances to Soviet leaders)? Or, if they do, is the reliability of predicted action in a time of crisis so comforting to a senior leader as to outweigh the loss of initiative at the lowest echelons (as the Soviets argue is a strength of their system)?

* - War.

p. 34. "...war (is) nothing but the continuation of policy with other means'..."

p. 36. "Tactics was concerned with engagements, their planning and execution; strategy was the coordination of these engagements to attain the object of the war."

p. 37. "The most splendid of victories was thus nothing in itself unless it was also the means to the attainment of a political end; whether that end was the total destruction of the enemy state or the laying down of whatever peace terms policy might require."

p. 49. "The object in war is to impose your will on the enemy..."

- These excerpts describe Clausewitz' view of the battlefield, from tactics through operational art to strategy and the ultimate political aim of the war. A warrior may not have to be a politician, but a warrior should understand that the war is aimed at a political goal of the nation. And it is imperative that both the statesman and the soldier understand that the war should be waged to achieve a popularly supported set of national objectives which can be achieved by no other economic or diplomatic means. How does this political relationship affect you in the execution of your wartime tasks? How about in the areas of rules of engagement, host nation support, or civil-military operations? How do these factors and your dealings in these areas affect the political nature of the conflict? How does the nature of the conflict (low, medium, or high intensity) affect the nature of the concern about these factors?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

7 - Citizen Soldiers.	9 - Resignation.
16 - Maneuver.	25 - Friction.
26 - Moral Forces.	30 - Education (military).
31 - Training.	34,36,37 - War.
39 - Center of Gravity.	40,41 - Mass.
49 - War.	54 - Strategy.
55 - Culminating Point.	57 - Insurgency.

DARKNESS AT NOON. Koestler, Arthur. New York, New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1966 (first printed by The Macmillan Company, 1941).

Our future wars will place soldiers in conflict with totalitarian regimes, regimes reknown for psychological and physical torture of prisoners. The soldiers taken prisoner in those conflicts with those regimes must understand the trial which they will face in captivity. Darkness at Noon portrays the experiences of one prisoner under the thumb of totalitarian captors. It depicts not only the aspects of interrogations, but also discusses the characteristics of a totalitarian regime and why perhaps prisoners are treated the way they are. Given the recent experiences of our prisoners in Iraq, in Vietnam, and in Korea after the USS Pueblo affair, the reader would do well to read this book carefully, heed its counsel, and pay special attention during unit survival, escape, resistance, and evasion training and code of conduct discussions.

Note: Assistance in the formulation of this piece was provided by Captain Wendell R. (Ray) Alcorn, United States Navy, who, after being shot down over North Vietnam in an A-4 aircraft, spent seven years as a prisoner of war.

Considerations: There are five important themes outlined below to which the reader should be attentive in the study of this book. These themes are related to the prisoner of war situation; they are common to almost any political prisoner experience; and they could serve as important departure points for discussion of the prisoner condition to which all military personnel are vulnerable in a time of hostility. This piece cites no particular excerpts from the book as discussion points, but instead emphasizes that the reader's appreciation of the general incidents in the book in relation to the major themes identified below should stimulate the professional learning experience and discussion desired. And, as is the case with all pieces in this guide, the comments here are not to be considered sacred; disagreement with any is encouraged as a catalyst for discussion.

- Personal code and standards. God, country, family, and fellows are most often mentioned as the sources of strength for prisoners. Some argue that institutions (God, country) provide the most consistent, stable foundation because of the assurance that they will also serve as anchors during the rehabilitation period after release; psychological trauma has been experienced by those prisoners whose "hope" and "foundation" during captivity was not there for them upon release (for example, those whose wife was

their primary foundation and she was "gone"). Regardless of the choice of which entity will be the source of strength, that choice should be designed to help the prisoner maintain a positive outlook, a sense of humor, and a firm belief that it is a worthwhile endeavor to prevail over all hardships in the prison experience.

+ God. The adage that "there are no atheists in the foxhole" could be extended to "there are no atheists in a POW camp, either." The oldest and most reliable source of strength, religious faith is most often credited as being a factor responsible for the survival of prisoners.

+ Country. The Uniformed Services Code of Conduct, revised after the return of the Vietnam POW's, serves as a reliable and widely recognized guide to honorable service as a prisoner of war.

+ Family. As mentioned earlier, choice of family as the mental anchor is characterized by the risk that death of or desertion by loved ones may severely complicate the rehabilitation process; but significant success is still recorded in the family's value as a survival cornerstone.

+ Fellows. Faith in fellow POW's is certainly a requirement while in captivity. This faith should endure so long as actions by particular POW's contrary to the welfare of the prisoner population do not cause reason to withdraw it.

- Personal habits.

+ Mental exercise. The most critical of the personal habits, mental exercise helps fight off the "prisoner syndrome" of self-pity and drive off the harsh reality of the prison environment.

+ Physical exercise. Caloric intake determines the level of physical exertion possible, but a regular exercise regimen of some level is required to maintain the physical strength and health required to maintain a healthy body and endure interrogation sessions. Exercise also contributes to sounder and more effective sleep, a conditioner of the body and another real means by which to escape the prison reality.

+ Sanitation. In the most primitive situations where sanitary conditions and the quality of medical attention are poor and the individual's immunity is low, even the slightest scratch can induce a fatal infection;

consequently, the prisoners must exercise great care to protect themselves.

- Relationship with Interrogators.

+ Attitude. Because the interrogator is the most direct adversary, the best attitude when in contact with him/her is one of strict businesslike formality. Establishing rapport should not be attempted, and the prisoner should attempt to recognize and thwart the interrogation approaches the interrogator adopts.

+ Cover.

* Since prisoners captured in groups of more than one are vulnerable to having interrogators "play one off the other," it should be policy in units entering hostilities (especially special operations forces and aviators operating deep behind enemy lines and thereby more vulnerable to capture) to establish benign cover stories for the unit as a part of operations orders; the stories will enable prisoners to consistently thwart interrogators' attempts to gain timely information immediately after capture.

* Cover stories should also be used to protect prisoner "operations" (such as the collection of materials to construct special purpose items, such as a radio).

- Relationship with guards. As opposed to the formal attitude recommended with interrogators, rapport should be established with the guards. These guards may be "less than elite" soldiers and vulnerable to offers or favors.

- Communication. This is the key to the organization of the prisoner population and to the chain of command for leadership of the prisoners. It is most difficult with isolated individuals, but is even more critical in their case to help ensure their sanity and survival.

+ Benefits. Once identified, the senior prisoner uses the communication network to:

* Establish standards.

* Plan courses of action.

* Offer encouragement to maintain good morale.

* Mentally prepare prisoners for interrogation, especially by communicating enemy interrogation strategies.

* Establish cover stories.

* Maintain contact with all prisoners to aid eventual friendly debrief of the prison population (in case not all known prisoners are released).

* Tap code. First mentioned on page 19, this system is the most common form of internal prison communication. It is designed as indicated below:

	1	2	3	4	5	
1	A	B	C	D	E	
2	F	G	H	I	J	(K)
3	L	M	N	O	P	
4	Q	R	S	T	U	
5	V	W	X	Y	Z	

Reading down and then to the right, two taps followed by three taps is the letter "H." In this structure, the "optional letter" is "K." In Darkness at Noon, the "optional letter" is "Q."

THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER'S DRIFT. Swinton, E.D. Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1986.

The Defence of Duffer's Drift is a classic study in small unit leadership and application of tactics. Set in the Boer War at the turn of the century, the story tells of Lieutenant Backsight Forethought ("BF") facing a problem familiar to us all: accomplish the mission with limited resources. Through a series of dreams, BF endures failure after failure, but magically accrues knowledge and experience. It is that knowledge and experience, applied wisely, which earns eventual success. It is a simple tale, but one of tremendous worth to soldiers of all ages. 22 lessons are highlighted; most are related to unit tactics. Addressed herein will be lessons and discussion points separate from these.

* - Deception.

pp. 12-13. The interchange between BF and the Boer farm family is a clear example that deception plans do not have to be complex and far-reaching to work. They only have to appeal to the preferences of the intended audience. It is true that BF's gullibility is profound, but, without prudent caution, we can find ourselves in similarly comforting, yet hazardous predicaments.

* - Duty.

p. 58. "True, we were not captured, and had very few losses, and had severely mauled the enemy, but they had crossed the drift...I had failed in my duty."

- This is the classic case of winning the battle, but losing the war. Leaders must become talented in achieving results and not be diverted by excursions in the process. The hours spent painting the vehicles matter little when the alert is sounded and they do not start. The hours spent engaging stationary targets mean little when all the enemy vehicles firing at you are moving. How well does your unit prioritize meaningful tasks and duties? Is the Mission Essential Task List used to prioritize unit efforts and duties or is it completed just because higher headquarters requires it?

* - Education (military).

p. 10. "Now, if they had given me a job like fighting the battle of Waterloo, or Sedan, or Bull Run, I knew all about that, as I had crammed it up and been examined in it too. I also knew how to take up a position for a division,

or even an army corps, but the stupid little subaltern's game of the defence of a drift with a small detachment was, curiously enough, most perplexing."

- Here is a case of an officer ill-trained to handle what would appear to be a most logical task for an officer of his grade and position. But he felt better prepared to accomplish the tasks of officers in grades much higher than his. He had memorized classic battles, not learned "how to think" in a new situation - how to prioritize the important problems assaulting him in the field and then solve them. Were you prepared to handle the duties and tasks assigned to you at your first duty station? If not, what did you do about it? If the military school system has some weaknesses, it is our obligation "in the field" to critique their effort and help make it better.

p. 12. "The north, then, being my front, the east and west were my flanks, where there might possibly be enemies, and the south was my rear, where naturally there were none."

- The officer here was so indoctrinated on linear warfare that he saw no other interpretation of the situation as applicable. How successful were our conventional tactics in Vietnam? What tactics will be used on our next battlefield?

* - Feedback.

p. 45. "This 'ere trench should have been wiggled about a bit..."

- A wise leader listens to the ideas of subordinates. No leader holds a monopoly on good ideas or the right solutions. The best plan or idea may exist in the mind of a subordinate. What means do you employ to ensure honest feedback from subordinates? How are your subordinates encouraged to submit ideas to improve the unit? How well do your NCO's contribute ideas and solutions?

* - Mission (versus CYA).

p. 29. "No one could tell whether some 'brass hat' might not come round and inspect us next day, so it was as well to be prepared for anything."

- Is it more important to dig the trench in a straight line to satisfy the "book" or meet your perception of a senior officer's whim or to dig it to fit the terrain to properly protect the soldiers? It is well to aim to

satisfy senior officers, but it is a higher good to satisfy the requirements of the situation as your judgment sees it.

* - Prisoners.

pp. 28-29. "Detainees" are used here to dig the trenches for BF's men. Would today's laws of land warfare permit the use of prisoners and/or detainees in the construction of military emplacements? Rules of engagement apply equally to military personnel and civilians.

Numerical order of pages with topics:

10 - Education (military).	12 - Deception.
12 - Education (military).	28 - Prisoners.
29 - Mission (versus CYA).	45 - Feedback.
58 - Duty.	

EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY (1789-1815); France Against Europe. Ross, Steven T. Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, Inc., 1969.

Dr. Ross describes the attempt by France, or more properly, Napoleon, to establish continental hegemony in Europe in the early nineteenth century. In that the French effort was consistent with earlier efforts by most every major European nation, this reading is valuable because it places the European crucible into focus. It is in this crucible that the United States is tested in the next century in two world wars. In that the British are seen to use seapower to help thwart French aims, this reading is valuable because it imparts the vision held by Britain that she must maintain mastery of the seas to survive, first, and, second, impose her will on others; the United States will later benefit from Britain's seapower in crushing another European zealot. In that Napoleon's fallure in Russia is seen to result as much from geographical immensity as from the Russian will, this reading is valuable because those same factors will help Russia, an ally of the United States, battle Germany in World War II. In that a lasting peace could not be achieved by selfish European powers more concerned with their private aims than the welfare of the continent, this reading is valuable because these same factors will doom Europe to a mere truce, rather than a lasting peace, after World War I. And in that Napoleon's tactics are depicted as one major reason for his success, this reading is valuable because it gives the reader insight into why these tactics predominated nineteenth century warfare and were a dominant factor in forming the character of American Civil War battlefields. So read this book with eyes wide open - these are just a few examples of what can be gleaned from its pages.

(NOTE: Books in this guide which also cover the events of this period include Rifleman Dodd [Forester], The Face of Battle [Keegan], and The Mask of Command [Keegan].)

* - What were the characteristics of pre-Napoleonic French forces (and most other European forces, for that matter)?
Address these items:

- Length of service for soldiers.
- Officers (source of commission, character, aspirations).
- Enlisted soldiers (source of enlistment, character, aspirations).

- Discipline (how imposed, morale, desertion rate).
- Tactics (formations, nature of battlefield, casualty rates).
- Size of the army and availability of reserves.
- Weapons characteristics (volume of fire, effective ranges, wounding/killing effects).

* - How did the Committee of Public Safety's "Levee en Masse" of August, 1793, ultimately affect the French government and its military? Address these items:

- Manpower mobilization (service by men, women, children, and the elderly).
- Economic mobilization (economic control, war production).
- Officer corps (character of the generals and lower grade officers).
- Military tactics and organization (assault columns, light infantry, artillery integration, battalion-sized units, morale).

* - Assess the strategic alternatives available to France in 1798 in her attempts to weaken Britain.

- Address these options and why they were not chosen:
 - + Attacks against British interests in the Americas.
 - + Attacks in support of Irish revolutionaries.
- Why was the Indian option chosen and what impact did Nelson's victory at the Battle of Aboukir have on its execution?
- What was the aftermath of this aborted French strategy, in regards to the following items?
 - + French prestige and influence in Europe and elsewhere.
 - + Status of British rule in India.
 - + Impact of Napoleon in the Middle East.

* - How did Napoleon secure his hold on the French nation after seizing control in 1799? Address these topics:

- Fortuitous timing in relation to French battlefield fortunes.

- Diplomacy (relations with enemies; overtures of peace).

- Politics (disposition of rivals).

- Military (nature of campaigns undertaken).

* - What were the fundamental elements behind the French successes of 1793-1801? Address these items:

- "Total war" concept (entire population motivated in support; economy welded to war).

- Napoleon's singleminded leadership after 1799.

- Democratic nature of the army and its revolutionary zeal.

- Imaginative logistics.

- Aggressive operational doctrine (frequent attacks; flexibility; exploitation of decisive victories).

- Lack of unity of purpose among her enemies.

- Young, tactically proficient generals and their use of tactical organizations.

- Exploitation of the revolutionary spirit in the lands opposed to them.

* - What drove Napoleon to adopt economic warfare against England in 1803 and what were the characteristics and strategy of the Continental System?

- Consider alternatives to economic warfare such as:

- + Invasion of England.

- + Naval warfare against England.

- + Negotiations with England.

- + Attack on or seizure of English colonies.

- + Advantages provided Russia by the respite in combat.

- + Effects of deteriorating situation in Spain on French morale in Paris.

- + Relative need for Napoleon to secure victory.

- Continue on to attack St. Petersburg. Consider:

- + Would Russian nobility and Alexander also have left there as they had Moscow?

- + Would Napoleon have made it that far?

- * - Assess the common argument that Napoleon lacked a sense of limits ("I would not want to be God because that would be a dead end.") and, because of that defect, defeated himself. Consider:

- The results of the Italian campaign:

- + France saddled with Italy.

- + Failed to gain the Rhineland.

- + Gained little more than a truce because of Austria's thirst for revenge.

- The failure to capitulate to the allies after the Battle of Leipzig (Battle of Nations).

- The drive on Moscow without a real plan.

- Unacceptance of the inevitable in 1813 (refusal of Metternich's settlement) and 1815 (Waterloo).

- Underestimation of enemies (British, Spanish, Russians).

- Victim of his own legend (belief of invincibility).

- Failure to recognize that enemies were changing tactics on the battlefield in reaction to his revolutionary tactics.

- Failure to recognize the need to recruit allies.

- Failure to "bring up" generals and statesmen capable of helping him and eventually replacing him.

- Assess these aspects of the Continental System:

- + Participating members.

- + Goals and objectives.

- + Measures (confiscation, trade restrictions).

- + Overall effect on both England and the participants.

* - What were the reasons for Napoleon's failure in Russia in 1812? Consider these items:

- Nature and sufficiency of assistance provided to the U.S. in its War of 1812 with Britain (could more aid to the United States have diverted English attention from Spain and eliminated the two-front war?).

- The impact of a two-front war in Spain and Russia (the best French troops remained deployed in Spain).

- Motivation and quality of and control over foreign troops in Napoleon's army.

- Size of the army (the impact of Napoleon's training [or lack of training] of his subordinate generals).

- The use of political warfare in Russia to win support of a populace largely discontent with its lot.

- Napoleon's assessment of the fighting quality of the Russian army and the will of Alexander.

- Napoleon's assessment of the impact of great distances on the French logistics system.

- Contingency plans in case of failure (especially important with the failure in the objective to defeat the Russian army along the border).

- Definition of the political objectives of the campaign.

* - Assess the two most commonly argued alternatives to retreat from Russia that Napoleon might have adopted in 1812.

- Winter in Smolensk. Consider:

* - What contributed to the success of the Fifth (and final) Coalition? Consider these items:

- Number of powers present in relation to the number of countries who chose neutrality.
- Defined, non-conflicting objectives.
- Unity of members.
- Resilience of members to initial setbacks at the hands of the French.

* - What were the significant elements of Britain's success between 1793 and 1815? Consider these topics:

- Industrialization and foreign trade (especially in regards to the effects of the continental system).
- Insular geographic location.
- Wellington's campaign in Spain.
- Political and social flexibility.
- Example of resilience to the rest of Europe (consistent member of the anti-French coalitions).
- Sophisticated financial system.
- British navy (seamanship, gunnery, professionalism and zest of commanders, logistics support, use of convoys to protect shipping).

* - What impact did the role of seapower, specifically Britain's dominance, have in Napoleon's defeat? Consider these items:

- Destruction of the French overseas empire.
- Isolation of France from overseas trade.
- Forcing France into the doomed Continental System.
- Destruction of the French fleet.
- Allowance of British strategic mobility.

THE FACE OF BATTLE. Keegan, John. London, England: Penguin Books, 1978 (first published in the United States by The Viking Press, New York, 1976).

As John Keegan puts it, this insightful work is an "attempt to catch a glimpse of the face of battle...to demonstrate, as exactly as possible, what warfare...was (and is) like, and to suggest how and why the men who have had (and do have) to face weapons control their fears, staunch their wounds, go to their deaths" (p. 77). He chooses as his laboratory for this study battlefields of a similar geographic zone (Agincourt, 1415; Waterloo, 1815; The Somme, 1916 - all in northwestern Europe) and as subjects combatants of similar ethnic backgrounds (white Europeans) and value systems (Western Christianity). The book opens with pertinent and interesting discussions of the value of military history to any officer corps, of what makes good (and bad) history writing, and of how the writing of military history has evolved. It concludes with a thought-provoking discussion of the future of battle. In between are masterfully created the deafening sounds and confusion of man and beast in life and death struggle; the relentless pace of battle and its effect on soldier and leader; the awesome collision of the chemistry of weapons, the geometry of formations, and the geography of the battlefield; and the juxtaposition of the omnipresent moral forces and physical circumstances which combine to determine the outcome of any and every battle. This book is an unsurpassed primer for any warrior.

Considerations: Beyond the specific excerpts and discussion points highlighted in this piece, there are common threads woven through this book to which the reader should pay particular attention. These themes, outlined below, are common to each battle and will probably be common to any future battlefield. Because of this universality, readers will find them of importance and value for discussion.

- + The evolution of battle (the personal relationship between opposing combatants; the size of the battlefield; the length of the battle; the physical danger to the individual soldier at any one place on the battlefield; the individual skills of combatants; the function and duties of officers; the relative cruelty of weapons).

- + The means of communication on the battlefield and the exercise of the personal factor of command by leaders (the commander's ability to see through the fog of war on the battlefield and affect the battle's outcome).

- + The impact of comradeship and loyalty to the cause, to leaders, and to fellow soldiers.

- + The physical, mental, and spiritual condition of the soldiers (the positive effect of rest, nourishment, comfort, and spiritual foundation and the negative effect of exhaustion, hunger, cold, heat, panic, alcohol, and moral turpitude).

- + The effects of fire (artillery and small arms, especially machineguns).

- + The nature of battle between types of combatants.

- + The effects of technology (i.e., the machine gun and barbed wire at The Somme).

- + The fate of the wounded.

* - Comradeship.

p. 51. "...ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves, in life-and-death situations, as subordinate members of whatever formal military organization it is to which authority has assigned them, but as equals within a very tiny group - perhaps no more than six or seven men....It will not be because of...leadership that the group members will begin to fight and continue to fight. It will be, on the one hand, for personal survival, which individuals will recognize to be bound up with group survival, and, on the other, for fear of incurring by cowardly conduct the group's contempt."

pp. 71-72. "'When a soldier is...known to the men who are around him, he...has reason to fear losing the one thing he is likely to value more highly than life - his reputation as a man among other men.'"

p. 186. "But even when a square was under fire, and men falling fast, those untouched seem to have drawn strength to stand from the proximity of their comrades..."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost

every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Death.

p. 330. "Might the modern conscript not well think, at first acquaintance with the weapons the state foists on him, that its humanitarian code is evidence either of a nauseating hypocrisy or of a psychotic inability to connect actions with their results?"

- This question reveals a dilemma probably more prevalent than is commonly anticipated. How did you react on that first day of training when witnessing the effects of the M16 round bursting the water cannister or the claymore mine or "beehive" round obliterating sand bags? If some uneasiness arose, then is it possible that some of your subordinates have had or do have some difficulty accepting that "reality of combat on the modern battlefield"? Is it a topic you need to prepare yourself to address with a troubled soldier? Or is it a topic no "real soldier" is concerned with because a "real soldier" casts all psychological reflection aside and routinely goes about the business of "neutralizing the opposition"?

* - Discipline.

p. 175. "Inside every army is a crowd struggling to get out, and the strongest fear with which every commander lives - stronger than his fear of defeat or even of mutiny - is that of his army reverting to a crowd through some error of his making. For a crowd is the antithesis of an army, a human assembly animated not by discipline but by mood, by the play of inconstant and potentially infectious emotion which, if it spreads, is fatal to an army's subordination."

- Some argue that this excerpt reflects the ultimate challenge of leadership: by force of will, personal example, and hard, realistic training to instill discipline in soldiers of a unit so that they will respond to orders and accomplish the assigned mission in the cruelest battlefield conditions. What other challenge to leadership is so paramount as the inculcation of discipline? How would you rate the discipline of your unit? Ready, willing, and fit to fight?

p. 70. "...soldiers die in largest numbers when they run, because it is when they turn their backs to the enemy that they are least able to defend themselves. It is their rational acceptance of the dangers of running that makes civilized soldiers so formidable, (DuPicq) says, that and the discipline which has them in its bonds. And by discipline he does not mean the operation of an abstract principle but the example and sanctions exercised by the officers of an organized force. Men fight, he says in short, from fear: fear of the consequences first of not fighting (i.e., punishment), then of not fighting well (i.e., slaughter)."

- So from DuPicq is drawn the conclusion that discipline partly overcomes the attraction of flight and drives the fighting spirit of a unit; that it is the leaders of the unit who instill that discipline; and that the failure to instill that discipline invites destruction on the aggressor as well as on the victim (pp. 150-151. "[With the French retreating in disarray before them, the British Scots Greys Brigade]...carried away by success and inexperience, rode right across the valley separating the two armies...Every officer within hearing exerted themselves to the utmost to reform the men; but the helplessness of the [French] offered too great a temptation to the [British] Dragoons, and our efforts were abortive. It was evident that [the French] reserves of Cavalry would soon take advantage of our disorder...[The French counterattacked and] it was in this part of the transaction that almost the whole of the loss of the [Scots Greys] Brigade took place.'). But from S.L.A. Marshall is drawn the conclusion that it is more comradeship and peer pressure that provide the sort of discipline that overcomes fear and provides the fighting spirit (p. 71. "...an army should foster the closest acquaintance among its soldiers... it should seek to create groups of friends, centred if possible on someone identified as a natural fighter, since it is their mutual acquaintanceship which will ensure no one flinches or shirks.'). Which view do you favor? Or does it take both leader-inculcated discipline and also the bonds of comradeship to overcome fear in battle? How does your unit

"stand" in regards to these critical criteria? If there are shortcomings, how would you address them?

p. 282. "...'(The stragglers) are damned if they are going to stay (to fight)...A young sprinting subaltern heads them off. They push by him. He draws his revolver...They take no notice. He fires. Down drops a British soldier at his feet. The effect is instantaneous. They turn back (to the fight)'..."

- Compare this incident with "fragging," the elimination of incompetent leaders in Vietnam by their subordinates (see "fragging" in Webb and West). Under what conditions is such field discipline warranted? Would you shoot a subordinate under these circumstances? If so, do your subordinates know this? Or do they need to know it? Why might this sort of discipline be "justified" while General Patton was "unjustified" for "merely" striking a soldier in World War II?

p. 26. "For modern naval warfare is...one in which the common sailor cannot, as the common soldier can, by running away or sitting tight, easily confound his commander's wishes."

- This interesting observation can be said another way: the ground commander's leadership challenge is more daunting because when an air force bomber pilot dives into action or the naval ship captain orders right full rudder, their crews have no alternative but to follow. This challenge drives the ground forces to develop a lasting discipline among subordinates. Since there are so many other complicating factors in battle, factors which no commander can accurately foresee, it is in the best interest of commanders to ensure that subordinates are disciplined to the conditions of the battlefield and prepared to follow under any circumstances.

* - Duty.

p. 163. "...he and I, and every Englishman on the field must die on the spot we now occupy."

- Our duty as servicemembers is to preserve the peace and, if necessary, fight our nation's wars. In the fulfillment of either obligation, the time may come when we must demonstrate the resolve reflected in this excerpt. It means "diving onto the grenade" and "holding at all costs." Are you really prepared to die for your country and your comrades? Are your subordinates? Have you ever talked about the depth of your conviction to flag and comrades with

peers? With subordinates? If so, what did you learn? If not, why not?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 114. "...the presence on the field of his own...annointed king, visible to all and ostentatiously risking his life in the heart of the melee, must have greatly strengthened (the soldier's) resolve."

p. 133. "... (Wellington) always managed to be present where the fighting was hottest..."

p. 188. "...It was upon the officers' behaviour that the men's (behavior) depended."

- The testimony of these excerpts is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evicent in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

These excerpts show why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (intelligence).

p. 33. "...an element compounded of affection for the soldiers he knows, a perception of the hostilities as well as the loyalties which animate a society founded on comradeship, some appreciation of the limits of leadership and obedience, a glimpse of the far shores of courage, a recognition of the principle of self-preservation ever present in even the best soldier's nature..."

- While this excerpt describes a multi-faceted element Keegan believes every historian must infuse into his writing, does it not also encapsulate many of the inherent traits of the intelligent leader? What does it take in your view for a leader to be "intelligent"? What leaders in your experience have been "intelligent," and why would you so characterize them?

p. 151. "...[The Brigade Commander] lost his life because of a false economy. He had left his best charger, worth far more than the government compensation fund would pay if it were killed, behind the lines and chosen to ride instead an inferior hack. The French Lancers caught him struggling to safety over heavy ground, easily rode him down, and speared him to death."

- This circumstance is somewhat comparable to situations in Webb and Remarque wherein soldiers are deprived of quality equipment so as to keep supply house shelves well stocked and the inventories in order. Intelligent leaders realize that "false economy" violates a common truth of warfare: "he who hits the hardest with the most stuff usually wins." Recognizing that there is commonly a need for some assets to be kept in reserve, how well does your unit "maximize" its resources?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 51. "...ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves, in life-and-death situations, as subordinate members of whatever formal military organization it is to which authority has assigned them, but as equals within a very tiny group - perhaps no more than six or seven men. They are not exact equals, of course, because at least one of them will hold junior military rank and he - through perhaps another, naturally stronger character - will be looked to for leadership."

- The point to be addressed from this excerpt concerns "informal leaders." Every small unit has a soldier who, because of the strength of personality or admirable social traits, becomes a leader outside of the actual chain of command. It is best that this "informal leader" be

identified by unit leaders and exploited to the unit's advantage. The commander's concern should be that these "informal leaders" are positive motivators and not peddlers of the "dark side." The positive "leaders" should be nurtured, the negative "leaders" neutralized or transferred. Who are the "informal leaders" in your unit? How do they positively or negatively influence other soldiers?

p. 265. "...the cloud of unknowing which descended on a First World War battlefield at zero hour was accepted as one of its hazards by contemporary generals. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the width of battlefields had been extending so rapidly that no general could hope to be present, as Wellington had made himself, at each successive point of crisis; since the end of the century the range and volume of small-arms fire had been increasing to such an extent that no general could hope to survey, as Wellington had done, the line of battle from the front rank. The main work of the general, it had been accepted, had now to be done in his office, before the battle began..."

- The tenor of this excerpt is shared in the critique of World War I generalship by Fuller and the depiction of General Curzon's actions by Forester (see discussions under this same topic under both authors); and it reflects a dilemma which must be solved by leaders today. The battlefield has gotten even more complex and lethal. In that environment, how do you as a leader determine where to go to influence the action, to be an "active leader"? How well will your means of communication with subordinates survive the chaos of the battlefield? What have you told your subordinates to do when they cannot communicate with you?

* - Military Service.

p. 220. "'I would rather bury you than see you in a red coat' were the words his mother wrote to William Robertson, a ranker who became a field-marshal, on hearing of his enlistment, and they tell us all we need to know about what a respectable Victorian working-class family felt at a son joining the army. Almost any other sort of employment was thought preferable..."

- Compare this excerpt with the passages from Myrer and Heinlein which depicts that American public opinion about military service in the interwar years was of equal disdain. With such precedent in both our distant heritage and our recent history, it is easy to understand how, even today, military service is held in low regard by parts of our population. How do you respond to the question commonly

asked of active service members, "When are you going to get out and make something of yourself?" Why are you in the service and why do you plan to stay when college or high school friends are doing "more meaningful" things in business, science, or academia? Why is the service a more attractive alternative to a "regular civilian job"?

* - Safety.

p. 318. "...young men are regarded by insurance companies as the worst class of risk, and wars put thousands of young men in charge of powerful vehicles on unsupervised roads fraught with hazards...during quiet weeks in the Vietnam campaign, traffic accidents often killed more American soldiers than did the Viet Cong."

- Though this excerpt makes accidental death appear to be inevitable, leaders can affect this "inevitability." How aggressively do leaders of your unit pursue safety? Would a profile of accidents confirm the vulnerability of the young soldier perceived here or some different phenomenon? How can the philosophy of safety be improved in your unit?

* - Soldiers in War (psyche).

p. 47. "'Battle', for the ordinary soldier, is a very small-scale situation which will throw up its own leaders and will be fought by its own rules - alas, often by its own ethics."

- This excerpt and the passage on the page before it aptly describe the "soldier in battle." It is such a "close" experience for each individual soldier or small group of soldiers that often leaders have no great impact on the course of individual events at any distance away from themselves. This point emphasizes the critical need to indelibly implant in soldiers in training before the battle the skills and confidence necessary for those soldiers to succeed in their isolated, individual wars on the battlefield.

p. 219. "... (the British army) was a trusting army. It believed in the reassurances proffered by the staff who, to be fair, believed them also. It believed in the superiority of its own equipment over the Germans. It believed in the dedication and fearlessness of its battalion officers - and was right so to believe. But it believed above all in itself."

- This excerpt also accurately describes the attitude and attributes of General Curzon of Forester's The General. Such attitudes and attributes, when taken with a dash of reason and a glimpse at the realities of the situation, are to be readily admired. But it was the absolute certainty of conviction in these attitudes and attributes in the face of the tragically evolving events of World War I that caused the Allied forces so much heartache and which are the target for the satire presented in The General.

* - Sports.

p. 194. "'(Waterloo) was won on the playing fields of Eton'...(Wellington) was proposing...that the French had been beaten not by wiser generalship or better tactics or superior patriotism but by the coolness and endurance, the pursuit of excellence and of intangible objectives for their own sake which are learnt in game-playing - that game-playing which was already becoming the most important activity of the English gentleman's life."

- This excerpt argues in favor of the benefits gained from unit athletic activities. Most commanders believe in the value of a solid athletic and sports program for units. And General MacArthur's opinion of the value of the "fields of friendly strife" certainly canonized this belief. Does your unit sports program encourage comraderie? Does it encourage the officers to work with the soldiers and thereby increase their bonds of trust and fellowship? Or can a sports program really do any of these things in the first place? Is it actually just a waste of time?

* - Synchronization.

p. 162. "When artillery of either side found the opportunity to 'cooperate' with other arms, that is, make its attack simultaneous with infantry or cavalry action against the same enemy formation...the effect of its fire was magnified."

- Even in earlier times, this principal tenet of modern battle was seen as critical to success. Especially in times of restrained resources, synchronization of combat multipliers and combat forces will most probably determine the victor. How well do your leaders and staff synchronize their assets? Is it a deliberate, orchestrated effort or one that is given to chance? How would you improve the process?

* - Tactics.

p. 163. "It was their extreme skill in skirmishing that had enabled the French, in the early battles of the twenty years' war, to inflict heavy loss on infantry without sending their own to close quarters. Eventually their enemies had grasped the need to oppose skirmishers with skirmishers..."

- This is an example of the development of tactics in response to an opponent's battlefield success. The French success with skirmishers was noted by her enemies and was eventually met with a countermeasure which foiled it. Such evolution of the art of warfare is continuous. A recent example witnessed in the training environment at the National Training Center evolved from the aggressive use of reconnaissance forces by the Opposing Force (OPFOR) to determine the deployments of Blue forces. In early years at the center, this successful OPFOR reconnaissance effort led to successful exploitation of Blue forces weaknesses and almost routine OPFOR dominance on that battlefield. In natural response to this dominance, Blue force units developed today's increasingly effective counterreconnaissance doctrine, and that OPFOR advantage decreased significantly. What other examples of this phenomenon have you witnessed? Is there a tactical problem which faces your unit today which has thus far defied solution? What are you doing about it?

* - Training.

p. 313. "Perhaps only in the British army, traditionally a guild of sharpshooters, and in Northern Ireland in the nineteen-seventies embroiled in a campaign which requires its soldiers to fire back at terrorist gunmen without touching the bystanders whom the gunmen use as cover, is marksmanship still lauded and taught."

- Most unit commanders in today's U.S. Army would certainly dispute this statement. While there are occasions when the employment of massive firepower is more critical than precise accuracy, there are significant enough other occasions where accurate fire is required to necessitate extensive marksmanship training. How well does your unit accomplish this training? Which is better, first-line leaders or principal unit instructors conducting this training? Why? How do the soldiers view the marksmanship skills of the officers? How does this view affect the attitude of officers towards marksmanship?

pp. 19-20. "Officer-training indeed makes use of simulation techniques to a far greater extent than that for any other profession; and the justification...is that it is

thus only that an army can be sure - hopeful would be more accurate - of its machinery operating smoothly under extreme stress...For by teaching the young officer to organize his intake of sensations...one is helping him to avert the onset of fear or, worse, of panic and to perceive a face of battle which, if not familiar, and certainly not friendly, need not, in the event, prove wholly petrifying."

- Forwarded here is the argument that leaders should try to anticipate every contingent situation on the battlefield and then train soldiers, especially the leaders, to satisfy the needs of these situations under the harsh, confusing, terrifying conditions of the battlefield. That process requires imaginative, tough-minded, and durable leaders who believe in General Patton's exhortation, "Sweat more in peace and bleed less in war." Can you look at your unit and confidently state that you and your soldiers are ready to go to war? Is your unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) realistic and used as the basis for unit and individual training? How would you improve the training in your unit to attain the benefits of the wisdom expressed in this excerpt?

p. 341. "Allied military psychiatrists had learnt by the end of the Second World War that the very first hours of combat disable ten per cent of a fighting force. A major intensification of the strains which broke those men (such as that imposed by several days of 'continuous operations') suggests that it might break the majority..."

- It is commonly held that hard, tough training is best because it is that which best prepares soldiers for the battlefield. But this excerpt implies that even the hardest, toughest training may not be sufficient to prepare many soldiers for the intensity of modern warfare. Whether you believe it or not, it should at least cause you to consider your unit's training regimen (especially those non-combat unit leaders who argue, "We do not need to train our soldiers to be as tough as Rangers."). Is it hard and tough enough?

p. 229. "In almost no battalion among those earmarked to attack on 1 July, therefore, had more than a quarter of the men, of whatever rank, memories of peacetime soldiering."

- Almost all of the excerpts on training drawn from this and other books in this guide emphasize the absolute need for tough, realistic training under battlefield conditions to temper a unit for combat. The testimony of this excerpt concerning the unpreparedness of the British

soldiers foreshadows the disaster which befell them at the Somme and speaks volumes in support of the need for such training.

* - War.

p. 163. "...infantry was (and is) the only force with which ground could (and can) be held (physical occupation being ten points of the law in war, and infantry the balliff's men)..."

- This argument cuts against the grain of the Air Force and Navy, but it is still the predominant case: wars are generally concluded by the ground gaining arm seizing and holding territory. There may certainly be exceptions (including the conclusion of the Pacific campaign in the Pacific after the atomic bombs), but they are few.

p. 342. "...The suspicion grows that battle has already abolished itself."

- Is this true? Are you in a profession for which there is no more use or calling? Is the spectrum of conflict now extinct?

* - War (crimes).

pp. 49-50. "...the army seeks to instill in its leaders the attitudes it does because experience has taught it that its mechanisms of command and control can only be kept functioning under stress if officers will scrupulously obey the rules of procedure. Those rules allot fixed values to all individuals and groups on the battlefield - 'friend', 'enemy', 'prisoner', 'casualty' - and impose strict limits upon which can be offered violence, and in what circumstances."

- Explained here is the military approach to elimination of the type of "war crimes" described in passages on the preceeding two pages of the book. But given the frustration, exhaustion, and rage prevalent on the battlefield, are war crimes inevitable? Are there other ways by which you as a leader can affect this inevitability? Are rules of engagement effective in this regard? Are there even such things as war crimes in the first place?

p. 329. "It must be counted one of the particular cruelties of modern warfare that, by inducing even in the fit and willing soldier a sense of his unimportance (by the overwhelming impersonal nature of the modern battlefield),

It encouraged his treating the lives of disarmed or demoralized opponents as equally unimportant."

- This argues that war crimes are inevitable because of war's increasingly impersonal nature and the loss of esteem by the individual combatants. How can you combat this as a leader? Or is it better to not combat it, preferring rather to generate among soldiers a sense that demonstrating hostility against all things on the battlefield foreign to "our side" is the only way to survive? Does the nature of warfare (i.e., conventional versus counterinsurgency) make a difference in the approach you take as a leader?

p. 283. "...reserves in the front line were firing at prisoners whom some of his wounded were escorting from the far side. At his command, they stopped, but reluctantly ...(saying) 'they are only Germans.'"

- Referring to the enemy as "slopes" or "gooks" in other wars in other times was similar in fashion. Depersonalizing the enemy, when a soldier is already exhausted, frustrated, and filled with a thirst for revenge, makes easier the commitment of such atrocities. How can leaders affect the apparent inevitability of such acts? How can you personally prevent yourself from being caught up in it?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

19 - Training.	26 - Discipline.
33 - Leaders (intelligence).	47 - Soldiers in War (psyche).
49 - War (crimes).	51 - Comradeship.
51 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
70,71 - Discipline.	71 - Comradeship.
114,133 - Leaders (courage).	150 - Discipline.
151 - Leaders (intelligence).	162 - Synchronization.
163 - Duty.	163 - Tactics.
163 - War.	175 - Discipline.
186 - Comradeship.	188 - Leaders (courage).
194 - Sports.	219 - Soldiers in War (psyche).
220 - Military Service.	229 - Training.
265 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
282 - Discipline.	283 - War (crimes).
313 - Training.	318 - Safety.
329 - War (crimes).	330 - Death.
341 - Training.	342 - War.

FIELDS OF FIRE. Webb, James. New York, New York: Bantam Books, 1979.

Having served as a platoon commander in the U.S. Marine Corps during the Vietnam war, Webb writes of the experiences of a Marine platoon near An Hoa in the late 1960's. He realistically recreates the brutal conditions of that most controversial of America's wars, depicting both the tragedy and the nobility of human conflict. Cleverly using characters from all walks of American life, Webb transmits powerful messages concerning leadership, ethics, and the objectives of war, particularly as they existed in Vietnam at the small unit level. This novel is rich in topics worthy of discussion.

(NOTE: The other books in this guide which cover the Vietnam period are The Village [West] and Once an Eagle [Myrer].)

* - Awards.

p. 152. LT Kersey and the regimental commander submit themselves for Silver Stars in an attack on the fire base during which they never left a bunker.

- Soldiers quickly lose respect for leaders involved in such shenanigans, awards lose their positive impact, and the system also suffers a loss of effectiveness. How effectively does the system in your unit award the soldiers?

p. 381. "'Tell Division I'm...cancelling an award recommendation I just started on the murderer.'" And Snake thereby loses an award earned prior to his death.

- What effect should improper deeds executed after valorous acts or meritorious achievement have on the presentation of awards? Consider this scenario: soldier earns award - award is approved by the proper authority and prepared for presentation - soldier misbehaves. Should the soldier receive the award? Do not clutter the contemplation of this question with a lot of extenuating or mitigating factors. The discussion of the question in its pure form will reveal the bare-bone philosophy regarding the relationship of punishment and awards in the unit and in your own mind.

* - Citizen Soldiers.

The draft of the Vietnam era created an Army of slightly different character than one would have hoped. While an

equitable draft would have created in the services a true cross section of America, such was not the case.

p. 209. "'Johnson made a bigger draft, filled it with loopholes, and went after certain groups of kids.'"

p. 1. "'And who are the young men we are asking to go into action against such solid odds? You've met them. You know. They are the best we have. But they are not McNamara's sons, or Bundy's. I doubt they're yours. And they know they're at the end of the pipeline. That no one cares. They know.'"

When the Reserves were not universally activated, another opportunity to broaden the base of participation vanished.

pp. 209-210. "'You'd hardly know there's a war on...It isn't touching anybody except us.'"

As a result, the fighting men of Vietnam were largely the poor, uneducated, inner city or rural youth;

p. 19. "There was a recruiting station at the wasteland's edge. It fed on creatures from the rundown roadhouses. They were vital sustenance."

p. 20. "(Snake) had always fought, and now it was right to fight. He had never been coddled, and now it was weakness to have been coddled...He came with no false prides, no sensitivities that a drill instructor's words could damage. The trivialities of boot camp rolled off him."

p. 154. "...the only way to...give (Phony) a fresh start, was for him to go into the service and come out with a clean record."

p. 242. "'I (Phony) never had a home in my life till I came out here.'"

Or those there by mistake;

- Goodrich (enlisted for the Marine Band).
- Bagger (enlisted with the entire football team).

Or those there because of values inculcated by the rearing process.

p. 25. "'Man's noblest moment is the one spent on the fields of fire. I(Hodges) believe that...I fight because we have always fought. It doesn't matter who.'"

p. 31. "It was a continuum, a litany. Pride. Courage. Fear. An inherited right to violence."

p. 33. "It was the fight that mattered, not the cause."

p. 351. "Bred to it, like a bird dog."

- How different are today's all-volunteer force soldiers from these? How and when does a leader adjust his leadership style to accommodate soldiers of different backgrounds? How do leaders successfully break down barriers between soldiers caused by class differences?

* - Communication (of mission).

A soldier's understanding of the mission and how he fits into its successful accomplishment is key to his hearty involvement in its execution. Communication of that mission was not always effective in Vietnam.

p. 219. "(Warner) was the only member of the platoon who spoke consistently of national objectives, communism, or winning a war. But even he had recently ceased such speculations: in the bush, they were irrelevant."

p. 155. "Back in the villes again. Somebody said it was an operation with a name, but it had its own name: Dangling the Balt...Inviting an enemy attack much as a worm seeks to attract a fish: mindlessly, at someone else's urging, for someone else's reason."

p. 259. "'We'll troll across the fields like balt because no one knows what else to do with us. We won't find any Phu Thuan. We'll just find trouble.'"

- How do you determine just how much the soldiers need to know? Is it important for all soldiers to know every aspect of how and why they are to do what you tell them to do? What is the best form of communication used by leaders in your unit? Is this form applicable at all echelons, or must the form vary from echelon to echelon? Is communication tougher or easier at higher echelons? Why? Do you agree that the commander's intent on operations should be communicated to two echelons below? Why or why not?

* - Comradeship.

Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion which every unit should seek. But comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance.

pp. 295-297. "(Hodges) missed the people in the bush, more than he had ever missed any group of people in his life... 'A person's past was irrelevant... There was a common goal, and a mutual enemy... I hate it. It's terrible. It's destructive. Nobody gives a rat's ass whether any of us live or die... It's so stupid any more I can't believe it... I hate it. But I miss it.'"

Comradeship is reflected in the actions of the soldiers;

p. 368. Snake dies saving Goodrich, his leadership burden throughout.

In the common bond of language (the vernacular) of the soldiers;

p. 81. "Groovy. Wow. Number One. Number Ten. There it is man. A bust for your dust. What a bummer. It don't mean nothing."

In the way soldiers recall shared actions by event rather than date;

p. 236. "... 'you remember that gold tooth I took out of that gook's head? The day Squeaky lost his eye?'"

And in the badges of recognition the soldiers adopt.

pp. 190-191. "For those brief moments they enjoyed their dirtiness, the patches of gook sores that ate into their skin, their filthy month-old clothes, even their relative gauntness. These minor evidences set them off from the rear pogues..."

p. 51. "(Hodges') new boots were embarrassingly unscuffed. His flak jacket was too bright a shade of green, undulled by the dust of the Basin..."

p. 118. "(The Chaplain had) fresh clothes, unscuffed boots... 'Well, what the hell does he know about it?'"

- Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Death (randomness).

p. 252. "The two booby traps had shaken (Goodrich). The victims were selected so randomly... 'There's not a g_____ thing you can do about it, either,' mused Goodrich. It enforced his sense of the complete randomness of it all."

- Many veterans will say, "When it's your time to go, it's your time to go." That may seem to be fitting in some cases, but is it in all "random" cases? How can training and discipline affect the apparent randomness? How do exhaustion, hunger, and physical discomfort affect "randomness"? Can a leader affect the mental state of a unit affected by "random casualties" with a strong sense of moral values (established by either instruction or example)?

Notice from the Index of Topics that this "random death" phenomenon is common to several of the books in this guide; the observations and discussion points above apply to most of them.

* - Draft Dodging.

pp. 105-106. Webb gives a wonderful portrayal of the draft dodgers of the Vietnam era.

- Are there justifiable grounds for draft dodging? Does living in a society and enjoying its benefits require submission to its requirements, even though they may be disagreeable (considerable the case of Anne Frank)? When is civil disobedience appropriate? Should the draft dodgers of the Vietnam era have been granted amnesty?

* - Education (military).

p. 133. Snake asks, "What do they teach at Amphibious Warfare School?"

Hodges replies, "Korea."

- Our military institutions are often accused of studying the wrong war. In recent years, we have been criticized for worrying too much about the European battlefields. What war was covered most carefully in your last military school? Was that the proper war? For what battlefield are you preparing yourself? Are the training centers providing proper focus to the units training there?

* - The Enemy (gooks).

p. 57. "No effect. (The psywar) speaker continued. 'Sounds funny,' thought Snake. 'Stupid gooks.'"

p. 285. "'What can six people---,' he considered Dan (the Vietnamese soldier who would be with them on patrol), '---five people and a g_____ gook - what can they do?'"

p. 314. "'G_____ gooks...they act like they own the place.'"

p. 345. "'Now, let's count some meat, all right?'"

p. 346. "'Some days you count the meat. Some days the meat counts you.'"

Reflected here is an interesting contrast. The VC and NVA were capable fighters and even feared as enemies, but the soldiers trivialized them by name ("gook") and expression. As a leader, is this a tendency you would allow? Condone? Encourage? What actions do you take to enforce your position (with the soldiers; with outsiders such as your seniors, peers, and the media)?

* - Fragging.

p. 80. "(Hodges) understood immediately why an individual would want to wound an incompetent officer with a grenade. 'It's not vindictiveness,' he reasoned. 'It's self-preservation.'"

- The "fragging" of officers and NCO's in lower echelon units was common enough to be a well-known occurrence. In fact, there were some who argued that the "lifers" were a greater enemy than the VC. Compare this with a similar incident in West. Under what circumstances would you condone such "field discipline"? How different is it from an NCO taking an insubordinate enlisted soldier

behind the barrack for some "physical counselling"? Or an officer shooting a soldier who disobeys an order in battle and becomes a danger to the unit and to mission accomplishment?

* - The Front.

p. 75. "He surveyed the squalid, ramshackle city of jerry-rigged poncho hootches that was the perimeter. Scavenged sticks and strands of bootlace supported makeshift poncho homes. 'Incredible,' he thought. 'That the air-conditioned, stewardess-patrolled flight, that all the starch and salutes of Da Nang, that the huge tents and bunkers of An Hoa's regimental rear would boil down to this.'"

- Webb accurately describes the progression of primitiveness from the "rear" to the "front" in Vietnam.

- And how, once in the "bush," contact with the "outside world" was infrequent and the sense of abandonment almost total.

p. 233. "Then the bird was gone, the moment of brief, fierce communication with the Other World had passed, and they were again abandoned."

p. 249. "Snake watched the medevac helicopter ascend. It was a high and distant deus ex machina that now left them again abandoned in the wilderness."

- And then, how small, trivial items like ice (pp. 213-214) and the relatively few comforts of the "rear" can be of immense importance.

p. 114. "The Liberty Bridge compound...he (Hodges) had listened to his platoon members chatter about its desirable qualities for a week...Hot chow. Few dangerous patrols. Daily baths in the river. Tents and cots. Sit-down crappers. Skate city."

- On one hand, it is important to give soldiers in the field comfort items that will benefit their morale and keep the system equitable (field soldiers receiving only Shasta grape and Fresca soda is hardly equitable). Simultaneously, the "luxuries" in the rear must also be kept at a reasonable level so as to not alienate the soldiers at the "front." Is an officers' mess or sleeping area appropriate in the field? Under what conditions and with what trappings? How can a leader affect the climate of

comradeship between the soldiers of the "front" and the "rear"?

* - Insurgency.

- The Vietnam war was rich in lessons that were never learned.

p. 115. "Government 'officials' (were in) faraway Da Nang, sometimes venturing into An Hoa for brief, daylight visits...If they had wandered on the other side of An Hoa's wire...they wouldn't have lasted five minutes...The coal mine was clogged with booby traps. The brick factory sat under clouds of claydust. The (destroyed) Old Bridge loomed as the symbol of the Basin's isolation."

- The attempts to industrialize failed in a predominately agricultural society, a society anchored in its roots and more faithful to the neverchanging land than to any transitory government of man.

p. 189. "'Governments are not real. Rice is real.'" (Dan)

p. 176. "'War is as natural as the rains. There are years when there is no war and there are seasons without rain. But always war and rain return. It is the nature of things.'" (Dan)

p. 182. "The villagers viewed the rounds as one would view a rainstorm. Some nights there were artillery rounds. Some nights there were no artillery rounds. It did no good to question it. Questions would not change it anymore than they would change the pattern of rainstorms."

p. 184. "Her family had been in the village for five hundred years...She was terrified of Duc Duc. It was only four miles away, but it would be filled with strange faces..."

p. 376. "(The Vietnamese) never questioned why the Marines left. It was the nature of things that they would leave. Always the foreigner leaves. This was not their home."

- The failure to comprehend these complex factors resulted in ineffective tactics, sometimes even tactics at odds with one another.

p. 171. "'I figure old Rock Man and his animals done made a lot more VC than they ever end up killing.'" (Snake)

p. 269. (Babycakes) "'That's the game out here. That's what we're here for. To kill gooks.'
(Goodrich) 'Funny. I thought there was more to it.'"

p. 347. "Operation Rice Denial. If We Kill Off All The Rice, the logic ran, There Won't Be Any To Give To The Enemy. If The Enemy Doesn't Have Rice, It Will Have To Quit Fighting. Hodges shook his head, watching the helicopter (drop gasoline on a rice paddy)...But, meanwhile, the villagers will starve...Underneath the hovering monster a mamasan stood, squarely in the middle of her (rice) seedbed...(in) the gasoline rain...The helicopter did not hear her. Nor did it see."

- Tactically, we failed to comprehensively apply lessons of the French experience in Vietnam (pp. 190-191) and used techniques that placed soldiers in great jeopardy.

p. 375. "The air strikes were like a magnet...They know what we are going to do. They will wait for the right time and mass on the road and destroy us. It is so stupid."

- The lessons here are plain. Know yourself, your equipment, your people, and your tactics. Know your enemy. Know the terrain. Know the land and its people. Know history. It is important to resolve both the similarities and the differences of the current situation to those of the past and their lessons. Leaders must think out logically the cause and effect of operations all the way from tactics through strategy to political objectives. Be cautious of fixating exclusively on the enemy or on military solutions only.

p. 367. "...there was no great effort for anything anymore, only thousnads, no, millions, of isolated wars...If They Die It's Not My Problem. They're Yours."

p. 259. "Point platoon was dying up the trail. (The platoon) lay and sat on the trail, facing high grass walls, listening to the personal battle, someone else's was at the head of the column."

p. 171. "Then (Hodges) lit Snake's smoke, and they watched the rest of Someone Else's War a mile away."

p. 263. "'(Stars and Stripes) says there weren't any, you know, big battles all last week.'"

- The lack of a "front," the absence of major defining battles, and the sporadic nature of enemy contacts cast a strange sense over a counterinsurgency conflict. At

the individual level, it is an extremely personal war with small-unit ambush and booby traps placing the emphasis on individual casualties. But simultaneously, at the unit level, it is extremely impersonal since so few large unit actions occur. How can a leader influence a unit's sense of cohesion in such an atmosphere? Or is it even important to try?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 80. "It occurred to (Hodges)...that he really did have the power of life and death over them."

p. 373. "A Private is not listened to. And it was so logical. A Private knows intrinsically what a general must learn through experience. That is because a Private thinks with caution since he will be killed. A General can be daring when only the Private will die for his mistakes."

pp. 111-114. SSG Austin's approach to the platoon upon first meeting them - "We're gonna square you all away." Hodges' reaction, "Austin would learn in time, he hoped." Phony's reaction, "You can't do that. You shouldn't have done that."

- These three passages relate basic relationships between leaders and subordinates. The first two reflect the literal life and death impact that a leader's competence and judgment have on subordinates. A phrase from World War I comes to mind, "It takes thousands of deaths to train a major general." The last passage portrays the method one leader may use to assume authority over subordinates. It is definitely not the "I'll wait to see how things go before I make any changes" approach. What is your approach to assuming command? Are there circumstances more appropriate for one than the other?

* - Leaders (reputation).

p. 119. "'What does (the Colonel) know about (dying)?' '(The Colonel) fought in World War II, maybe Korea.' Burgie grunted, unconvinced. "'What's he done lately?'"

- Soldiers look for "continuous" leaders, not leaders who rest on their laurels. The 90-day competency and memory curve that drives the training cycles for basic skills applies also to the demonstration of a leader's caring, competent leadership. How does personnel turnover in a unit affect this perception? Are new soldiers willing to accept a leader based on what they hear was done in the past?

p. 238, "'He's (Hodges) one of them...Leaders of Men.'"

- Leaders seek this type of respect from their subordinates, but it is difficult to earn. Which is more important to you: To be liked? To be feared? To be respected? Which relationship is best in peace time? In war? How is it possible to be liked and respected simultaneously?

* - Leaders (stature).

pp. 310-311. "Down South his men were on patrol, or digging new perimeters, or dying, and he was nothing if he did not share that misery."

- The stature of a leader is built on the loyalty for subordinates reflected here.

p. 151. "'Don't let it get to you, Lieutenant. If you start crying, we're in the hurt locker.'"

p. 161. "(Hodges) wanted to cry. (The platoon) would watch him and then wonder what kind of an officer he was, how he could give orders to them when he couldn't take it. He couldn't cry."

- But once established, is the stature of a leader cracked by the "sign of weakness" of crying or strengthened by the "sign of compassion" of crying? If one of your subordinate leaders cries in a tough situation, how would you feel about it? What if it were one of your senior leaders? Are there situations where crying may be okay and not others? How about the display of others in the range of emotions: Anger? Laughter? Sullenness? Depression?

* - Lifer.

p. 129. "...sour-faced, humorless men who actually believed that mere rank made a person more intelligent, compensated for personal deficiencies."

- This is one definition of a "lifer." "Lifers" were also characterized as being more fearful of the consequences of an action on their career than on the correctness of the act itself.

p. 340. "'If it ever hit the press that this event occurred, and we let it go by without investigating it, the s____-would-hit-the-fan.'"

p. 381. "(The company commander)...thought of what the newspapers would say if they found out about the incident...It might ruin, and would certainly affect, his career."

- And "lifers" were more interested in form than substance.

p. 324. After new equipment was issued just for a general's visit, these instructions followed to the platoon, "'You got till noon to get over to Supply and turn those (new) flak jackets and (helmet) covers back in. Anybody I see after that with green on better have a reason.'"

- Unfortunately, those soldiers who wanted others to condone their improper or illegal actions often tied the rules of war and military regulations to "liferism" as justification enough for doing what they wanted to do.

pp. 100-101. (Snake) "'I ain't having any new lieutenant or somebody run me in because you want a pair of shorts (that belong to that old man).'"
(Bagger) "'My man Snake is gonna be a lifer.'"

- While "lifer" and "careerist" were often synonymous in the minds of soldiers, two careerists in the book, platoon sergeants Gillingland and Sadler, were not considered to be "lifers"; whereas two others, platoon sergeant Austin and the regimental sergeant major were. What was the difference? Are feelings of subordinates toward their leaders important, or does it not matter if leaders are thought to be or even called "lifers"? Do you seek to attain the title of "lifer" from your subordinates? Why or why not? Do you encourage or discourage the use of the term?

* - Media.

p. 133. "'F_____ reporters. G_____ leeches, sucking off other people's blood. Sit like buzzards, watch us die for a f_____ news story, then go back to Saigon and celebrate their story with a whore.'"

- Animosity between the media and the military was pervasive during the Vietnam war. Great mistrust between the two, conceived in the jungle and the briefing rooms, exists still today. One outgrowth of this relationship is today's media pool concept. What are the obligations of the media in reporting from the battlefield? What responsibilities do leaders have to help the media fulfill their obligations? Is the media pool a satisfactory

solution? Should it be continued? Or discontinued in favor of what? What rules of engagement with the media would you establish for your subordinates? Or perhaps even more basic questions need resolution. What is the importance of the free press to the survival of democracy? How "free" can free press be in relation to military operations?

* - Night (operations).

p. 283. "The god of night pulled his shade across the sky, unleashing all his demons as the gray set in. The platoon moved quickly down the sawgrass trail, racing him, hurrying to beat the black. The black belonged to those others, the night god's children, who frolicked, even murdered under the romance of starbright. Night for the platoon was hiding time, time to dig deep holes and wait in fear for the loneliest of deaths, the impersonal, shattering projectile that would just as soon kill tree or air as man."

- This passage accurately reflects the condition of night operations for most units in Vietnam. U.S. technology has made major strides in obtaining advantages for us in night operations, but it remains the leader's responsibility to imbue in subordinates through training a confidence in night operations that overcomes the natural psyche of fear.

* - Racial Tensions.

pp. 194-198. Webb's description of the "Black Shack" and the "war within the war" is sadly accurate of the racial tension existent in many units during the war. The frustrations of the civil rights movement of the 1960's and an unprepared military leadership were mixed in that crucible of Vietnam, resulting in problems which distracted from the war effort.

p. 277. "But it wasn't the Army. It was the Revolution. Group reactions to discipline. Group hates. Group concessions. Be a Brother or face the risk of being alone, rejected by both groups."

p. 271. "'The (black) man thinks Ah'm tryin' to be white because Ah ain't chasin' after Booby Seale or somebody.'" (Cannonball)

p. 344. "'People ain't never goan' forget you're a nigger. People ain't never goan' think niggers an' honkies are the same. Only thing you can do is be so g_____ good that it doan' matter.'" (Sadler)

- And too often, black malcontents were treated with kid gloves (as with Rap Jones, p. 326) and not disciplined properly. This gave rise to negative backlashes from the good soldiers. Actual discrimination of even the perception of discrimination were (and are) a cancer eating at the central core of many units. It is incumbent on leaders to recognize the lessons here and apply unflinching equity and consistency to their command actions to ensure that no perception of discrimination is even suggested.

* - Shirking.

p. 158. "(Hodges) didn't want to do it. He thought again about bagging it. But if he did it to the Skipper, some of his men would do it to him. Shirking danger was an infection that spread more quickly the plaque."

- A leader's obligation to his/her responsibilities is continuous, on duty and off. All it takes is one soldier observing a leader one time doing less than should be done and the seed is planted that will invariably later sow mission failure.

* - Soldiers in War (description of life).

p. 1; p. 50; pp.68-69; and p.206. Webb realistically portrays the soldiers' living conditions in war. It emphatically casts doubt on the concept of war as a romantic endeavor.

* - Soldiers in War (psyche).

p. 91 and p. 350. Related here are the "stream of consciousness" ramblings of a terrified soldier, a natural result of the conditions of the war, but still something that must be overcome so that soldiers can concentrate on the task at hand. Combat is characterized as being long periods of boredom interrupted by moments of sheer terror. To combat the psyche of the terrorized soldier, leaders can encourage confidence in self, comrades, and unit leadership and provide solid training, knowledge of the mission and situation, and comradeship.

* - War (crimes).

p. 250. "The flames rose anonymously, but it was the platoon's collective act of passion, a substitute for not being able to fight the enemy that had ravaged them."

p. 293. "He bent papasan nearer and nearer, until the man's bleeding face was only inches above Ogre's corpse."

'Yeah. Take a good look, gook. You think we should let you go after that?'"

- These passages and the "stream of consciousness" passages on p. 407 and pp. 162-163 realistically reflect the frustration and tension that lead to war crimes. Some argue that war crimes are inevitable, but how can you as a leader affect this inevitability? Are rules of engagement effective in this regard? Are there even such things as war crimes in the first place?

* - War (nobility).

p. 333. "(Snake) sensed that it was all here, everything, and there was none of it (in the 'World'). All of life's compelling throbs, condensed and honed each time a bullet flew: the pain, the brother-love, the sacrifice. Nobility discovered by those who'd never even contemplated sacrifice, never felt an emotion worth their own blood on someone else's altar. The heart-rending deaths. The succeeded. All here...He'da died for me. And I killed 'em back for him."

- War is often described in literature as man's most noble and tragic undertaking. Veterans often express sentiments such as those in this passage. It does not make war any more attractive, but it does perhaps partially explain why, "So long as there is mankind, there will be war" (Jomini, The Art of War).

Numerical order of pages with topics:

1 - Citizen Soldiers.	
1 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
19,20,25,31,33 - Citizen Soldiers.	
50 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
51 - Comradeship	57 - Enemy (gooks).
68 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
75 - Front.	80 - Fraggling.
80 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
81 - Comradeship.	91 - Soldiers in War (psyche).
100 - Lifer.	105 - Draft Dodging.
111 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
114 - Front.	115 - Insurgency.
118 - Comradeship.	119 - Leaders (reputation).
129 - Lifer.	133 - Education (military).
133 - Media.	151 - Leaders (stature).
152 - Awards.	154 - Citizen Soldiers.
155 - Communication (of mission).	158 - Shirking.
161 - Leaders (stature).	171,176,182,184,189 - Insurgency.
190 - Comradeship.	194 - Racial Tension.
206 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
209 - Citizen Soldiers.	213 - Front.
219 - Communication (of mission).	233 - Front.
236 - Comradeship.	238 - Leaders (reputation).
242 - Citizen Soldiers.	249 - Front.
250 - War Crimes.	252 - Death (randomness).
259,263,269 - Insurgency.	277 - Racial Tension.
283 - Night (operations).	285 - Enemy (gooks).
293 - War (crimes).	295 - Comradeship.
310 - Leaders (stature).	314 - Enemy (gooks).
324 - Lifer.	333 - War (nobility).
340 - Lifer.	344 - Racial Tension.
345,346 - Enemy (gooks).	347 - Insurgency.
350 - Soldiers in War (psyche).	351 - Citizen Soldiers.
367 - Insurgency.	368 - Comradeship.
373 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
375,376 - Insurgency.	381 - Awards.
381 - Lifer.	

THE FORGOTTEN SOLDIER. Sajer, Guy. Maclean, Virginia: Brassey's (U.S.), Inc., 1990 (first English translation published by Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., New York, New York, 1971).

The Forgotten Soldier is to World War II what All Quiet on the Western Front is to World War I: a stark, emotional, gut-wrenching portrait of soldiers in war for the duration, under scarcely believable conditions. The ultimate purpose of our profession of arms is warfare; this book relates the psychological and physical conditions of warfare for which leaders of today need to prepare their units and their soldiers. Although some excerpts are isolated in the following pages, the most pertinent aspect of this book is its ruthlessly stark description of the terror, the cold, the atrocities, the hardened hearts of war's victims, and the indomitable human will and spirit. Read this book with your eyes and your heart wide open - it will take courage for you to apply the lessons learned here.

(NOTE: Books in this guide which also cover World War II include The Mask of Command [Keegan], Men Against Fire [Marshall], Once an Eagle [Myrer], and The Second World War [Keegan].)

* - Comradeship.

pp. 240-241. "(The German soldiers and their Russian enemies) all grinned at each other without distinction, like players from two teams in the showers after a match. There was no longer any feeling of hatred or vengeance, only a sense of life preserved and overwhelming exhaustion...Although hardly anyone understood more than a few words of the other language, we were all laughing and trading cigarettes...We were able to forget the hate which divided us, as our stupefied senses reawakened to an awareness of life...Finally, our torn and filthy hands broke the hard bread and held it out to the men who had been trying to kill us only a few hours before."

pp. 344-345. "This dramatic attempt left us gasping with admiration...(The Russians') attitude and performance seemed so far removed from those of the partisans that we felt no hate for them."

- A sense of comradeship envelops not only members of one's own unit, but also worthy opponents. If soldiers of either side experience equally recognizable hardships and if the combat waged was honorably fought, a bond of comradeship transforms their avowed hostility towards one another into at least a grudging sense of respect after the

fact. Or do you believe it? Have you ever felt such a sense of comradeship with an opponent after an especially competitive sporting event? If so, can you not imagine that same sense existing in the most extreme of all sporting events, war? But if this sense of comradeship exists, why do atrocities against opponents occur in battle? Does it have something to do with the concept of "worthy opponent"? What has a leader to do with whether or not a unit will be a "worthy opponent"? Should a leader encourage or not encourage his soldiers to see the enemy as "worthy opponents"?

pp. 68-69. "I should perhaps end my account here, because my powers are inadequate for what I have to tell. Those who haven't lived through the experience may sympathize as they read, the way one sympathizes with the hero of a novel or a play, but they certainly will never understand, as one cannot understand the unexplainable...I shall try to reach and translate the deepest level of human aberration, which I never could have imagined, which I never would have thought possible, if I hadn't known it firsthand."

- All of us share a certain level of comradeship simply because of our commonly held profession; however, there is a higher level of comradeship shared by those who have experienced combat. On the surface, anyone who wears a unit patch on their right shoulder may qualify, but it is only those with the hardened look about the eyes or the "thousand-yard stare" who really qualify. War stories cannot translate this experience to the uninitiated. How well is your unit preparing its soldiers for this ultimate experience?

p. 40. "Knowing that my friends were there, with only a few trucks between us, made me feel a great deal better, and I almost forgot that each turn of the wheels was taking me closer to the front."

pp. 83-84. "Friendships counted for a great deal during the war, their value perhaps increased by the generalized hate, consolidating men on the same side in friendships which never would have broken through the barriers of ordinary peacetime life."

pp. 112-113. "We conformed to the prescribed pattern with a good will that came from a deep sense of comradeship...I cannot regret having belonged to a combat unit. We discovered a sense of comradeship which I have never found again, inexplicable and steady, through thick and thin."

p. 247. "We hardly spoke during that night, but I knew that I should try to live for the sake of my friend..."

p. 250. "I looked for Hals or some other friend, but couldn't see any familiar faces... For me, they had become almost like relatives, and their absence weighed on me."

p. 328. "Once again I learned how hard it is to watch a comrade die; almost as hard as dying oneself."

p. 342. "...the circumstances of war united us in a symphony of heroism, in which each man felt himself to a certain extent responsible for all of his fellows."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Death.

p. 297. "...each bullet they fired was bound to hit someone, and if I should happen to be the only casualty in a victorious army of a million men, the victory would be without interest for me. The percentage of corpses, in which generals sometimes take pride, doesn't alter the fate of the men who've been killed. The only leader I know of who finally made a sensible remark on this point, Adolf

Hitler, once said to his troops: 'Even a victorious army must count its victims.'

- This is an important point for leaders to keep in mind. Combat will produce casualties. A leader who has a subordinate die will suffer some pangs of conscience wondering if he/she could have done something different to alter the outcome. But the inevitability of casualties makes overemphasis of this concern counterproductive. Leaders must concern themselves with doing the best job they can and thereby reduce needless casualties. Talk to veterans about their first experience with death on the battlefield to help prepare yourself for that event.

* - Death (randomness).

p. 97. "I would have liked things more if Neubach had still been alive, but one must remain humble and resigned in the face of Providence. After all, it was I who should have been driving instead of Neubach."

- Many veterans will say, "When it's your time to go, it's your time to go." That may seem to be fitting in some cases, but is it in all "random" cases? How can training and discipline affect the apparent randomness? How do exhaustion, hunger, and physical discomfort affect "randomness"? Can a leader affect the mental state of a unit affected by "random casualties" with a strong sense of moral values (established by either instruction or example)?

Notice from the Index of Topics that this "random death" phenomenon is common to several of the books in this guide; the observations and discussion points above apply to most of them.

* - The Front.

p. 178. "A new, hitherto unsuspected acuteness sharpens every sense, and the tension seems pressing enough to subdue one's wildly racing heart."

- This excerpt is consistent with excerpts from the World War I narrative of Remarque, and the observations which follow here are also similar.

It takes only one introduction to "the front" for a soldier's instincts to be as refined as described in this excerpt. But unless a leader has so dutifully and expertly trained soldiers to achieve a keen awareness of "the front," those soldiers may not survive the initial introduction. This lack of awareness is part of the reason why "cherries" were such outcasts during their first few days at "the front" in Vietnam; their inexperience made them vulnerable

to the hazards and a risk to themselves and their fellow soldiers. If your training is not yet producing in soldiers this critical awareness of how "the front" is different from their normal experience, how can it be improved to accomplish this?

* - Initiative.

p. 229. "It is strange how often the sense of having the initiative can lead men to confront an enemy far stronger than they."

- Initiative is a critical fundamental of war; the adversary who enjoys it invariably enjoys a great advantage. Is there a fundamental of war more important than initiative? If so, what is it and why? How do unit leaders encourage the development of initiative in their units and among their soldiers?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 97. "It's astonishing how agreeable it is to meet confidence and enthusiasm when one is feeling lost. It was as if heaven had sent me this healthy animal to revive my morale."

- The testimony of this excerpt is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evident in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

This excerpt shows why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let

things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 9. "As he speaks, he pats me on the shoulder. I feel very much moved by the friendliness of this lieutenant to whom I have just given such a frightful journey. I would never have guessed that this man whose face is somewhat frightening would be capable of a quasi-paternal gesture."

p. 83. "Laus - who had a good heart when the chips were down - saw that we were foundering, and allowed us each an hour or two of sleep, as he could."

- The expression of kindness toward a subordinate by a leader is seldom out of place, but it is a gesture that each leader must weigh for each situation and for each soldier. Perceptions of weakness by witnesses in some circumstances make such gestures inappropriate. In any case, a leader should consider in his/her own personal philosophy how and when to best express kindness and how to do so consistently. The worst possible case is for a leader to express kindness falsely, for the subordinates will realize the gesture for what it is. A leader must above all be true to himself/herself. Where does kindness fit into your personal philosophy? What is an example of an inappropriate gesture of kindness in your experience? How about the most effective example?

p. 83. "We felt profoundly moved by these attentions. a package of sausages, jam, and cigarettes seemed generous repayment for our endless nights in the stone-cracking cold, and our wanderings through the mud of the Don Valley."

p. 377. "Our stomachs were empty, our mess tins were empty, and the horizon was devoid of any hope."

- It is often heard that a good leader does not let the sun set on hungry or unpaid soldiers. Their wants and needs are pretty basic, and it is the leader's obligation to care for those needs. This first excerpt demonstrates the appreciation that results from even token care in this regard. The second excerpt demonstrates how difficult this seemingly simple task might sometimes be, but also how

interconnected satisfaction of hunger and the well-being of the human spirit are.

p. 39. "We now possessed a rolling kitchen which could serve us hot meals. This made a great difference to us. Immediately before our departure we were served a large hot meal, which produced an almost unbelievable sense of well-being, and raised our spirits to a remarkable degree."

- Caring for soldiers is a remarkably basic process, but sometimes the effort of it makes some leaders downplay its importance as rationalization for not providing it in tough times. This excerpt demonstrates that soldiers throughout time have appreciated few things more than a hot meal in the field. How effective is your unit in reliably providing this service, even under the most difficult circumstances? Is the mess sergeant adored or despised in your unit? If he is despised, should not a leader be despised also since that leader probably is largely responsible for the situation? This process is one which can invariably be improved in every unit. How would you improve it in your unit?

pp. 15-17. "Laus was munching something he had taken from his pack...As though his action were some kind of signal, we all took out our food, some immediately devouring the equivalent of two meals...Our sergeant (Laus) was busy building himself a shelter with the railway baggage - not at all a bad idea. When he covered this over with his waterproof sheet, he was completely sheltered - the old fox."

- In this excerpt, the leader did not first care for the soldiers before caring for himself. Is it routine for the leaders in your unit to care for the soldiers first? If not what should be changed to make it routine?

* - Leaders (reputation).

p. 216. "Captain Wesreldau often helped us to endure the worst. He was always on good terms with his men, and was never one of those officers who are so impressed by their own rank that they treat ordinary soldiers like valueless pawns to be used without scruple. He stood beside us during countless gray watches, and came into our bunkers to talk with us, and make us forget the howling storm outside."

p. 218. "Our conversations with Captain Wesreldau made a deep impression on us. His obvious and passionate sincerity affected even the most hesitant, and seemed of

another order than the standard appeals to our sense of sacrifice, which left us stupefied and incredulous. He invited questions, which he answered with intelligence and clarity. He spent his time with us, whenever he was free from other duties. We all loved him, and felt we had a true leader, as well as a friend on whom we could count. Herr Hauptmann Wesreldau was a terror to the enemy, and a father to his men. Every time we moved, or were sent out on an operation, his steiner preceded our vehicles."

p. 376. "We walked past his grave one by one, saluting. We felt that we had just lost the man on whom the well-being of the whole company depended. We felt abandoned."

p. 430. "Weiner should have been a general, or even the Fuhrer. We had more confidence in him than in anyone else...There was Weiner, our leader. He was worth dying for."

- A perfect situation would have all leaders in receipt of respect of this sort from their subordinates; however, it does not happen routinely. It takes effort and skill by the leader and a little thought about how to most profitably apply inherent personality traits. Which is more important to you: To be liked? To be feared? To be respected? Which relationship is best in peace time? In war? How is it possible to be liked and respected simultaneously?

p. 19. "...he was like every sergeant-major in the world; afraid of responsibility, and at the same time giving us a hard time."

- It is no different for officers or NCO's. Each must be consistently and continually given responsibility and the appropriate authority to do the job. If that does not happen, they are unpracticed in the application of authority and the acceptance of responsibility, and the standard of leadership suffers accordingly. Although you as the senior leader always hold the ultimate responsibility, how do you allocate responsibility to subordinates? And how do you grant the appropriate authority? Who are the best examples for delegation of these factors in your unit? What can other leaders emulate from them? How is this excerpt characteristic or uncharacteristic of senior NCO's in your experience?

p. 168. "It seems scarcely credible that by the time we left we all nourished a certain admiration for the Herr Hauptmann. Everyone, in fact, dreamed of someday becoming an officer of the same stripe."

- It seems impossible to the uninitiated that a leader who is so demanding, so distant, and so tough could ever earn the respect and admiration of subordinates. But if subordinates understand that the leader has their best interests in heart, it is possible. However, there is a fine line between hard training and brutality - a leader must be cautious to not cross it. Which is more important to you: To be liked? To be feared? To be respected? Which relationship is best in peace time? In war? How is it possible to be liked and respected simultaneously?

* - Leaders (stature).

p. 277. "Their military responsibilities had come to an end, and they would never again be victimized by military police."

- This excerpt really begins on page 274 and describes a discouraging scene of power run amuck. It is similar to a situation with military policemen described in Myrer. Leaders must be cautious of subordinate leaders (military policemen in this case) who may emerge from achievements of a high stature unknown to them before with an inflated sense of ego (graduates from Ranger School are infamous for this type of response). How do you make sure that your subordinates are not abusing their power? What is a recent example of the abuse of power that you have observed? And its results?

* - Mercy Killing.

p. 262. "We shot a great many men to put them out of their misery, although mercy killings were strictly forbidden."

- Given the availability and quality of medical care on the World War II battlefield, is the situation here one which makes mercy killing justifiable? Under what circumstances is mercy killing justifiable on the battlefield? What guidance do you offer your subordinates on the subject? Or do you just leave it up to their individual preferences and conscience? Note a similar question in Remarque.

* - Moral Forces.

p. 103. "An attacking army is always more enthusiastic than an army on the defensive, and more likely to accomplish prodigies. This was particularly true of the German Army, which was organized to attack, and whose defense consisted of slowing the enemy by counter-attack."

- One exception to this excerpt might be the Texans' spirited defense of the Alamo in 1836. Can you think of other spirited defenses that won strategic victories? Do you agree with the thought forwarded by this excerpt? Can you, as a leader, create among your soldiers the enthusiasm and spirit required to overwhelm an enemy, regardless of your mission? If so, how?

* - Night (operations).

p. 229. "There is nothing more terrifying than moving at night through a piece of wooded or bushy country, in which every shrub might release a sudden flash of white light to dazzle and blind a moment before the intense pain which could mean the end of life."

- This passage accurately reflects the condition of night operations for units in World War II. U.S. technology has since produced advantages for us in night operations, but it remains the leader's responsibility to train soldiers and develop in them confidence in night operations.

* - Philosophy of Command.

pp. 216-218. In these pages, a company commander describes to his subordinates his personal motivation and philosophy of command (note that similar passages appear in Forester and Myrer). We all have such a philosophy, and in most command positions we are expected to publish it. This expectation reflects the importance of such a philosophy and, more critically, the need for that philosophy to be known to subordinates. Although officers disagree about the depth of dissemination of this philosophy, most agree that every subordinate should hear it or read it. It is said that an officer needs to tell subordinates not only what he/she stands for, but also what he/she will not stand for. This encourages consistency in the leaders and brings comfort to the subordinates. Have you developed a personal philosophy? How have you expressed it to subordinates? Have you asked of peers, mentors, or subordinates their opinions concerning your philosophy? Under what conditions do you think your philosophy might change?

* - Soldiers in War (description of life).

p. 37. "On that day the temperature fell to thirty-five degrees below zero, and I thought I would surely die. Nothing could warm us. We urinated into our numbed hands to warm them, and, hopefully, to cauterize the gaping cracks in our fingers."

- Sajer gruesomely depicts the soldiers' "living conditions" in war, not only in this excerpt, but at almost any point in the book. It emphatically casts doubt on the concept of war as a romantic endeavor.

* - Soldiers in War (psyche).

pp. 26-27. "Perhaps the circumstances of this particular Christmas night made a critical difference, but in all the time since then I haven't heard anything which moved me so much...This was, in its way, the most beautiful Christmas I had ever seen, made entirely of disinterested emotion and stripped of all tawdry trimmings. I was all alone beneath an enormous starred sky, and I can remember a tear running down my frozen cheek - a tear neither of pain nor of joy but of emotion created by intense experience."

p. 343. "It was Christmas night. Despite our miserable circumstances, we were filled with emotion, like children who have been deprived of joy for a long time."

- Soldiers, especially those from families which celebrate holidays in a traditional fashion, suffer melancholy when away from home for these holidays, especially for the first time. And that melancholy is acute in direct proportion to the severity of the conditions in which the soldier finds himself. Veterans of Vietnam tell of tears steaming down the cheeks of jungle-hardened "boonie rats" as they stood singing "Silent Night" at some fire base with Bob Hope's Christmas USO show troupe. But it does not take war to make for these situations. Soldiers in your unit suffer from it, too, if they cannot make it home for the holidays or other significant occasions. What does your unit do for soldiers in such circumstances: Dinners in leaders' homes? Homebaked goods distributed in the barrack? What works best?

p. 316. "We fought from simple fear, which was our motivating power. The idea of death, even when we accepted it, made us howl with powerless rage. We fought for reasons which are perhaps shameful, but are, in the end, stronger than any doctrine. We fought for ourselves, so that we wouldn't die in holes filled with mud and snow; we fought like rats, which do not hesitate to spring with all their teeth bared when they are cornered by a man infinitely larger than they are."

- It is argued that it is best to leave a surrounded enemy some avenue of escape to prevent the "cornered animal syndrome" reflected in this excerpt. That argument forwards the thought that casualties would be

considerably higher if an enemy were forced to stand and fight. Do you agree? Is it best to shut off all means of escape to an encircled enemy force and then ruthlessly destroy it? What is another alternative?

p. 35. "But after a moment I couldn't go on. My knees trembled, and I dissolved in tears. I could no longer grasp anything that was happening to me. I could see clearly in my mind's eye France, and my family, and the games I used to play with my friends and my Meccano set. What was I doing here? I can remember crying out between bursts of sobs: 'I'm too young to be a soldier.'"

- This excerpt depicts the state of mind of a frightened soldier, the state of mind of almost every soldier during the periods of sheer terror which punctuate the longer spells of boredom on the battlefield. It is the commander's challenge to so well prepare soldiers for the rigors of the battlefield that they are able to overcome this terrorized state of mind to do their duty and achieve mission success.

* - Staffs.

p. 205. "A mess truck had arrived at the hamlet...The simple fact that we were being supplied restored some of our confidence."

- Compare this excerpt with a much less favorable support situation in Remarque. Here the support staff is accomplishing the purpose for which it was constituted and thereby strengthening the resolve of the command. The competent execution of such support is invaluable. As a leader, do you personally check on the support services your soldiers receive? If not, have you delegated that responsibility to a trusted subordinate? How would you improve the support services your soldiers receive?

* - Training.

p. 353. "Orders from higher up had put an end to the coddling of troops just back from the front."

- A soldier's training is never done. It is for the good of the soldier and the good of the unit, even in a war zone. The challenge for leaders is to make the training meaningful and make the soldiers understand its necessity. It was a mystery to some of us during the Vietnam war when, after two weeks on patrol in the field, we were subjected to training periods during our three-day "stand-downs" in the rear. The fault in our perception of that training being a

mysterious waste of time lay partially in our selfish naivete, but mostly in a "drill-by-the-numbers" hierarchy who were not successful in translating to us the very real need for us to remain sharp in our field skills. The other side of the ledger is the very real need of soldiers for rest and recreation. That must also be provided to every extent possible and in balance with the required training. Do your soldiers complain about some of the "concurrent" training they receive in the field? Do these complaints originate from the pitiful nature of the training or from your failure to depict the real need for the training? How can you make it better?

* - War.

p. 223. "Too many people learn about war with no inconvenience to themselves....Nothing is really serious in the tranquillity of peace...And even now, in my sleepless exhaustion, how gentle and easy peace seems!"

p. 288. "Peace has brought me many pleasures, but nothing as powerful as that passion for survival in wartime, that faith in love, and that sense of absolutes. It often strikes me with horror that peace is really extremely monotonous. During the terrible moments of war one longs for peace with a passion that is painful to bear. But in peacetime one should never, even for an instant, long for war!"

- Many veterans bristle when those unbaptized by fire challenge their experience, the former usually responding with something like, "If you haven't been there, don't try to tell me about it." That emotion is expressed in this excerpt. Do you agree? Does it actually take the whine of bullets overhead to appreciate the danger and fear and trials of war? Or can you teach it? Or absorb its lessons by reading about it?

* - War (crimes).

p. 186. "We were forbidden to take prisoners...It was either them or us - which is why my friend Hals and I threw grenades into the bread house, at some Russians who were trying to wave a white flag."

p. 234. "But the almost drunken exhilaration which follows fear induces the most innocent youths on whatever side to commit inconceivable atrocities."

pp. 373-374. "We remembered once again the tragic deaths at the territorial posts all along our line of

retreat during the winter...the faces of tortured men under the dark winter sky...If anyone had ordered us to fire (on the peasants), we would have obeyed without hesitation."

p. 415. "(The civilians) had to dodge the tanks pursuing them, and multiple barrages of howltzers and quadruple machine guns, and Ivan's bayonets - all of which is very difficult for a mother with an infant at her breast and a small child hanging on to her skirts. But after all everyone is born to die."

- These excerpts present actual situations, wrought with frustration, exhaustion, and rage, which resulted in atrocities on the battlefield. Are such war crimes inevitable? How can you as a leader affect this inevitability? Are rules of engagement effective in this regard? Are there even such things as war crimes in the first place? Will you encourage or discourage the reporting of alleged war crimes?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

9,15 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
19 - Leaders (reputation).	26,35 - Soldiers in War (psyche).
37 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
39 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
40,68 - Comradeship.	
83 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
83 - Comradeship.	97 - Leaders (courage).
97 - Death (randomness).	103 - Moral Forces.
112 - Comradeship.	
128 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
168 - Leaders (reputation).	178 - The Front.
186 - War Crimes.	
194 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
205 - Staffs.	
215 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
216 - Philosophy of Command.	
216,218 - Leaders (reputation).	
223 - War.	229 - Night (operations).
229 - Initiative.	234 - War Crimes.
240 - Comradeship.	
242 - Soldiers in War (description of life).	
247,250 - Comradeship.	262 - Mercy Killing.
274 - Leaders (stature).	288 - War.
297 - Death.	316 - Soldiers in War (psyche).
328,342 - Comradeship.	343 - Soldiers in War (psyche).
344 - Comradeship.	353 - Training.
373 - War Crimes.	376 - Leaders (reputation).
377 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
419 - War crimes.	430 - Leaders (reputation).

THE GENERAL. Forester, C.S. Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1987 (first published in England in 1936 and in the U.S. by Little, Brown, and Co., Boston, in 1947).

On the surface a great war story and underneath a clever criticism of the conduct of World War I and of the British officer corps of the early 1900's, The General is rife with lessons on the profession of arms for soldiers of any time period. On one hand, Herbert Curzon is seen as a leader with many admirable qualities, specifically his innate drive to do well at soldiering and thereby serve Britain and his traditional, honorable bravery, almost to a point beyond reason. But on the other hand, Herbert Curzon is seen as an officer anchored to the past, fighting a war today with yesterday's doctrine, and it almost brings his precious army and his beloved country to their knees. Regardless of our view of him, Curzon's career, largely structured by accidents and fate, offers pointed examples to a careful reader of how we can better do our duty. Generalship by J.F.C. Fuller is likewise a critique of the conduct of senior officers in World War I.

(NOTE: Books in this guide which also deal with World War I include All Quiet on the Western Front [Remarque], Once an Eagle [Myrer], The Face of Battle [Keegan], The Mask of Command [Keegan], and A Short History of World War I [Stokesbury].)

* - Anachronism.

p. 6. "'And stand up if you want to speak to me'...it went against his grain to make a target of himself for a lot of farmers whose idea of war was to lay ambushes behind rocks."

p. 41. "It seemed incredible that Carruthers could be talking to a cavalry colonel about machine guns and entrenchments like this..."

- These are examples of a basic premise of this book: a military organization often does poorly because it tries to apply the doctrine of past wars to current conflict and past traditions to current times. What does your unit do now that it has always done that reflects this? How can it be improved?

* - Careerism.

p. 23. "These pushful, forceful persons had a black mark set against them in Curzon's mind...They disturbed the

steady even tenor of life which it was right and proper to expect."

- It is argued that most generals and senior Army officers are of the same personality type because "the system" encourages it. These officers become successful because they fit into "the mold," and they in turn encourage the promotion of subordinates with whom they are comfortable, that is, those who also fit into "the mold." What is your opinion on this perception? Have you seen encouragement, either blatantly or surreptitiously, of performance of duties and behavior which fit into "the mold"? If "the mold" actually exists, what are the advantages to the Army as a whole? Disadvantages? If it exists, how should you deal with "the mold"? Comply? Fight it?

* - Change of Command.

p. 99. "(The former division commander) would never be able to resist the temptation to put his nose into the new organization of the division. Young officers could hardly be expected to order off a Major General, under whom they had only recently been serving, even though he was again retired. There would be hitches, perhaps nasty scenes...There must be no chance, not the faintest possibility, of trouble in his division. Moreover, it might weaken his authority a little if people assumed that (the former division commander) was staying on to see him firmly in the saddle."

- The philosophies of how best to change over the leader of units and organizations is as old as military service itself. These run the gamut from the new commanders coming in days or weeks early for briefings on the unit and opportunities to observe the unit in action to the opposite extreme of no contact at all until the change of command and then the former commander having until sunset to be off post. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each extreme? Which method serves the soldiers of the unit better? The new commander? The unit as a whole? Which do you favor? Or is there a middle ground which is better? Why?

* - Communication (of mission).

p. 5. "Probably (the company commander) had not been too sure himself (of what he was doing), because the battle had begun in a muddle amid a cascade of vague orders from the staff, and since then no orders had reached them..."

- A commander's obligation is to honestly assess situations for subordinates, issue clear, concise orders for their execution, and communicate the "commander's intent" so that they grasp the "big picture" which contains as a part the unit's mission. A soldier's understanding of the mission and how he fits into its successful accomplishment is key to his hearty involvement in its execution. Communication of missions, guidance, and philosophy is one of the most important and difficult challenges a commander will face. How do you determine just how much the soldiers need to know? Is it important for all soldiers to know every aspect of how and why they are to do what you tell them to do? Do you agree that the commander's intent on operations should be communicated to two echelons below? Why or why not?

* - Death.

p. 37. "He bore it as a personal grudge that his brigade should have had no casualties save stragglers during a month's active service."

p. 52. "Men who stopped to think about their chances of being killed were a nuisance to their superior officers."

- Since death is inevitable in combat, should leaders be as insensitive to it as is expressed in these excerpts? Must all leaders so harden their hearts in search of mission accomplishment? What will be your personal philosophy in regards casualties? How will that philosophy compliment or contradict mission accomplishment? If a leader does not "believe in the war," is he/she justified in going out of the way to prevent casualties among subordinates, even to the point of disregarding the mission?

* - Discipline.

p. 168. "All this gross indiscipline must be checked at once. He circulated a scathing divisional order, and strengthened the hands of the military police, and saw to it that a score of offenders received exemplary punishments. The effect was immediate and gratifying, because the amount of crime decreased abruptly - as soon as the men had grown accustomed to the new conditions and to the methods of those in authority, so that they could evade detection; for no disciplinary methods on earth could keep British soldiers from wine, women, and wood."

- For many units, the problem of "indiscipline" is resolved once the crime statistics go down. It is no longer a concern that the detection of these crimes may have become

less effective. Is your unit statistic- and symptom-conscious or more concerned with the cause of such problems? That troubling matter aside, do you agree with the last sentence in this excerpt? If so, and if you also agree that "soldiers will be soldiers," then how do you plan to deal with such "human frailties" in the event of your deployment to an environment of "lesser civilization"? Or do you even worry about it?

p. 14. "Then they settled down in their barracks with the fixed determination (as the Colonel expressed it, setting his lips firmly) of 'teaching the men to be soldiers again.'"

- A character in Webb's book about Vietnam made a similar remark about how Vietnam had distracted Marines from being Marines. A character in Sajer's book on World War II mentioned how soldiers had to be soldiers again when off the front lines. The same was implied in Remarque's book on World War I soldiers and in this excerpt on the Boer War. What is there about conditions in a combat zone that, in the opinion of some leaders, takes the soldiers away from being soldiers? Is it a problem in reality or only a perception of the leadership? Or does it have something to do with a pre-hostility training environment which is so unlike combat conditions as to produce two different kinds of soldiers? And whose "fault" is that? Who is obligated to make training combat realistic so that the levels of discipline are practiced in peacetime training and can then easily and naturally carry over into hostilities? How does your unit training today reflect that need to gear soldiers up to those combat conditions? Is that training so short of the mark that you need to be ready to deal with a completely different kind of soldier in combat?

p. 171. "Moreover, as Curzon had suspected, a certain amount of a live-and-let-live convention had grown up in the line. Each side had inclined to refrain from inflicting casualties on the other side at moments when retaliation would cause casualties to themselves...Curzon would have none of this. It seemed to him to be a most dangerous and unsoldierly state of affairs; if a soldier whose duty it was to kill the enemy refrained from doing so he was clearly not doing his duty and it might lead to untold damage to discipline. Drastic divisional orders put a stop to this."

- This excerpt reflects how soldiers caught up in a seemingly hopeless situation contrive ways to survive. And such attitudes were not unique to World War I. Platoon leaders and company commanders in the Vietnam War admit that, as the war wound down and the U.S. withdrawal began,

they became much more concerned with preventing friendly casualties than with aggressively closing with and destroying the enemy. How do you feel about this? Can you conceive of a situation in which you might feel and react the same way? Another consideration is the issuance of orders that cannot be specifically enforced. It is said that leaders should refrain from issuing "pro forma" orders because they dilute the authority of a commander and confuse subordinates about what is really important. Could the divisional orders issued in this excerpt really stop this quest for self-preservation? Would you issue the order even if it could not be enforced?

* - Duty.

p. 225. "He did not like to be thought a murderer even by fools with no knowledge of duty and honour."

- Our duty as servicemembers is to protect the peace and, if called upon to do so, win our nation's wars. That last requirement is somewhat shocking to those who are beguiled by our effervescent recruiting campaigns. Try telling an audience of young soldiers, especially those of the non-combat arms, that when they raised their right hand to take the oath of service, they were really volunteering to be the first to serve their country and possibly die in a combat zone; their looks of amazement will convince you that their concept regarding this duty is not consistent with reality. With that in mind and the fact that leaders are responsible for their soldiers in war, have you resolved with yourself that your subordinates may die? And that some of our countrymen, especially the bereaved families of those killed, will hold you responsible for these deaths (as many did in the Vietnam era)? Talk with veterans who have lost subordinates in combat and learn about their reactions; yours will not be much different, and it would do well to understand that.

* - Education (military).

pp. 24-25. "It was not often that Curzon could be brought to discuss the theory of war...As soon as any man started to talk about the theory of war one could be nearly sure that he would bring forward some idiotic suggestion, to the effect that cavalry had had its day and that dismounted action was all that could be expected of it, or that machine guns and barbed wire had wrought a fundamental change in tactics, or even - wildest lunacy of all - that these rattletrap aeroplanes were going to be of some military value in the next war."

- It is the opinion of many Army officers and of most Naval officers that the time spent studying our profession of arms and the theories of warfare is time spent away from the "active service"; thus, it is time not spent pursuing the advancement on the career "fast track"; thus, it is time wasted. This is certainly the short-sighted view. The maturity of an officer requires an understanding of military history, military theories, and international relations; it also requires interaction with peers and seniors in all branches of service to broaden the base of understanding of the country's military establishment (joint operations are the future); and it requires time away from the pressures of an assignment to reflect on the profession. How do you and your peers feel about these thoughts? Are you prepared to devote time to study your profession? How tough is it to get CAS3 allocations in your unit? How is that allocation process a reflection of the command's philosophy?

* - Fraternization.

p. 224. "But Curzon had no intention of sending for him; he formed that resolution after only brief reflection. Cole had his duty to do like everyone else, and there was no reason why he should be selected rather than any other for a safe billet. Curzon had always frowned on favoritism..."

- The form of fraternization of most common concern is usually that of a romantic nature between leaders and subordinates of the opposite sex; but another form of fraternization, reflected often between leaders and subordinates of the same sex, is that of favoritism or friendship so close as to give rise to the perception of favoritism. It is difficult for a leader not to show special fondness for a subordinate who is competent, positive natured, and unit oriented and who shares similar interests. That fondness may be expressed in the more frequent use of the subordinate's first name, more demonstrated interest in the subordinate's family and activities, more of a tendency to request that subordinate's services for specific missions, or even more off-duty social contact. Whatever the expression of fondness, that real or perceived favoritism will have a destructive affect on unit morale and cohesion. How well do you think you handle relationships with favorite subordinates? What are examples of this type of fraternization that you have experienced and what was their effect? How would you have handled the situation differently?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 8. "...his mere presence and unruffled demeanor acted as a tonic on the men."

p. 47. "The wounded and the faint-hearted alike brought their rifles to their shoulders again under the stimulus of his presence."

p. 55. "He put new heart into the men by the way in which he disregarded danger...No soldier in the world could have remained unmoved by the nonchalant fashion in which he was always ready to lead into danger...Over and over again during those eleven days it was his arrival which turned the scale."

- The testimony of these excerpts is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evident in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

These excerpts show why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 8. "Twice he spoke harshly. Once was when he found Trooper Haynes cowering behind rocks without making any attempt to return the fire, and once was when he found Trooper Macguire drinking from his water bottle. Water out here in the veldt was a most precious possession, to be hoarded like a miser's gold, for when there was no more water there would be no flight left in the men."

- Two sets of extremes are seen in this excerpt. At the personal level, we see extreme courage to stand among the hail of bullets to lend courage to subordinates, but simultaneously extreme foolishness to do it in such a brazen manner. At the leadership level, we see the good judgment to reprimand a soldier for not firing, but also the poor judgment to reprimand another for drinking water. This latter case is paralleled in both Webb and Remarque ("Lifer") where just having a commodity is more important than putting it to the use for which it was designed and is so desperately needed. What is a recent example in your experience of a senior soldier more interested in form than substance?

p. 165. "Miller, dark, saturnine, silent, had said nothing so far, and now, after a Lieutenant General and a Major General had expressed themselves so enthusiastically it could not be expected of a mere Colonel to go against their opinions - not a Colonel, at any rate, who placed the least value on his professional career."

p. 173. "A word from Curzon would take him from his staff position where he could think even though his mouth remained shut and put him into an infantry battalion where he would not be able to think at all."

- No leader is correct all the time and no leader has the monopoly on good ideas; accordingly, no decent, clear-thinking leader will tolerate among subordinates the "yes-man" attitude reflected in these excerpts; nor will that leader knowingly create an atmosphere in which the "yes-man" attitude is perceived by subordinates to be the expected attitude. How healthy is your unit in this regard? Have you established the means for feedback from subordinates? Have your seniors made it possible for you to offer feedback? Are good ideas tried and tested freely? Do subordinates feel free to tell you bad news as well as good? The better approach is reflected in this excerpt from p. 176. "It must be recorded to Curzon's credit that he never afterwards allowed that incident to prejudice him against Frobisher - and it is significant of his reputation for fairness that Frobisher had no real fear that he would."

p. 168. "He chafed against the feeling of impotence which he experienced at having to command his division by telephone. He was still imbued with the regimental ideal of sharing on active service the dangers and discomforts of his men."

p. 184. "...as Curzon saw it, a divisional general among his men even if they were occupying a mile of tangled front was of more use than a divisional general two miles behind."

- Compare this with excerpts and discussion under the same topic under Fuller. The telephone and "inactive leadership" by generals are scathingly critiqued there as major failures of general officer and senior leadership in "modern times."

* - Leaders (reputation).

p. 6. "The loss of the only officer the squadron had left would place Sergeant-Major Brown in command, and Brown was not at all desirous of such a responsibility."

- It is probably not so much a reflection on the sergeant major that he did not care for the responsibility as much as a reflection on the system which did not routinely grant him responsibility through the years of his career so that he would become practiced with it. All soldiers must be consistently and continually given responsibility and the appropriate authority to do their jobs. If that does not happen, they are unpracticed in the application of authority and the acceptance of responsibility, and the standard of leadership suffers accordingly. Though the senior leader always holds the ultimate responsibility, how do you allocate responsibility to subordinates? And how do you grant the appropriate authority? Who are the best examples for delegation of these factors in your unit? What can other leaders emulate from them? How is this excerpt characteristic or uncharacteristic of senior NCO's in your experience?

* - Leaders (stature).

p. 7. "All his training, both military and social, had been directed against his showing any loss of composure before his inferiors in rank, even if those inferiors should actually be voicing his own fears."

- On the one hand is the belief that, "If you maintain your head while those around you are losing theirs, you obviously don't know what is going on." On the other

hand is the belief that a unit draws strength or weakness from the commander, demonstrating the emotions that the leadership displays in a crisis. Which do you believe? Is it okay for a leader to be emotional, to vent frustration, fear, and sadness? Or is it best to be constantly restrained and in control of one's emotions? Give examples to support your case.

p. 150. "Curzon had the feeling that it would be harmful to discipline if a major general were to admit to his subordinates that he had human attributes..."

- If one of your subordinate leaders shows emotion in a tough situation, how would you feel about it? What if it were one of your senior leaders? Are there situations where emotion may be okay and not others? How about the all feelings in the range of emotions: Anger? Laughter? Sullenness? Sadness? Depression?

p. 104. "The sight of a Major General come to see how they were getting on was a most welcome break in the day, reviving hope in breasts where hope of anything was fast dying altogether."

- Related in these pages is a classic example of leadership. Though not especially qualified for command of a division, Curzon boldly establishes his priorities on his first day in command by demonstrating to subordinates in lousy weather conditions how involved he would be in the command. Leadership involvement in all aspects of soldiers' lives is key to a healthy command environment. "Managing by wandering around" is a phrase used in the civilian world to describe a successful management strategy; "leading by wandering around" is just as applicable. A commander who allows his/her in-box to chain him/her to the comfortable, reassuring confines of the office is not a leader, but an observer who has little or no positive impact on the unit. How do you ensure that you are out and around your unit area often enough to be an effective leader? Do your seniors visit you enough to positively affect your unit?

* - Loyalty.

p. 67. "...there was no chance of his disparaging his superiors to anyone..."

p. 130. "...it would have needed a very serious deficiency indeed to induce Curzon not to give the simple loyalty (to his seniors) which he in turn expected from his subordinates."

- While loyalty to one's senior officers is encouraged for the more obvious reason of maintaining the chain of command, a less obvious benefit of such loyalty is created: that subordinates, when they observe this admirable "loyalty up" characteristic in their leaders, will tend to mirror it. Consequently, they are loyal to their leader as a logical extension of the fine example set for them. How healthy is "loyalty up" in your unit? Is gossip and grumblings about senior leaders more prevalent than discussions about their admirable traits? How would the situation be improved? But while "loyalty up" is laudable, where does the obligation to be loyal to seniors end? The incident described on pages 237-239 concerning the display of prisoners for visiting dignitaries is a case for speculation. Do we as military professionals assume our experience and knowledge are so paramount as to be inviolate? Where does old-fashioned honesty come to bear? What effect does such an incident have on subordinates, seeing as they have their "old man" involved in a shady deal?

p. 6. "A fortnight ago a whole squadron of Lancers - not of his regiment, thank God - had been cut off in that way and forced to surrender..."

- While loyalty to one's unit is fine (and, in fact, encouraged), so fervent a loyalty that it wishes ill to others in service to the country is destructive. Our oath of commission requires of us loyalty to our country, the President, and the Constitution, but many officers, in short-sighted pursuit of personal glory or gratification, place self, unit, and service above that basic loyalty. One only has to visit the Pentagon to hear interservice squabbles which are rife with short-sighted service loyalties and counter to the greater welfare of the nation as a whole. Or visit unit readiness briefings where commanders' eyes twinkle with delight at a peer's poorer showing. Or do you agree? Do we owe greater loyalty to our service or to the nation? Do you see your peers or seniors wishing other commanders at their level ill so that their unit prospers in comparison? Is that situation of brother-against-brother optimal when you may have to deploy to a combat zone with that unit on your flank?

* - Philosophy of Command.

p. 30. "Curzon, of course, had worked like a slave...The job was there to be done, and done well, and it was his business to do it."

p. 32. "...the cavalry colonel's active service maxim - 'Feed the horses before the men, and the men before the officers, and the officers before yourself.'"

p. 47. "...It was Curzon who repelled that attack. There was no limit to his savage energy in the execution of a clear-cut task."

- These excerpts express the most basic attributes which should be contained in a philosophy of command (note that similar sentiments are expressed by a company commander in Sajer and by leaders of all grades in Myrer). All leaders should have such a philosophy, and in most command positions we are expected to publish it. This expectation reflects the importance of such a philosophy and, more critically, the need for that philosophy to be known to subordinates. Although officers disagree about the depth of dissemination of this philosophy, most agree that every subordinate should hear it or read it. It is said that an officer needs to tell subordinates not only what he/she stands for, but also what he/she will not stand for. This encourages consistency in the leaders and brings comfort to the subordinates. Have you developed a personal philosophy? How have you expressed it to subordinates? Have you asked of peers, mentors, or subordinates their opinions concerning your philosophy? Under what conditions do you think your philosophy might change?

* - Regulations.

p. 23. "It was sufficient to him that the convention was established; it was that fact which justified the convention."

- Have you ever heard the statement, "We do it that way because we have always done it that way"? That fogbound attitude is reflected in this excerpt. An advantage of serving in "the line" before serving on a staff is that a soldier from "the line" is more likely to employ the lessons learned in that line assignment to accomplish the coordination responsibilities on the staff. A soldier not so experienced is much more likely to fall into the "same old way" trap. How prevalent is the "same old way" syndrome in your unit? Are the existent SOP's revised periodically to reflect unit changes or do the SOP's also further cement the "same old way" syndrome?

* - Relief.

pp. 189-190. Discussed on these pages is the relief of a subordinate commander. While a solid, completely

disseminated philosophy of command and consistent application of authority should alleviate the need for the relief of subordinates, there will inevitably come a time in a leader's career when the relief of a subordinate for poor duty performance or moral reasons becomes necessary. Resolve that in your mind now to dispel some of the agony over the decision when that time comes. What are examples of relief in your experience? Were they justified or not? Why? How were they handled? What would you have done differently? What are some cases where you thought a relief was in order and it did not occur?

* - Sports.

p. 136. "Yet it is possible that fox-hunting played its part in welding the Ninety-First Division into a living, active whole, for every officer did his best to hunt, and the friendships formed in the hunting field may have influenced subsequent events in No Man's Land."

- Most commanders believe in the value of a solid athletic and sports program for units, as reflected in this excerpt. And General MacArthur's opinion of the value of the "fields of friendly strife" certainly canonized this belief. Does your unit sports program encourage comradery? Does it encourage the officers to work with the soldiers and thereby increase their bonds of trust and fellowship? Or can a sports program really do any of these things? Is it actually just a waste of time, as reflected in the excerpt from Fuller?

* - Strategy.

p. 56. "It occurred to no one that they had to die (uncomplainingly) because the men responsible for their training had never learned any lessons from history, had never realized what resources modern invention had opened to them, with the consequence that men had to do at the cost of their lives the work which could have been done with one-quarter the losses and at one-tenth the risk of defeat if they had been adequately armed and equipped. And of the surviving officers the ones who would be marked out for promotion and high command in the new army to be formed were naturally the ones who had proved themselves in the old fashioned battle..."

- Learning the lessons of history must be combined with a perceptive appreciation for technology in assessing what the next battlefield will look like. Only then can a successful strategy be derived. Are you comfortable with the utilization of your unit's weapons and mobility on

training exercises? Is there a probable contingency on which you might be deployed that your unit is not prepared, either by structure or employment tactics, to undertake? How can you remedy that?

p. 192. "The next attack to be made would have to be planned very differently."

- But the discussion that follows this excerpt relates no real difference in strategy than that of intensity. The stalemate of World War I may have had few other options, but the futile attempts to simply go after the trenches with a bludgeon rather than a scalpel revealed very little imaginative leadership. That shortcoming is further reflected in this next excerpt:

p. 205. "Men without imagination were necessary to execute a military policy devoid of imagination, devised by a man without imagination."

- And finally confirmed at the Somme:

pp. 218-219. "Napoleon had said that artillery preparation was necessary for attack - they had employed an artillery preparation greater than the world had ever seen. Careful planning beforehand was desirable - the plans had worked perfectly, without a hitch, up to the moment of proof. Ample reserves - there had been ample reserves in hand. It would have only needed for Curzon that night to have discussed the tactical problems with some hard-bitten infantry subaltern for him to have become convinced that the invention of machine-guns and barbed wire, which Napoleon had never heard of, called for a departure from Napoleon's tactical methods, and if Curzon had once been convinced it would have been hard to unconvince him."

- But the necessity for another solution was still resisted:

pp. 227-228. "...he imagined that tanks might be a useful tactical accessory...It would take a great number of tanks, all the same, to kill the number of Germans necessary for victory. Only infantry, of course, can really win battles..."

p. 235. "Innovations and charlatany were indissolubly linked in his mind."

* - Training.

p. 4. "Curzon was in command...by the chances of war. Three officers senior to him were sick...and (the officer) who had been in command when the squadron went into action, was dead at Curzon's feet..."

p. 44. "...this much was certain, that however little Borthwick knew about machine guns it was more than Curzon did."

- An old axiom holds that a leader should be able to do everything his/her subordinates can do. Although this may not be an ironclad requirement in large or technically oriented command positions, the point that a leader should understand at least the capabilities of all organic equipment is still valid. The thought behind the first excerpt extends this axiom to the leader's requirement also to understand the boss's job and the job of peers in "adjacent" units. This not only provides a clearer understanding of the commander's intent on one hand and a grasp of the "big picture" on the other hand, it also prepares the leader to assume these positions as inevitable casualties occur in war. How prepared are you to assume your boss's job? Or the job of a peer (maybe in addition to your own)? How well have you trained your subordinates to assume your job? How can you build into your unit training occasions where this eventuality can be exercised?

* - War (trinity).

p. 235. "Civilian interference in military affairs spelt ruin - all his teaching and experience told him that."

- A basic premise from Clausewitz on the successful national prosecution of war is that a basic trinity works in a well-coordinated, mutually supportive manner. That trinity consists of the government, the military, and the people. The government must firmly assess the political aim of the war in satisfaction of national interests and objectives and then assign specific objectives to the military; the military must aggressively achieve these objectives; and the people must provide continuing support of these efforts. When one or more of this trinity are out of kilter with the others, the war effort most likely will fail (witness our experience and that of the French in Vietnam).

Numerical order of pages with topics:

4 - Training.	5 - Communication (of mission).
6 - Loyalty.	6 - Anachronism.
6 - Leaders (reputation).	7 - Leaders (stature)
8 - Leaders (courage).	
8 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
14 - Discipline.	23 - Regulations.
23 - Careerism.	24 - Education (military).
30,32 - Philosophy of Command.	
37 - Death.	41 - Anachronism.
44 - Training.	47 - Leaders (courage),
47 - Philosophy of Command.	52 - Death.
55 - Leaders (courage).	56 - Strategy.
67 - Loyalty.	99 - Change of Command.
104 - Leaders (stature).	130 - Loyalty.
136 - Sports.	150 - Leaders (stature).
165,168 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
168,171 - Discipline.	
173,184 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
189 - Relief.	192,205,218 - Strategy.
224 - Fraternization.	225 - Duty.
227,235 - Strategy.	235 - War (trinity).

GENERALSHIP: ITS DISEASES AND THEIR CURES. Fuller, J.F.C., Major General. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Co., 1936.

Major General Fuller's aim was to cure the generals of Great Britain of their "diseases" of leadership prior to the next war (World War II). In so doing, he provides us with an interesting insight into the leadership concerns of his time. The reader notes that many of these are also the concerns of our time. Simultaneously, Fuller espouses personal opinions which are of considerable interest, including thoughts on the most effective age of generals and military theories on mechanization and tactics. Written over 50 years ago, this short work is timeless. The General by C.S. Forester is a more satirical critique of the performance of the senior officers of World War I.

(NOTE: Other books in this guide which also cover World War I include All Quiet on the Western Front [Remarque], Once an Eagle [Myrer], The Face of Battle [Keegan], The Mask of Command [Keegan], and A Short History of World War I [Stokesbury].)

* - Education (military).

p. 78. "The object of education is not so much to discover 'what to think,' as to learn 'how to think.'"

- This refers to not only the professional military schools we all attend, but also to our personal professional educational efforts. Certainly this guide is aimed at that objective and should help and encourage its readers to think objectively about their profession. How would you structure differently the courses you have attended at the military schools to accomplish the "learn how to think" challenge? What can you do about it in your unit with your unit's training plan? With the individual professional development plan?

* - Feedback.

p. 88. "The old are often suspicious of the young and do not welcome criticism, yet without criticism, both destructive and constructive, there can be no progress...the easiest course to adopt is to lay down rules and regulations which must be implicitly obeyed; yet...such rules and regulations are apt to cramp intelligence and originality."

- A free flow of feedback to leaders is crucial to enlightened leadership. Perhaps the first key positions to which "the old" here pertains are company first sergeants

and battalion commanders and sergeants major. How healthy is the interchange between these leaders and their subordinates in your unit? Is there free, undefensive interchange or do "rules and regulations" stifle this interchange? If it needs improvement, how would you do it?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 23. "...heroism is the soul of leadership, whether a man is leading himself by placing his convictions before his interests, or whether he is risking his life to save the lives of his comrades, or to help win the cause his country is fighting for...for until a man learns how to command himself it is unlikely that his command over others will prove a profitable business."

- The essence of this is that the personal and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of personal courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

p. 45. "The men only wanted someone to give them a command."

p. 47. "'Ulysses don't scare worth a d____.' It is such generals who can lead men, who can win victories and not merely machine them out.."

- The exertion of the "personal" factor of command can be key. And it is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (intelligence).

p. 32. "'creative mind'...Originality, not conventionality, is one of the main pillars of generalship.

To do something that the enemy does not expect, is not prepared for, something which will surprise him and disarm him morally. To be always thinking ahead and to be always peeping round corners. To spy out the soul of one's adversary, and to act in a manner which will astonish and bewilder him, this is generalship. To render the enemy's general ridiculous in the eyes of his men, this is the foundation of success."

p. 33. "When war arises the small minds, worn out by attention to trifles, are incapable of effort, and fall miserably."

- It should be obvious that intelligence and a creative mind are critical factors in leadership success. But added to this surely must be common sense; for have we not all seen overly intelligent leaders with the common sense of rocks who drive subordinates to distraction by their constant meddling? The issuance of mission-type orders and the execution of "brief-backs" are the essence of enlightened, intelligent leadership. Woe be to the unit where it is thought "unprofessional" for leaders to be seen with their feet up on their desk thinking occasionally rather than out in the unit area doing all the time. How much thinking do you do on the job about your job? How do we preserve and encourage originality in a system which tends to reward dependability, predictability, and "zero defects"?

p. 34. "...It is impossible to endow a general with courage and intelligence, it is possible to pick fit men and young men who are likely to remain fit for command."

- There are two commonly held maxims: "mental fitness and physical fitness go hand-in-hand" and "a leader should be able to do all his subordinates can do." Do you agree or disagree with these? Are they absolutes or are there exceptions in each case? Where does the weight standard fit into the physical fitness criteria? Should weight even be a consideration?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 16. "...the generals in charge of the operations fought their way into the fortresses with their troops. Departure from this practice had led to unduly prolonged spasms of futile fighting, to great and unnecessary waste of precious life, and to a separation in spirit and sympathy of the generals and staff from the rest of the army."

p. 21. "...the most rapid way to shell-shock an army is to shell-proof its generals; for once the heart of an army is severed from its head the result is paralysis."

p. 53. "But when he (the general) is attacking he must be there on the spot, not to direct only but to encourage; for however exalted may be his rank, he should never forget that he is still a soldier."

pp. 58-59. "If he becomes an office soldier, they become office soldiers; not only because his work makes their work, but because his morale makes their morale: how can he order them into danger if he remains in safety? If the general-in-chief does not face discomfort and danger neither will they; if they do not, neither will their subordinates, until the repercussion exhausts itself in a devitalized firing line."

p. 61. "(The generals) could establish contact (with subordinates by telephone), but they could accomplish this only by dragging subordinate commanders out of the firing line, or more often persuading them not to go into it (in the first place), so that they might be at the beck and call of their superiors."

- A common occurrence in Vietnam was "helicopter stacking" above a firefight: a platoon or company in contact on the ground, observed overhead in ascending order of rank by the battalion commander, the brigade commander, and the division commander. This oversupervision by radio was usually as personal as the leadership of the senior officers ever got. The result was fewer senior commanders on the ground personally leading soldiers and the lowest casualty rate among generals of any war in our history. And some argue that the future battlefields (either another counterinsurgency or a rapidly moving conventional war over a vast area) will make personal leadership just as rare. How do you view the leaders and staff senior to you? Are they "office soldiers"? How does their presence or absence affect their ability to enact sound policy and cogent operational plans? Or your respect of them? What is it that most affects the ability or desire of senior leaders and staff to "get involved" with subordinate units and leaders? How does the size of the staff affect this relationship?

* - Regulations.

p. 79. "It is not recognized that the object of regulations and rules is to produce order in the fighting

machine, and not strangle the mind of the man who controls it."

- This statement forwards the almost "heretical" idea that Army regulations should be for guidance only (note a similar opinion in Myrer). This further implies that a commander may exercise his/her judgment (judgment which must be significant because he/she was chosen for his/her post over several worthy competitors) in commanding his/her unit, perhaps even "bending" a regulation or two in the process. In many units, such "liberties" are unheard of. In others, they are routine. The climate of command in either type unit is probably parallel to the relative freedom enjoyed by the commander to exercise his/her judgment in this regard. How do you feel about it? Are regulations to be rigidly obeyed? Or can a commander use them for guidance and command as he/she judges best? Or are there some regulations that can be "bent" and others that should not be?

* - Safety.

p. 86. "Audacity, and not caution, must be our watchword. Safety first may make a good midwife, but it will never make a good general."

- Does this "safety" mean "accident free" or the "conservative employment of forces" to avoid risk or the possibility of failure? In the context seen here, it probably means "conservative." But for the sake of argument, let us say it means "accident free." Does this statement then refer to safety in training or combat? Or both? Commanders are relieved routinely in most units because of casualties to their soldiers caused by "unsafe" incidents in training exercises or "unsafe" conditions in garrison. Is there such a thing as justifiable training injuries? How can a commander realistically train soldiers for the lethality of the modern battlefield and simultaneously conduct an "accident free" exercise? How do you feel about the statement that, "Any combat training program worth its salt will result in a predictable casualty rate"? How would you change your unit's training program to reflect your philosophy on safety?

* - Sports.

p. 81. "Games and sports have an immense value as physical relaxers and restorers; but in themselves they have no more military value than playing fiddles or painting postcards."

- Do you think that this statement pertains only to the officer as an individual or to units in general? On the surface, this excerpt certainly proposes a different philosophy than that espoused by General MacArthur ("On the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that on other fields on other days will sow the fruits of victory.") and the Duke of Wellington ("Waterloo was won on the fields of Eton."). Does your unit sports program encourage comradery? Does it encourage the officers to work with the soldiers and thereby increase their bonds of trust and fellowship? Or can a sports program do any of these things to begin with? Is it just a waste of time, like "playing fiddles"?

* - Staffs.

p. 65. "No soldier can doubt the immense value of a general staff if it is the general's servant, and not the general's goaler."

pp. 66-67. "The staff becomes an all-controlling bureaucracy, a paper octopus squirting ink and wriggling its tentacles into every corner. Unless pruned with an axe it will grow like a fakir's mango tree...It creates work, it creates offices, and, above all, it creates the rear-spirit."

- Almost every officer will enthusiastically declare that the best job in the Army is company command. It must be a remarkably great job because it maintains this almost nostalgically affectionate place in our hearts despite the overwhelming crunch of paperwork imposed upon the company commander from above. This burden has been so bad in some units that division commanders have studied how much paperwork could be reduced to make the job less a strain. Why is there a strain like this on company commanders? Easy - the battalion staff and the brigade staff and the division staff. Let us use the battalion staff as the illustrative example. This staff has a distinct administrative manpower advantage over the "staffless," undefended company commander. And the staff fills its time with generation of requirements to which the company commander must respond. And as the staff generates more requirements, or has more requirements placed on it by its brigade staff, the battalion staff grows bigger - and more requirements are generated for the company commander just keeping these folks busy during the duty day (after all, they cannot sit around idle, can they?). The true ability of an organization to lead its soldiers is usually directly proportional to the size of its staff. If the headquarters company is at 100% strength and there are

several additional soldiers "detailed" to the staff (but who remain on the books of the companies), chances are the battalion commander and company commanders do not do much leading of soldiers - the requirements generated by this staff (who, after all, must keep busy to justify their existence) simply tie the commanders to their "in-box." But brigades and battalions whose staffs are small, without the six or seven assistant operations officers, at least have a chance - all they need are leaders who combine their good judgment (already proven by the size of their austere staffs) with the courage to get out and lead soldiers. Or do you agree? How efficient is the staff in your organization? Of the organization senior to you? Is their level of efficiency related to their size? Should an officer and NCO first be assigned to a line unit before serving on a staff, or does that matter?

* - Training.

p. 55. "Nothing is more dangerous in war than to rely upon peace training; for in modern times, when war is declared, training has always been proved out of date."

- Our peacetime challenge cannot be better stated. The Combat Training Centers offer excellent, intense training to prepare divisional units and leaders for combat (corps units also benefit from the Battle Command Training Program). But if you are not in one of these units, how do you prepare for the rigors of combat? What would you add to your unit's garrison training program to further the end of preparation for battle? In fact, can any training adequately prepare you for the intense battlefield environment?

* - War.

pp. 25-26. "...all great nations learned the truth of word, and strength of thought, in war...they were nourished in war, and wasted by peace; taught by war, and deceived by peace; trained by war, and betrayed by peace; in a word... they were born in war, and expired in peace."

- Relate this to your beliefs and the experience of the United States. Where do we as a nation fall on this spectrum of "expiration"? How did the Vietnam war fit into this beneficial depiction of war? The Persian Gulf War? Can this line of reasoning not also apply to individual perceptions? How do people view the United States who have been overseas or fought in a conflict under her flag as compared to those who have done neither? Is there value for a country to require its citizens to have to serve her? Or

does it really matter so long as the nation exists in peace and prosperity? See a similar thought in Heinlein.

Numerical order of pages with topics:

16 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
21 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
23 - Leaders (courage).	25 - War.
32,33,34 - Leaders (intelligence).	
45,47 - Leaders (courage).	
53 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
55 - Training.	
58,61 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
65,66 - Staffs.	78 - Education (military).
79 - Regulations.	81 - Sports.
86 - Safety.	88 - Feedback.

THE GLORIOUS CAUSE. Middlekauf, Robert. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1982.

Described in this book is the birth of the United States, a birth with the characteristics of many other revolutions: one with rebels and loyalists among the common people; one matching an inexperienced army against a veteran army; one with the revolutionaries fighting on home ground against a colonial power fighting on foreign shores far from home; and one with a people full of revolutionary zeal sorely tested by the hardships of war opposing a people accustomed to control of colonies who must decide just how much they want to sacrifice to maintain that control. In a confrontation created by the colonial power, the revolutionaries rose to their glorious cause, the defense of republican freedom. The military leader should be well based in this conflict not only because it forged our nation, but also because the lessons learned by the British in this war are so similar to those we experienced in Viet Nam. There is much to be gained from the study of this wonderful effort by the colonists. So read and be proud of our forefathers.

(NOTE: The first portion of this book is a detailed description of pre-Revolutionary War politics and culture in both America and England, and the latter portion describes the post-war Constitutional Convention. While interesting, these portions are not as cogent to the questions at hand as the portion between pages 250 and 581.)

* - What were the political issues which motivated the American people and the army in the Revolution? Consider these items:

- Legitimacy of power or, stated another way, "the rights of Englishmen" (governors, legislatures, taxation).
- Constitutional issues (use of naval force).
- Military occupation of the colonies by Britain.
- Religious freedom from the Church of England.
- Personal liberties (trial by peers).

* - Compare the principal strengths and weaknesses of Britain and the colonies in fighting a war against one another.

- Consider these British factors:

(+) Professional regular army and navy.

(+) Training, education, and experience of officer corps.

(-) Lack of manpower (as indicated by their use of mercenaries).

(-) Communications and distances.

(-) Fiscal restraints.

(-) Combat in a hostile land.

(-) Soldiers fighting an "enemy" of kindred spirits.

- Consider these American factors:

(+) Literate, religious population with a willingness to endure to achieve a "glorious cause."

(+) Ubiquitous militia.

(+) Dedicated and principled leadership, especially General Washington.

(-) Poorly trained and inexperienced military.

(-) "Beginners'" start-up problems (organization, supplies and equipment, leadership, financing, planning).

* - What unique problems did the war in North America pose for Britain's diplomacy and armed forces? Consider the following:

- Lack of British allies in Europe and thereby no way to divert France toward land campaigns.

- Drain on British resources, especially the requirement to maintain forces in North America (fiscal and manpower restraints).

- Combined opposition of the colonies, France, Holland, and Spain (host of enemies and dispersal of British efforts).

- Military efforts uncoordinated with political aims (lack of strategic focus, not realizing the difference between fighting a war and putting down a rebellion).

- Logistics, communications, and distances.

- Rural, scattered, educated, self-sufficient, and committed enemy which British did not know well and which it underestimated (especially in regards to the American leadership abilities).

* - What were the characteristics of 18th century European armies upon which the British army and even the early American Continental army were patterned? (Compare with thoughts on a similar question in Ross.) Consider these items:

- Personnel (source and personal characteristics of soldiers and officers [education, morale, desertion rate]).

- Operations (impact of weather, the seasons, and daylight; exploitation of victories in pursuit of total victory in a total war).

- Tactics (manual of arms; close-order drill; battle formations).

- How did General Washington deviate from the "standard"? Address these items:

- + Winter campaigns.

- + Use of militia.

- + Total war concept (conduct war to satisfy political aims; use of the population - especially the care not to alienate the large mass of uncommitted colonists).

* - What were the motivations which caused the individual American "revolutionaries" to fight? Consider these items:

- Intimidation and coercion (or lack thereof) by officers.

- Religious beliefs.

- Financial rewards from plundering the enemy and the local inhabitants surrounding the battlefields.

- The bravery and courageous example of officers.

- The power of alcohol to inhibit fears.

- The "American cause" of the Continental army soldiers.

- The "neighborly" relationships among men of militia units.

* - What were the principal strengths and weaknesses for the colonies in the alliance with France?

- Assess these strengths of the alliance:

- + Both wanted to weaken Britain.
- + Open and/or increase trade with France (some of which was lost with Britain).
- + Added manpower and naval force.
- + Diversion of British political attention and military forces to other theaters.

- Assess these weaknesses of the alliance:

- + Suspicion of French interest in American lands.
- + France more interested in revenge against Britain than in American interests.

* - Which theater of conflict was strategically the most important in determining the outcome of this war? Assess these theaters:

- South (British overestimation of loyalist support; British inactivity in the theater during 1776-1779; lack of decisive victory by the British following the seizure of Charleston; vulnerability of the colonies to attack from the sea at numerous locations).

- Central (site of the American "capitals"; source of much of the manpower and support for the Continental army; General Howe's miscalculation in moving to Philadelphia rather than joining Burgoyne; the victory at Yorktown).

- North (most active of the rebellious colonies were in New England; the defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga; colonies' vulnerability to attack from Canada).

- Atlantic Ocean (lines of communication from Britain vulnerable to French and Spanish interdiction).

- Europe (the conflict with Spain, France, and Holland as a diversion of resources and strength from the effort in America).

- Caribbean Sea (colonial conflicts diverted British attention).

* - What role did sea power play in determining the outcome of the Revolution? Address these topics:

- American privateers and raiders.
- The exploits of John Paul Jones.
- British troop movements.
- British logistics efforts.
- French and British naval encounters.
- British blockade efforts.

- Joint operations (especially the land and sea effort at Yorktown, Charleston, and Savannah).

* - Could Britain have defeated the rebellion of its colonies in North America? Address these items and how individually or in coordination with others Britain might have fared better.

- Howe's pursuit and destruction of Washington's army after the Battle of Long Island in 1776.

- Better coordinated effort between Howe and Burgoyne in 1777 to split the colonies along the Hudson River, rather than Howe deploying alone to Philadelphia and leaving Burgoyne on his own.

- Better courtship of loyalist support, convincing them to stay put and support British forces rather than becoming refugees.

- Better treatment of civilians to prevent alienation of neutrals.

- Integration of land and sea operations.

- Better stated political objectives (Police action? Conventional war? Pacification?).

- Exploitation of the victory at Charleston in 1780.

- Soothing of European rivalries to prevent the French and Spanish intervention in favor of the colonies.

- Better positioning of naval forces at the outset of war to prevent Count d'Estaing's escape from the Mediterranean and gaining the naval initiative.

- Better use of naval power (concentration against the French fleet at a decisive point, preferably in the English Channel, and concentration on American logistical choke points).

THE KILLER ANGELS. Shaara, Michael. New York, New York: Ballantine Books, 1975 (first published by Random House, New York, 1974).

"This is a story of the Battle of Gettysburg, told from the viewpoints of Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet and some of the other men who fought there" (Michael Shaara). Using documents of the era and letters of the major participants as sources, Shaara transcends time to place the reader on that fateful Gettysburg battlefield in the first days of July, 1863, at the shoulder of the soldiers who would decide the battle that many historians declare sealed the outcome of the war and forged the nation that would emerge from that war. It is beneficial to refer to McPherson to set the context of the battle, but, even by itself, this novel is a moving, brutally honest portrayal of the battle, the leaders, and the fog of war that decided its outcome. Leaders of today will better appreciate the Civil War as America's first total war and why men in battle are truly killer angels.

(NOTE: Other books in this guide which also cover the Civil War are Battle Cry of Freedom [McPherson], The Red Badge of Courage [Cranell], and The Mask of Command [Keegan].)

* - Civil War.

p. 68. "'Damn fool (English Colonel Freemantle)...he still thinks it's about slavery'...what a shame it was that so many people seemed to think it was slavery that brought on the war, when all it was really was a question of the Constitution."

- This excerpt reflects the belief among this group of officers that the Civil War was caused not by slavery, but by an interpretation of the Constitution regarding state sovereignty. Compare this with McPherson's reasoning that slavery was the cause of the war.

p. 66. "'(Armistead to Longstreet) I've been thinking on your theories of defensive war, and look, Pete, if you don't mind the opinion of an aging military genius, just this once? Technically, by God, you're probably right. Hell, you're undoubtedly right. This may be a time for defensive war. But, Pete, this aint the army for it. We aren't bred for the defense. And the Old Man, Lord, if ever there was a man not suited for slow dull defense, it's old R.E. (Lee).'"

- Some strategists argue that the South might have prevailed in their pursuit of independence if they had

chosen to defend, trade space for time, and let the North become war weary to the point that the North would have let the South go its own way. As is seen in this excerpt, however, the elan and esprit of the South demanded action, not the defensive, and the Confederacy's fate was sealed. How far can and should a commander go to change an army (or a unit) so that it can fight the way it must in order to win? See McPherson for more discussion of these strategic considerations.

* - Comradeship.

p. 135. "... (Confederate soldiers let) a valiant Yankee color sergeant withdraw after a great fight. The men refused to fire at him, that man had been brave, he deserved to live."

p. 350. "'I guess you got to hand it to (the Confederate soldiers), the way they came up that hill...nobody ever said they wasn't good soldiers...they're Americans anyway, even if they are Rebs.'"

- Expressed here is the concept of the worthy opponent, a concept that runs deep in the tradition of warfare. If soldiers of either side experience equally recognizable hardships and if the combat waged was honorably fought, a bond of comradeship transforms their avowed hostility towards one another into at least a grudging sense of respect after the fact. Compare this with a like excerpt in Sajer. Have you ever felt such a sense of comradeship with an opponent after an especially competitive sporting event? If so, can you not imagine that same sense existing in the greatest of all sporting events, war? But if this sense of comradeship exists, why do atrocities against opponents occur in battle? What has a leader to do with whether or not a unit will be a "worthy opponent"?

p. 16. "(Lee and Longstreet) had been together for a long time in war and they had grown very close...After a while Lee said slowly, 'When this is over, I shall miss it very much.'"

p. 122. "Isn't that amazing? Long marches and no rest, up very early in the morning and asleep late in the rain, and there's a marvelous excitement to it, a joy to wake in the morning and feel the army all around you and see the campfires in the morning and smell the coffee..."

pp. 160-161. "There was even an air of regret at the table, a sense of seize the day, as if these bright moments of good fellowship before battle were numbered, that the war

would soon be over, and all this would end, and we would all go back to the duller pursuits of peace."

p. 285. "But none of (the sick soldiers) wanted to go (to the hospital), some deathly afraid of the hospital itself, some not wanting to be away from men they knew, men they could trust, the Regiment of Home."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities, even among senior leaders such as Lee and Longstreet; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Discipline.

pp. 271-272. "Stuart was in pain, and (Lee) felt pity, but this was necessary; it had to be done as a bad tooth has to be pulled, and there was no turning away...(Lee) wanted to say, it's all right, boy, it's all right; this is only a lesson, just one painful quick moment of learning, over in a moment, hold on, it'll be all right...Keep (Stuart) on rein, but on a loose rein. He has to be checked now and then. But he's a fine boy. And I am sorry to have to do that. Yet it was necessary."

- There will be several moments of truth in an officer's assignment as a leader, but few have the

importance as that when discipline of a subordinate, especially a good one, is required. It is at those times, as in the case in this excerpt with Lee and Stuart, that the leader must muster the necessary courage to handle the situation. A failure to do so breeds distrust and rumors of favoritism among other subordinates. The pain experienced in the episode of discipline is far less than that experienced when reaping the whirlwind of discontent resulting from the failure to do so. What situations of this sort have you experienced and what was the result of whatever measures were taken? Are there situations in your present unit where a leader needs to courageously discipline a wayward subordinate? If so, how would you handle it?

* - Fitness.

p. 16. "(Longstreet) sat alone to await the dawn, and let them sleep a little longer."

- Here a senior leader recognizes that an additional hour's sleep will do more for the organization's effectiveness than an hour spent in the confusion of hasty preparation in the dark for movement. It is certainly a judgment call affected by exigencies of the moment and one similar to which leaders routinely have to make. The caution here is that many leaders, imprisoned by the premise that action is preferable to inaction in all situations, would have made the decision to wake the soldiers in the same circumstance which faced Longstreet. There is no way to precisely define such a possibility, but what factors will impact on your assessment of a situation which forces you to decide between the fitness of the command and action to the contrary to accomplish the mission?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 230. "'Let's fix bayonets.'"

- These pages describe the episode which is widely believed to be the critical event in the critical battle of the war, an event, which by extension, enabled the Union to survive and the United States to evolve in the manner it did. We all aspire to such coolness under fire. And since this is one of the truly classic leadership examples in our military history, it is critical to note that Chamberlain was a rhetoric professor. He rose to greatness not because of the "right" military background, but in spite of the lack of it - and because of his personal qualifications of courage, character, leadership, perseverance, resourcefulness, and respect for his men.

* - Leaders (intelligence).

p. 103. "...It was a brutal military truth that there were men who were marvelous with a regiment but could not handle a brigade, and men who were superb with a division but incapable of leading a corps. No way of predicting it..."

- It is said that we ascend through levels of leadership in our careers until most of us reach a level beyond our competence. If you have witnessed such an instance in an organization, how did it affect the unit? How was it handled? When such a situation arises, should the soldier in question be "eased out" or "coached along" by senior leaders?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 43. "He grinned to himself, and the staff noticed his face and relaxed momentarily."

p. 44. "The hint finally got to (Buford). (The staff) could not eat until he had eaten. They trailed him wherever he went, like a pennant; he was so used to their presence he did not notice their hunger."

- These excerpts illustrate how loyal, respectful subordinates defer to their leaders. It is not something which most leaders demand, but is something that just accrues to a leader, especially one who exercises life and death decisions. What measures do you take as a leader to stay tuned to this chemistry with subordinates, to ensure that they know you well enough to execute your philosophy or intent without orders, that they are cared for even when you are not conscious of the need to care for them, and that your closeness with them does not destroy the separation from them that must still exist?

p. 60. "(Longstreet) knew enough to stay out of (the fireside comradery of subordinates). The presence of the commander was always a damper."

p. 264. "(Longstreet) thought: I don't belong. But he wanted to join them. Not even to say anything. Just to sit there and listen to the jokes up close, sit inside the warm ring, because off here at this distance with the deafness you never heard what they said; you were out of it. But... If he joined there would be a stiffness. He did not want to spoil their night."

- Reflected here is a question that perplexes every leader: when can I let down the wall that surrounds me from my subordinates? As human beings, leaders enjoy companionship as much as anyone does, but the old adage that "it's lonely at the top" reflects the very real separation between leader and the led that accrues to command. The predominant thinking is that if it is tough to send a subordinate into mortal danger, it is doubly tough to send a subordinate with whom a social relationship is shared. Fraternization and its debilitating effects must also be considered. Some leaders are able, because of their personality, to enjoy extensive social relationships with subordinates. Other leaders cannot. Leaders should sense their personal style in this regard and, in that it is important that leaders have some social relationship with immediate subordinates at least, adopt that style to suit their leadership role and the situation at hand. Who are some leaders in your experience who enjoyed success with social relationships with subordinates and some who did not? What lessons from how these leaders handled themselves can you apply to your philosophy?

p. 109. "(Lee) swung to Heth. 'General, you may attack.' To Pender he said the same. He gave no further directions. The generals would know what to do now."

- Every leader should aspire to the condition reflected in this excerpt: a commander so confident that his/her subordinates understand his/her intent and philosophy of command that he/she can make a simple command and then assume compliance and expect success. If you are not at such comfort with your subordinates, what can be done to create such a situation? How about with your seniors?

p. 39. "(Buford) felt the beautiful absence of a commander, a silence above him, a windy freedom."

p. 198. "...It was Lee's practice to back off, once the fight had begun, and let the commanders handle it."

p. 254. "Longstreet explained that Lee usually gave the orders and then let his boys alone to do the job."

- Buford's excerpt is the epitome of the grandest sort of command, one in which the leader feels an obligation to none other than country and subordinates and the freedom to use military skill, judgment, and leadership to get the job done. The second and third excerpts describe a command climate under General Lee in which such freedom existed. But too often the post-mortem written by outgoing commanders of today talks of unrelenting pressure and endless

interference from above. Command, which is supposed to be the pinnacle assignment of our profession, turns out too often to be a sentence to purgatory, a term of enshacklement to the fears and ambitions of senior leaders. There is an obligation by senior leaders to ensure that their subordinates get the job done, but skillful senior leaders orchestrate this obligation in such a way as to present to subordinates an educational and rewarding sense of freedom. It is close to a universal truth that the greater the sense of freedom enjoyed by commanders, the better is the command climate in a unit and the better it does its job. How "free" do you feel as a subordinate? How "free" do your subordinates feel? What are some methods you have seen successful leaders use to achieve this sense of freedom?

p. 128. "Chamberlain thought: two things an officer must do, to lead men. 'You must care for your men's welfare. You must show physical courage.'"

- Is that all there is to it? Do those two things and soldiers will follow? If not, what other things must a leader do? Or have as personal attributes?

p. 19. "(Kilrain said) 'If ye'll ride the horse today, Colonel, which the Lord hath provided, instead of walkin' in the dust with the other fools, ye'll be all right'...'You walked,' Chamberlain said grumpily..."

p. 120. "It was time to dismount. A good officer rode as little as possible. (Chamberlain) got down from the horse and began to march along in the dust, in the heat."

- Few things endear a leader to subordinates than for the leader to endure hardships with them, on equal terms. The leader must only be cautious to endure the hardships in a condition so as to be able to carry on with his/her duties (Chamberlain here suffered heat stroke as a reward for his efforts to march with his soldiers rather than ride). What are some hardships that are more important for a leader to endure with his/her soldiers? How well do the leaders of your unit meet this challenge?

* - Leaders (stature).

pp. 325-326. "... (Armistead) saw that Longstreet was crying. He moved closer. The General was crying. Something he never saw or ever expected to see, and the tears came to Armistead's eyes as he watched..."

- Excerpts from Webb indicated a subordinate's belief that if the lieutenant cried, the rest of the unit

would be negatively affected. But here, Longstreet's emotion seemed not to have that affect on his subordinates. Are there some times when such a display of emotion by a leader is, if not appreciated, then at least sympathetically accepted? And other times when it is entirely inappropriate? Do a leader's tears tend to more negatively affect subordinates in the unit in general (i.e., privates and sergeants) as opposed to immediate subordinates or peers? What experience do you have with situations of great emotion and what was inappropriate or appropriate about the way leaders handled themselves?

* - Loyalty.

p. 188. "(Longstreet) had disagreed last night, had argued all morning, but now he was setting his mind to it. The attack would come."

p. 192. "(Longstreet) said (to Hood), 'Your idea of moving to the right was sound, but (Lee's) mind was set.'"

- A real test of a subordinate's loyalty is depicted in these excerpts. The first test requires the courage of a subordinate to argue a position contrary to that of his/her senior officer. The extent and fervor of that argument is determined by the situation at hand and the particular personal relationship between the senior and subordinate. The second test requires equal courage, that of the subordinate accepting the judgment and decision of the senior to execute the senior's course of action, the course opposed by the subordinate, and then executing that course with exuberance, as if it were his/her own choice to begin with. How do you allow subordinates to present alternate courses of action in the planning phases of a mission or project? How does your senior allow you to do so? What are cases where the presentation to a senior of opposing courses of action are morally or legally "required"? See a continuation of this loyalty theme under "Resignation."

* - Military Service.

p. 347. "'(Lee to Longstreet)...we have no Cause. We have only the army. But if a soldier fights only for soldiers, he cannot ever win. It is only the soldiers who die.'"

- General Lee's thought implies that only a patriot, one with a Cause in which to believe and for which to fight, can "win," while the leader without such a Cause and only his/her devotion to soldiers as a driving force has

no hope to "win." The patriot may lose soldiers along the way and still can gain ultimate victory for the Cause; the leader without a Cause can achieve ultimate victory only when no soldiers are lost, a hopeless pursuit. So our challenge is to balance these thoughts. Our Cause is to preserve in peace and protect in war our democratic way of life. We must strive to do so with minimal loss of life, but all the while realizing that some lives will be lost. Do you agree? What is your Cause? What about your seniors and peers? Is it important that your subordinates know about your Cause? Why or why not?

pp. 195-196. "'(Lee to Longstreet) To be a good soldier you must love the army. But to be a good officer you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love. That is...a very hard thing to do. No other profession requires it. That is one reason why there are so very few good officers. Although there are many good men.'"

- This excerpt aptly describes one precept of why our profession is a calling rather than a job. We as a body must be ever vigilant to uphold the honor and prestige of our significant position in a democratic society. That entails constant care for our personal affairs and the admonishment of those in our ranks who are dishonest or immoral. For it is only when leaders enjoy the absolute trust and respect of subordinates that they can in good faith order soldiers into deadly situations and then expect those soldiers to respond, intuitively aware that their leaders are doing the best right thing for that time and place. What shortfalls among fellow officers have you witnessed which detract from the overall reputation of the officer corps and what can be done to correct them? What can be done to help us achieve our aspiration of an officer corps of spotless reputation and unshakable honor?

* - Resignation.

p. 304. "(Longstreet to himself) There is one thing you can do. You can resign now. You can refuse to lead (the attack)."

- If the subject of a disagreement over a mission or order exceeds a subordinate's will to comply, be it because of legality, morality, or sanity, the ultimate extension of arguments to the contrary by the subordinate is resignation. This excerpt caps a long depiction of Longstreet's disagreement with General Lee about the Confederate tactics at Gettysburg (see other pertinent excerpts under "Loyalty"). It reflects the emotional trauma which accompanies the consideration of so drastic a step as

resignation. Though senior military leaders devised rationalized reponses when asked why they did not resign in the face of the unsound, half-hearted political strategy forced upon them during the Vietnam war, it remains a tender sore point for them as to why so few of them did resign while some lower ranking officers did. Under what circumstances would you and your peers consider resignation? Is it really a viable, worthy, effective option?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

16 - Comradeship.	16 - Fitness.
19,39,43,44,60 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
66,68 - Civil War.	103 - Leaders (intelligence).
109,120 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
122 - Comradeship.	
128 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
135,160 - Comradeship.	188,192 - Loyalty.
195 - Military Service.	
198 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
230 - Leaders (courage).	
254,264 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
271 - Discipline.	285 - Comradeship.
304 - Resignation.	325 - Leaders (stature).
347 - Military Service.	350 - Comradeship.

THE MASK OF COMMAND. Keegan, John. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1988.

As the author states on page 11, "The leader of men in warfare can show himself to his followers only through a mask, a mask that he must make for himself, but a mask made in such form as will mark him to men of his time and place as the leader they want and need. What follows is an attempt, across time and place, to penetrate the mask of command." John Keegan herein reveals the masks of command worn by Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Adolph Hitler. And the leadership lessons are as extensive as the years and range of moral characteristics that separated them. They lived and led, now you can learn.

* - Agility.

p. 150. "Wellington had taken the trouble to improve a road that ran along the ridge, so as to facilitate the movement of reinforcements from one point of crisis to another."

- Agility is a battlefield characteristic sought by wise commanders, and it is, after all, one of the tenets of Airland Battle doctrine. Here it is facilitated by Wellington by the artificial alteration of the battlefield. Wellington's campaigns against French forces in Portugal and Spain are detailed in Ross.

* - Civil War.

p. 165. "(Grant) knew that the Southerners, always strapped for supplies, could win a firefight only as a result of bad Northern management of their own superior resources."

- The great advantages in resources enjoyed by the Union during the Civil War made the Confederacy's hopes for independence dim indeed. See McPherson for greater detail on the disparity in resources between the two and its implications.

p. 197. "For all their operational expertise, Lee and Jackson proved men of limited imagination. Neither found means of forcing the North to fight on their terms, as they might have done had they tempted the Northern armies to enter the vast spaces of the South and manoeuvre out of touch with their railroad and river lines of supply. Both thought in terms of defending the South's frontiers rather than exhausting the enemy."

- Compare this with thoughts in McPherson wherein it is argued that "trading space for time" would have better served the Confederacy's aim of independence.

* - Communication (of mission).

p. 55. "Sometimes (Alexander) spoke only to a select group. During the Gaugamela preliminaries, for example, his pre-battle exhortation was an 'officers only' occasion, what the British army calls an 'Orders Group,' from which subordinate leaders take back the word of the commander to their own units. Then he had a short and lighter message for each of the component contingents..."

pp. 318-319. "(A commander) must also know how to speak directly to his men, raising their spirits in times of trouble, inspiring them at moments of crisis and thanking them in victory...the need of every commander to convey an impression of himself to his troops through words, to explain what he wants of them, to allay their fears, to arouse their hopes, and to bind their ambitions to his own."

- Effective communication with subordinates is one of the greatest challenges that faces leaders, especially leaders with a great number of subordinates and more than one subordinate level of command. How does a leader decide what to tell subordinate leaders for their subsequent dissemination to the soldiers and what to tell all subordinate soldiers personally? The key to resolving this dilemma rests in resolving how best to use the chain of command. Since the credibility of subordinate leaders lies to considerable degree in their authority to command, it is imperative that they be given the prerogative to do so; this entails that mission-type orders and the like be given to subordinate leaders for their dissemination to their soldiers. This requirement to exercise the chain of command must be balanced with the very real need for the soldiers to routinely see and hear their higher commanders. To exercise this prerogative, senior leaders should periodically address soldiers in person, but in more of a morale-enhancement fashion than in an order-giving mode. Finally, it is important to recognize the very real requirement for a leader to possess solid communication skills. Subordinates need to hear their leader; a leader without the skills to be heard needs to practice to develop them. What do you routinely communicate orally to subordinates and what to subordinate leaders? How do your methods reinforce the requirement to maintain a viable chain of command within your unit? What are the deficiencies in communication that exist between you and your higher headquarters and senior leader?

p. 198. "...In cases of great emergency, when new dispositions have to be made on the instant, or it becomes suddenly necessary to reinforce one command by sending to its aid troops from another, and there is no time to communicate with headquarters, I want you to explain my views to commanders and urge immediate action, looking to co-operation, without waiting for specific orders from me."

- This is a wonderful example of a leader ensuring that his intent is communicated so well that leaders can execute actions and take the initiative in absence of guidance and still pursue the "game plan." Our current standard is that the commander's intent be disseminated two levels below that of the issuing headquarters. How well does that work in your unit? Are you confident that you are "in your commander's mind" and "in his/her commander's mind" all the time? How can it be improved?

* - Comradeship.

p. 131. "The effect (of the lack of unit transfers in the British army) was to produce a high degree of what today is called 'small unit cohesion.' The men knew each other well, their strengths and weaknesses were known by their leaders and vice versa, and all strove to avoid the taint of cowardice that would attach instantly to shirkers in such intimate societies."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entitles; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in this excerpt are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship

with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Culminating Point.

p. 260. "(German offensives in Europe in 1940) would have worked absolutely had the follow-on forces been able to keep pace with that of the spearhead. But plodding, horse-drawn formations simply could not; by an effect to which Clausewitz had taught all offensives were liable they expended so much of their energy in mere movement that, when a culminating effort was called for, it proved beyond their power to deliver."

p. 265. "(In France) the Infantry had lagged at most a few hours behind the tanks. On the steppe (of Russia), the Infantry, even by marching twenty-five miles a day, might not catch up with the spearhead for days at a time. And the bag and baggage trailed even farther to the rear, crowded onto roads never meant for heavy traffic, or waiting for carriage on the sparse and devastated rail network."

- These excerpts are excellent examples of Clausewitz' culminating point, that factor of ultimate organizational exhaustion which every commander must anticipate and precisely time operations to avoid. See Howard (Clausewitz) for definitive discussion on this critical factor.

* - Duty.

p. 163. "'I (Wellington) have eaten of the King's salt, and therefore I conceive it to be my duty to serve with unhesitating zeal and cheerfulness, when and wherever the King or his Government may think proper to employ me.'"

- Our first responsibility as citizens is to recognize our inherent responsibility to serve our country in some capacity or another. For those who choose to serve in the military, that commitment is further refined by the sentiment of this excerpt and ultimately, after the cause is established as just, by the expression, "Theirs is not to reason why, theirs is but to do and die." Are you and your subordinates so committed? When was the last time you talked to them about it?

* - Initiative.

p. 69. "(Alexander) surveyed the lines of retreat that offered and, as he was so often to do in the future, opted for the most difficult piece of ground. His thinking clearly was that the enemy would presume the contrary, take time to react and so confer on him a moment of initiative. And at the exploitation of an initiative he was already becoming a master."

- It is expressed in various ways ("we will get the enemy to fight at the time and place of our own choosing"; "we will begin the operation when it is in our best advantage to do so"), but the attention given initiative by commanders consistently identifies it as a hard-sought advantage on the battlefield. Is there another battlefield advantage more important? If so, why?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 81. "The knowledge that their king was taking the supreme risk drove capable and well-briefed subordinates, at the head of drilled and self-confident troops, to fight as hard and skilfully as if he had been at the elbow of each one of them."

p. 99. "(At Waterloo, Napoleon) was watching from the height on the far side of the valley. Wellington, by contrast, kept at the closest quarters to his infantry, riding among them, uttering brief words of encouragement, occasionally taking refuge in a square when the French cavalry boiled about...He was constantly in his soldiers' range of vision."

p. 149. "The general must make himself the eyes of his own army...must constantly change position to deal with crises as they occur along the front of his sheltered line, must remain at the point of crisis until it is resolved and must still keep alert to anticipate the development of crises elsewhere."

p. 167. "A European general would have sounded retreat at the first hint of trouble, thinking to regroup on safer ground and fight another day. (Grant), oppressed by the knowledge that the Union could afford to take 'no backward step' in its struggle with southern rebellion, banished all thought of retreat and rode like fury from blind spot to blind spot, keeping his men in place."

p. 221. "...In 1861-65 it was still just possible for a general with the will to do so to ride about his line while his army was in action. Grant had the will."

p. 315. "Command...is ultimately quite straightforward; its exercise turns on the recognition that those who are asked to die must not be left to feel that they die alone."

- The testimony of these excerpts is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evident in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

These excerpts show why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice? Wellington's exploits at Waterloo are also assessed in Ross.

p. 329. "The first and greatest imperative of command is to be present in person. Those who impose risk must be seen to share it...Old warriors who have survived risk intact seem to the young merely old; and would-be heroes not heroic at all. It is the spectacle of heroism, or its immediate report, that fires the blood."

- Compare this excerpt with the excerpt from Webb wherein the doubtful soldier asks his buddy about the brigade commander who is a legendary warrior from the last

war, but is now too clean to have seen combat recently:
"(But) what's he done lately?"

p. 213. "Expecting to find (the enemy) waiting to engage him, (Grant) pressed forward only because he lacked 'the moral courage to halt.' When he found that the enemy had decamped, 'my heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that (the enemy) had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterward. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting the enemy.'"

- This is a well-known descriptor of the relative courage of leaders on the battlefield and a thought from which all leaders can draw strength.

* - Leaders (Intelligence).

p. 325. "There are, indeed, times when a commander must watch and wait...but in the last resort a commander must act."

p. 328. "Sometimes a commander's proper place will be in his headquarters and at his map table, where calm and seclusion accord him the opportunity to reflect on the information that intelligence brings him, to ponder possibilities and to order a range of responses in his mind. Other times, when crisis presents itself, his place is at the front where he can see for himself, make direct and immediate judgements, watch them taking effect and reconsider his options as events change under his hand."

- These excerpts and the discussion pertinent to them neatly depict what is probably the classic combat leadership challenge: knowing where and when to be in order to apply the benefit of the correct information to take the action required to achieve success at the most advantageous time with the fewest friendly casualties. That the challenge is a mouthful reflects its complexity. The part of that challenge of being at the right place at the right time is discussed under the topic "leaders (courage)." Being technically and tactically competent enough to first filter through the "fog of war" for the bits of applicable, critical information and then collating them into a mosaic which depicts the true nature of the situation and proposes a solution is the second part of this great challenge. What have you done to prepare yourself to meet this challenge in your present position? How have you prepared your subordinates for their positions? How well prepared are

your subordinates to do so in your position? And you in your senior's position?

p. 161. "(Wellington's) mind, at a calculating level, had to carry an inventory of his own forces, their dispositions in breadth and depth, their cumulative loss and their persisting combat ability. Perceptively, he had to try to calculate how the enemy stood by the same indices. Both sets of calculations had to be run against a mental clock of the passage of time...And throughout he had to form estimates of the fluctuating resolution of his opponents, both of those he could see - the enemy soldiers in the front line - and of those he could not, particularly the commander against whom he was pitting his will."

- There are successful leaders and there are dumb leaders, but there are no successful dumb leaders. The description of the mental challenges facing Wellington in this excerpt is daunting, but the task is certainly no easier for leaders on today's lethal battlefield. Experience and study are key to maintaining the edge in such an environment because native intelligence cannot accomplish success alone. How are you preparing yourself for that test of fire? How are you preparing your subordinates?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

pp. 45-46. "Alexander, in short, sought to lead by indulgence as well as by example...'compassionate leave'...general cancellation of debts...Before Issus (Alexander) made sure his men had eaten...before Gaugamela 'he bade his army (to) take their meal and rest'...After Issus, 'despite a sword wound in his thigh (Alexander) went around to see the wounded'...'those Alexander) knew had done valorous deeds in the battle he honoured...He was also, of course, meticulous about disposing decently of those who succumbed to their wounds, friend and foe alike."

- Here is a trait common to all truly great leaders - the ability to lead forcefully, yet leave no doubt about honest concern for the welfare of the led. Whatever other attributes a leader may possess, few can surpass in importance that of caring leadership. What do you do to care for your subordinates? How can the caring of your unit be improved? A common adage is that "you don't reenlist a soldier, you reenlist his wife"; what priority does this place on caring for family members?

p. 160. "Hearing after the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo that many (of the wounded) had been left without shelter, (Wellington) rode thirty miles after dinner to expel some

uncaring officers from their lodgings and install the wounded in their place. He made the same journey the following night to ensure that his orders had been obeyed, since they had been received 'in a sulky manner,' and when he found they had not, he put the officers under arrest, marched them to headquarters and had them tried and cashiered."

- Because of the personal effort involved and the true caring exhibited by such a leader, would not soldiers truly and freely respect such a leader? And would not the chain of command be bound to follow the example?

p. 61. "Alexander, of course, was the arbiter of mood, and he knew and would impose the decencies."

- As is noted in other pieces, especially in Shaara's description of the impact of Longstreet's mood and personality on his staff, the leader sets the tone and mood for his/her unit or organization; it is a simple extension of the adage that "a leader is responsible for all his/her unit does or fails to do." If a leader exhibits hooliganism and allows his/her subordinates to do likewise, the unit will be filled with hooligans and perform accordingly. If a leader is straight-laced and humorless, chances are so will be his/her unit. A simple example of this is a unit's social habit, such as at a dining-in. Numerous are the tales of dining-ins which "left the club in shambles"; as numerous are tales of dining-ins as dry and boring as the fallen leaves. Both extremes were a direct result of what the leader, intentionally or not, caused them or allowed them to be, and both are accurate indicators of the stature of those units under that leadership climate. The key is to find the middle ground; a middle ground comfortable to the leader which allows him/her to be himself/herself; and a middle ground which produces a unit climate of high morale, professionalism, and confidence - in short, a unit in which it is fun and rewarding to serve. How much fun are you having in your unit? How effectively can you set the mood of your subordinates? If the mood of your unit needs to be changed, how do you change it?

p. 316. "The taskmaster who eschews mystification, who makes himself, his behaviour and his responses familiar to his subordinates, must then evoke compliance...by...emotions (love and fear) ultimately self-limiting in effect."

- Mystification, or the mask of command as Keegan presents it, is the means by which a leader protects himself from the ravages of the old adage that "familiarity breeds contempt." Of all successful leaders of your experience,

were there any who were able to escape this "truism"? If so, how did they become completely "familiar with their soldiers" and still retain the soldiers' unswerving loyalty, to the extent that the soldiers would willingly obey orders that risked their lives? How can any leader "drink with the guys" and then order "the guys" into no-man's land?

p. 335. "(Modern armies') elaborate hierarchies - fourteen ranks interpose between a private and general - act as a system of screens to camouflage the altitude at which dangerous orders are generated."

- How many ranks separate you from the privates? The more that do, the greater the challenge to stay in tune with the needs and true climate of the organization. The ultimate question that every leader must keep in mind, and then seek to answer with the greatest possible enthusiasm, is "what have I done for PFC America today?" Well, what have you done for your privates today?

pp. 323-324. "Decoration is a particularly potent tool in the management of a commander's direct subordinates... Coercion is as essential a component of command as prescription or kinship. Ideally it should remain implicit, and when made explicit should manifest itself as rarely as possible as physical force, except in extreme emergency never falling arbitrarily or threatening the majority."

- The system of award and punishment which a leader adopts is dependent in large part on the character of his/her subordinates and in large part determines the climate in the unit or organization. The ideal situation presents the leader with solid, conscientious soldiers (the predominant case with soldiers of the volunteer army of 1991) which enables him/her to depend on the liberal use of rewards to maintain discipline. But regardless of the situation and the relative degree of application of reward and punishment, administration of that application must be consistent in fact and consistent in the perception of the soldiers. Which is more predominant in your unit, reward or punishment? Why? If punishment is more predominant, what can be done to tip the scales toward a more reward-oriented climate?

* - Leaders (stature).

p. 35. "At their closest, the ties between the leader and his companions would be those of blood. But the heart of their relationship was an ethical one, the equality that persists between those who share risks and vie to outdo each other in the display of courage...To keep the regard of such

men, the war leader had constantly to excel - not only in battle but in the hunting field, in horsemanship or skill at arms..."

- The nature of war and warriors may have changed over the years since Alexander, but the need for the leader to maintain excellence in the profession of arms has not. From this philosophy flows the adage that "a leader must be able to do all his/her soldiers can do and be willing to do it first." Do you try to live up to that adage or are there exceptions? How many of their tasks do your soldiers expect you to be able to perform well? What do you expect of your senior?

* - Military Service.

p. 193. "... (Grant) recognized that (General Buell) was a 'strict disciplinarian' but suggested that, as a pre-war regular, '(Buell) did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who enlisted for the war and the soldier who serves in time of peace. One system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence or wealth and independence of character. The other included, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation.'"

- This perception still haunts the military, as many civilians perceive military volunteers in peacetime as being those who cannot "hack it on the outside." Although admittedly built on a combination of incentives to enlistment unprecedented in American history, the results of the Persian Gulf deployment and shortlived war argue that the volunteer Army created in the 1980's is the best peacetime Army ever organized. How do you answer that question commonly asked of many soldiers by family members or civilian friends, "When are you going to get out and make something of yourself?" Why are you in the service and why do you plan to stay when college or high school friends are doing "more meaningful" things in business, science, or academia? Why is the service a more attractive alternative to a "regular civilian job"?

p. 176. "...the soldier's trade is a harsh one - harsh emotionally as well as physically - which but a minority is fitted to perform. Only the young and strong can stand long marches, poor food, short sleep, scanty shelter, wet, cold, thirst and the constant burden of musket, knapsack and cartridge pouch. Only the tough and well-integrated can bear the risks of the battlefield, the callousness of combat, the agony of bereavement among friends and comrades."

- This description certainly fits with the common perception of the life of a combat arms soldier. But because all future wars will really have few, if any, "rear areas," leaders should have in their mind the conviction that all soldiers need to be so toughened. This conviction flies in the face of the impression given young people by our exuberant recruiting advertisements, but is one that leaders must have in mind as they design their unit training programs. How well are you and your subordinates prepared to meet these rigors? If you reminded your soldiers that upon their enlistment they volunteered to be the first Americans to serve their country on the battlefield, how would they react?

* - Moral Forces.

p. 24. "Alexander, however, noting that the Persians seemed to be counting on the steepness of the river bank to defeat his effort, rightly concluded that he enjoyed a moral advantage."

- Clausewitz wrote of the decisive power of moral forces. It is said that the "moral high ground" of the Union, its cause to eliminate slavery, was decisive in the Civil War, as was the moral impetus of the Allies to defeat Hitler in World War II. While these are strategic examples of the value of moral force, this excerpt illustrates that moral force has equal application on the tactical battlefield. Belief in a cause, confidence in warfighting prowess, and willingness to follow a leader all imbue in soldiers a psychological strength difficult to measure, but indomitable in battle. How can a leader affect the moral force of a unit? What moral forces has your unit to its advantage?

* - Staffs.

p. 137. "(Wellington) decides; his chief adviser translates decision into paperwork and makes a technical judgement. From it action flows."

- Herein is described the perfect command and staff action sequence. The commander conducts his estimate, provides guidance and intent, and then allows the staff to do its work, bringing the commander's wishes to fruition with a timely, well-coordinated order. Would you estimate that the command and staff action sequence in your unit is as well oiled as this? How could it be improved? How effectively is the commander's intent communicated?

p. 198. "A staff of regulars would have been a barrier between (Grant) and his army. His staff of amateurs was a medium of communication, because it resembled the men he commanded almost to the point of mimicry."

p. 318. "(Wellington and Grant's) intimates fulfilled the role on the one hand of remembrancers to the commander of his responsibility for the army's welfare, and on the other of witnesses to the army of the commander's concern for it."

- An often understated, but absolutely critical function of any staff is to act as a conduit between subordinate units and the senior commander. It is true that the primary conduit in this regard is subordinate commanders, but the staff should also spend time with subordinate units to assist in their particular areas of expertise and also sense the climate, discipline, and readiness of those units. A staff that seldom ventures outside the headquarters does its commander ill service. In fact, it is a wise commander who states that his/her staff is not really his/her staff at all, but that the staff should work so hard with and for subordinate commanders that these commanders should view it as their own. How often do you see the staff of your higher headquarters? Is that enough? How could they be more helpful to you and the commanders they serve?

p. 336. "Staff officers who, even when general staff culture flourished at its most intense, had nominally been required to alternate between staff appointments and troop duty, were subsequently and with increasing strictness actually required to do so."

- This also reflects the current pattern of assignments, especially those of junior officers. Staffs are thus prevented from becoming "chateau soldiers," a separate class from the supported units, and staff officers better serve because they better understand the needs of supported units. What is the assignment policy for staff officers in your unit? How does it contribute to a healthy and empathetic staff?

* - Tactics.

pp. 71-72. "Indeed, in retrospect we can now see that the tragedy of the First World War was that the waging of siege warfare and the proliferation of rapid-firing weapons had suddenly coincided without the military establishment of the Western world having had time to detect their coincidence or draw the appropriate conclusions from it."

- Refer to Forester, Stokesbury, and Keegan (The Face of Battle [The Somme]) for better insight into this tragic lack of appreciation in World War I.

p. 115. "The musket was the workaday instrument of death. It dealt death, however, in doses strictly limited by space and time."

- The discussion which follows this excerpt in the book outlines the "Napoleonic" tactics which carried over into the Civil War. Note in McPherson how the increased range and improved accuracy of the rifles of 50 years later rendered these tactics the vehicle of death on the killing fields of America.

* - War.

p. 272. "Hitler, in short, was to be chef; the generals bottlenashers. They were to be left to find, train and equip the army's soldiers; he was to commit them to and command them in battle."

- This excerpt reflects a command structure in contrast to Clausewitz' view that statesmen should allow the generals to execute the battlefield aspects of the war, once political aims and objectives are established. Hitler's approach may not have been the reason Germany lost World War II, but its desultory effect on the military leaders so tasked to execute a strategy not their own had to have been a contributing factor.

pp. 301-302. "...radio did not bring to the Fuhrer's headquarters all the other information of an immaterial but much more important kind - the look of the battlefield, the degree of heat and cold, the variation in intensity of enemy pressure, the level of noise, the flow of wounded backward, the flow of supply forward, the mood of the soldiers, to be judged by the expression of their faces and the tone of their answers to questions - which only a man on the spot would gather."

- And for all of its wonders, the radio could not create for Hitler, hundreds of miles away, a sense of the battlefield a true commander would need. So not only did he prevent his generals from executing the war, Hitler also had no realistic way to effectively manage the forces.

* - World War I.

p. 245. "The defect of the military organizations that went to war in 1914 was that they were too strong, so strong

in both numbers and firepower that none could hope to defeat another in the open field, and all in consequence were fated to fight a stalemate warfare in static positions...the concentration of manpower on the fighting front from Switzerland to the sea was so dense and the capability for rapid reconcentration of reserves by lateral railroad along its length so large that no army, with weapons and equipment then available to it, could hope to assemble a breakthrough force. By the time it had got together a concentration large enough by a general staff's calculations to force an entry, undisguisable signs of warning would have set counter-offensive reserves into motion. When it launched its attack, irresistible force would meet immovable object and stability, give or take a few thousand yards of front, must be restored."

p. 246. "... (In the mid-19th century) time-tested blackpowder musket and smoothbore cannon were replaced in all advanced armies by rifled weapons. Rifled weapons fired projectiles - explosive if from cannon - out to unprecedented ranges and with an accuracy never before achieved. An immediate effect was to drive cavalry, the bulkiest of tactical targets, clean off the battlefield."

p. 247. "... 'The true strength of an Army lies essentially in the power of each, or any of its constituent fractions, to stand up to punishment, even to the verge of annihilation if necessary.'

p. 248. "(With improved rifles, more and more rapidly firing artillery, and machine guns) A brigade of infantry, 3,000 men, when supported by its third of the divisional artillery, could in consequence discharge each minute a volume of fire at least equal to that of the whole of Wellington's army of 60,000 firing volley and salvo at Waterloo."

p. 249. "...barbed wire - invented by an American in 1874, ten years too late to add its share of horror to the Civil War - had begun to appear also (on the battlefields of World War I)."

p. 251. "Generals, who as late as 1862 could directly observe the effect of their orders on the fighting, had now been driven, by the very intensity of the fire they unleashed, so far from the seat of action that the power to influence its ebb and flow had been taken from their grasp...And what held true for the generals did so also for the artillery commanders who were the principal agents of their plans. Bombardment and barrage plans could be pre-ordained. They could not be altered once the fighting

had begun...Artillery warfare was, in fact, self-defeating. The enormous preliminary bombardments gave a defender all the warning he needed to bring reinforcements forward to the threatened sector. The weight of fire unleashed actually added to the obstacles the attacking infantry had to negotiate, lashing barbed wire into impenetrable entanglements and churning no-man's-land into a moon landscape of shellholes. And the barrage, whether of the attackers or of the defenders, comprehensively destroyed the fragile network of telephone cables that offered the only means by which stricken infantry could request assistance from the artillery it counted upon to help it forward."

- These passages aptly describe the changes in warfare and how their impact created the unfathomable slaughter that was World War I. Compare these with the accounts of Forester, Keegan, and Stokesbury.

Numerical order of pages with topics:

24 - Moral Forces.	35 - Leaders (stature).
45 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
55 - Communication (of mission).	
61 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
69 - Initiative.	71 - Tactics.
81,99 - Leaders (courage).	115 - Tactics.
131 - Comradeship.	137 - Staffs.
149 - Leaders (courage).	150 - Agility.
160 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
161 - Leaders (intelligence).	163 - Duty.
165 - Civil War.	167 - Leaders (courage).
176,193 - Military Service.	197 - Civil War.
198 - Communication (of mission).	
198 - Staffs.	213,221 - Leaders (courage).
245,246,247,248,249,251 - World War I.	
260,265 - Culminating Point.	272,301 - War.
315 - Leaders (courage).	
316 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
318 - Staffs.	318 - Communication (of mission).
323 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
325,328 - Leaders (intelligence).	
329 - Leaders (courage).	
335 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
336 - Staffs.	

MEN AGAINST FIRE. Marshall, S.L.A. Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978 (first printed in 1947).

Germinated by the observation of the fighting men of World War II, this book is a study of the reactions and emotions of men against fire, with special emphasis on the physical and psychological aspects of the problem of command at the tactical level. It addresses critical tenets of leadership and training and lays a foundation of requirements for preparing soldiers for war. General Marshall undertakes a search for battlefield truth in the hope that readers will learn from it and attempt to perfect an Army in service to a country for which many gave their lives. These lives will not have been lost in vain if we make an earnest effort to apply these lessons and improve our little part of own Army accordingly.

* - Battle Buddies.

p. 148. "Fear is contagious but courage is not less so. To the man who is in terror and verging on panic, no influence can be more steadying than that he see some other man near him who is retaining self-control and doing his duty."

- The assignment to every soldier of a "battle buddy" has safety and operational benefits, but a benefit often overlooked and perhaps the most important of all is the cohesive affect the "buddies" will have on one another, as expressed in this excerpt. Do all of your soldiers have battle buddies? Who appoints these buddy teams? How are they reviewed for effectiveness?

* - Center of Gravity.

p. 106. "...a first responsibility of the tactical commander at every level is to determine, as exactly as possible, by all means within his power, where that heart (of the enemy's greatest strength) is located, and then plan his battle or rearrange his plan accordingly."

- Clausewitz theorized that every force has a center of gravity, that factor in its makeup which it protects above all else and whose destruction or compromise would determine the course of the conflict. An enemy force has such a center, regardless of that force's size. It may be its leader, a particular weapons system, its logistics capability, or any number of other key items or factors. This excerpt highlights the importance of the commander's assessment of his enemy's strength and center of gravity. What is your unit's center of gravity? What enemy center of

gravity do you most often train to destroy or neutralize? What others might exist that you need to consider?

* - Communication (of mission).

p. 139. "...the greater danger to the commander is not that he will err in wording his order but that he will not follow through in making certain that the order is heard and understood all along the line. Words repeated out loud down to the last man will be obeyed. But an order only half heard becomes a convenient excuse for non-compliance. In the giving and in the relaying of orders the rule is to remove every element of doubt. If there is not time for this precaution, there is not time for the maneuver."

- Of course, if there is time for feedback or a briefback by subordinates, this is the ideal situation. But the principal point here is that leaders must ensure that their orders, instructions, and intent are communicated clearly to the last soldier. The failure to do so, as reflected in the latter portion of this excerpt, mirrors the cowardly staffer's creed that "an action passed is an action completed." A leader cannot assume understanding of his/her orders. How do you ensure that all of your subordinates understand your guidance? What feedback do you offer your senior leader when he/she provides you instructions?

* - Comradeship.

p. 42. "The warmth which derives from human companionship is as essential to (the soldier's) employment of the arms with which he fights as is the finger with which he pulls a trigger or the eye with which he aligns his sights."

p. 43. "It is that way with any fighting man. He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily. Having to make a choice in the face of the enemy, he would rather be unarmed and with comrades around him than altogether alone, though possessing the most perfect of quick-firing weapons."

p. 124. "With the growth of experience troops learn to apply the lessons of contact and communication, and out of these things comes the tactical cohesion which enables a group of individuals to make the most of their united strength and stand steady in the face of sudden emergency."

p. 150. "...the tactical unity of men working together in combat will be in the ratio of their knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other."

p. 155. "...the relationships within our Army should be based upon intimate understanding between officers and men rather than upon familiarity between them, on self-respect rather than on fear, and above all, on a close uniting comradeship."

p. 161. "...When the hard and momentary choice is life or death, the words once heard at an orientation lecture are clean forgot, but the presence of a well-loved comrade is unforgettable."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Coordination.

p. 87. "The total strength of a position does not reside in its numbers of men and weapons but in knowledge of the numbers and the mutual sharing thereof. All tactical support must be known and be felt to be of true moral help in a time of crisis."

p. 86. "So it should be a watchword of minor tactics that it is never enough to support to the limit; tactical security requires that full knowledge of all support be shared by all concerned."

p. 92. "Information is the soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in successful tactics."

- The wisdom of the discussion surrounding these excerpts seems self-evident, but that it is so elusive in execution speaks of the attention needed to ensure proper coordination among all neighbors on the battlefield. Such coordination should be habitual, applied so regularly in garrison activities, training exercises, and all manner of unit business that it would likewise be habitual on the battlefield. How confident are you that your neighbor on the battlefield will know enough about you and you about him/her to ensure security and success in your operations? On whom do you place the responsibility to coordinate support and exchange information with neighboring and supporting units? Does he/she see his/her role in the important context expressed in these passages?

p. 94. "In operations the object of any valid quest for information from the top down is to see what may be done to help."

- While subordinate leaders enjoy the receipt of information from higher headquarters, it is critical that they understand their obligation to furnish information on their status back to that higher headquarters in a timely fashion. It might require considerable effort to do so under engaged conditions, but the subordinate must grasp the fact that it is upon the higher headquarters that he/she depends for support. That higher headquarters must husband precious resources and properly judge the actual situation on the battlefield to best allocate those resources to that subordinate who needs them the most at that particular time to accomplish the units' mission. If the subordinate fails in that crucial communication of status, the higher headquarters will not have a true battlefield vision and chances are that precious resources will not be used as effectively as they might be otherwise. How well does your unit practice the process of allocation of resources under battlefield conditions? How would you do it better?

* - Discipline.

p. 54. "The best showing that could be made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one man in four had made at least some use of his firepower."

- It is for this conjecture about World War II soldiers that this book is largely reknown. As mentioned in the Author's Note in the book, it led to training revisions which resulted in an increase in individual soldier

involvement in the Korean War. How do you as a leader ensure that all of your soldiers do their duty at critical moments? How does your chain of command assist you with this dilemma? How does establishment of the Battle Buddy system affect the situation?

pp. 75-76. "The men who show no disposition to use the small weapons, even when properly urged and directed, can be switched to the gun crews. There, the group will keep them going...This sounds like a paradox - to expect greater response to come from increased responsibility. But it works. I have seen many cases where men who had flunked it badly with a rifle responded heroically when given a flame-thrower or BAR. Self-pride and the ego are the touchstone of most of these remarkable conversions. A man may fail with the rifle because he feels anonymous and believes that nothing important is being asked of him...The switch to a heavier weapon is a challenging form of recognition. It is a chance for the man to show others that he has been held in too lowly esteem."

- These excerpts transmit the feeling that a sense of responsibility and the proximity of comrades nerve soldiers to greater achievement. It is important to realize that this applies to soldiers of all branches, not just infantrymen, and all grades and ranks, not just privates. The application for all leaders, then, is for them to assign soldiers to tasks that best meet their mettle under crisis conditions so that as much of the unit's assets as possible is in fruitful action in those times. How do you assign responsibilities to subordinates? How could you consider these opinions on relative responsibility and proximity to fellows to the tasks your soldiers have to accomplish? Have you soldiers whose marginal performance might improve if they were given more responsible tasks?

* - Education (military).

p. 116. "...the beginning (of the process to train a soldier) lies in a system of schooling which puts the emphasis on teaching soldiers how to think rather than what to think..."

- Compare this with a like excerpt from Fuller. Both authors highlight the need for leaders to be able to reason, to be able to apply common sense where and when it is needed, and, more importantly, to realize where and when doctrine may not apply and then devise an alternative successful solution. What schooling or training have you received where only the "school solution" was accepted? How does your unit training apply the "how to think" approach?

* - Fitness.

pp. 173-174. "A hard road march is the most satisfactory training test of the moral strength of the individual man. The great advantage of the gain in moral force through all forms of physical training is that it is an unconscious gain. Will power, determination, mental poise, and muscle control all march hand-in-hand with the general health and well-being of the man...Truly then, it is killing men with kindness not to insist upon physical standards during training which will give them a maximum fitness for the extraordinary stresses of campaigning in war."

- Compare this to an entry under "Training" in Myrer. The value of fitness is obviously appreciated more in today's Army than in the author's time when, apparently, the low concern for fitness was the cause of his frustration. It is well to re-emphasize here that the hardening of the body and spirit beyond the "comfortable fitness level" advocated in fitness club advertisements is required of soldiers because fitness club members are not the ones preparing to deploy to the modern, lethal battlefield. Also to be remembered is the fact that while equipment maintenance and individual knowledge may be brought "up to speed" in the last hours or days before a deployment, physical fitness cannot be; it must be maintained at a high level all the time. Are you and your subordinates ready to step onto a flight bound for the battlefield tomorrow morning? If not, doing 500 pushups and 750 situps and running 26 miles tonight to "catch up" will not do it - it's too late!

* - Initiative.

p. 22. "As more and more impact has gone into the hitting power of weapons, necessitating ever widening deployments in the forces of battle, the quality of the initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues. It has been readily seen that the prevailing tactical conditions increased the problem of unit coherence in combat. The only offset for this difficulty was to train for a higher degree of individual courage, comprehension of situation, and self-starting character in the soldier."

- Initiative is that treasured commodity with which we claim the American soldier is graced above that of any of his/her possible adversaries. Yet we impose drill on soldiers in training, perhaps by its very nature suppressing or stifling initiative, and some less-than-confident leaders

are hesitant to grant subordinates the freedom to exercise initiative ("Don't do anything until I get back" and "I must approve any variations from this plan"). Do your subordinates know when and how they are free to exercise their initiative? Does your senior give you mission-type orders which allow you use your initiative? What are occasions when the exercise of initiative by subordinates in your unit may be counterproductive? Are there any individual characteristics you hold to be more valuable than initiative? If so, what are they and why?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 48. "Knowing that the leaders are afraid makes the men more fearful."

p. 187. "'Anticipation is 60 per cent of the art of command.'"

- The first excerpt is stark testimony to the effect that a leader's courage, or lack of it, has on subordinates. It is crucial for any leader at any echelon to display courage, even though he/she may not really feel courageous at the moment. It is especially crucial for leaders in the field of view of their soldiers to act courageously. How can a leader know how he/she is going to react? How can a leader be sure that he/she will display courage? Most of us probably will not know until the moment of truth arrives. But it is incumbent on all leaders to prepare themselves under the most rigorous and hazardous conditions possible to hone steely-edged nerves against the onslaught of battlefield terror. The second excerpt speaks to the need to be able to discern where to be when, to know what to do when you get there, and then having the courage to do it. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (intelligence).

p. 108. "...60 per cent of the art of command is the ability to anticipate; 40 per cent of the art of command is the ability to improvise, to reject the preconceived idea that has been tested and proved wrong in the crucible of operations, and to rule by action instead of acting by rules."

p. 116. "To square training with the reality of war it becomes a necessary part of the young officer's mental equipment for training to instill in him the full realization that in combat many things can and will go wrong without it being anyone's fault in particular...there is no system of safeguards known to man which can fully eliminate the consequences of accident and mischance in battle."

p. 117. "Improvisation is of the essence of initiative in all combat just as initiative is the outward showing of the power of decision."

- Anticipation involves thinking through all probable branches and sequels for a course of action and planning actions to react to their occurrence or, better yet, to plan action to cause the more favorable branches and sequels to occur and thereby make the enemy react to their occurrence. This requires extensive experience with the forces and weapons involved, a fundamental knowledge of the enemy, and a reasonable ability to assess environmental and topographic impacts on operations. It also requires the imagination to purposefully question subordinates to ensure their understanding of the intent of the operation and their part in it and the accommodation in their plans for the probable contingencies (commanders must be able to ask the right questions). That all may be the easy part. What General Marshall calls improvisation in the second excerpt is tougher, truly an art. It is initiative expressed in high-speed action and a capability all leaders must develop in themselves, as is emphasized in the third excerpt. What measures short of combat experience or training devices do you think are the most effective in developing a leader capable of success in this "60/40" environment?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 62. "...no commander is capable of the actual leading of an entire company in combat...the spread of strength and the great variety of the commander's problems are together beyond any one man's compass...therefore a part of his problem in combat is to determine which are the moral leaders among his men when under fire, and having found them, give all support and encouragement to their effort."

- This excerpt allows that "informal leaders" exist in units outside the formal chain of command. It is to these leaders, either because of their social, athletic, or charismatic leadership skills, that soldiers of a unit look for leadership in times of crisis, in garrison or on the battlefield. It is well that leaders identify these soldiers and exploit their influence to the unit's positive

advantage. Who are the informal leaders in your unit? Are these informal leaders positive influences or negative influences? (Compare this excerpt with one of the same topic in Keegan - Face of Battle.)

p. 102. "The diabolical effect of even such a relatively simple instrument as the field telephone is that it may come to command the commander. It chains him to a system of remote control. At first he sees it only as a useful channel for quick communication in combat. Then he fears to leave it lest it should require his presence in headquarters the moment after he leaves to go forward."

- This excerpt warns of the tendency toward "inactive leadership," that same malaise which Fuller and Forester curse as affecting the leaders of World War I. See further discussion under this same topic for them.

p. 103. "'The commander should appear friendly to his soldiers, speak to them on the march, visit them while they are cooking, ask them if they are well cared for, and alleviate their needs if they have any.'"

p. 104. "... (commanders) not only used their visits to inspire their men but they learned much which could be applied to conserving the lives and building the efficiency of their forces."

p. 105. "In rear areas the commander, high or low, wins the hearts of men primarily through a zealous interest in their general welfare. This is the true basis of his prestige and the qualifying test placed upon his soldierly abilities by those who serve under him. But at the front he commands their respect as it becomes proved to them that he understands their tactical problem and will do all possible to help them solve it."

p. 159. "...the essential is that (the soldier) be given freedom to think with a clear mind, which freedom can be his only when he becomes convinced that the Army - and particularly the Army as represented by his immediate superiors - is doing everything possible for his welfare."

- These excerpts exemplify the extremes (and the importance of achieving these extremes) to which commanders must go to ensure the welfare of subordinates, earn their respect, and be assured that the unit is capable of the missions assigned to it. What is your habit of checking on soldiers in the field? Does your senior leader accurately appreciate your situation in tough conditions? What can you

do to ensure that your senior leader gets the image of your unit that he/she needs to make proper decisions?

pp. 171-172. "Nothing more unfortunate can happen to the commander than to come to be regarded by his subordinates as unapproachable, for such a reputation isolates him from the main problems of command as well as its chief rewards...It is never a waste of time for the commander to talk to his people about their problems; more times than not, the problem will seem small to him, but so long as it looms large to the man, it cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand. He will grow in the esteem of his men as he treats their affairs with respect."

- Talking with soldiers is key to a truly successful command. It is easy to do when the subordinates are few in number; but because it gets increasingly difficult as the unit grows larger, leaders in these cases must be more aggressive in seeking out ways to maintain this communication. This real need to communicate with soldiers goes back to the old adage, "Don't let the sun set on a hungry or unpaid soldier." If a leader's communications are so fouled up that he/she does not know about such problems in the first place, then the problems will not be solved, and the unit climate can only deteriorate. What do you do to ensure effective communication with subordinates? What is more important: communication of the leader's philosophy and guidance down or communication of subordinates' ideas and concerns up?

p. 189. "'I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign: but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way.'"

- This is the ideal command relationship: a senior commander confident in a subordinate's personal ability, a subordinate's training and preparation, a subordinate's operational status, and a subordinate's understanding of the commander's intent to the extent that a simple order ordains that subordinate's freedom to execute the mission as he/she sees fit. How predominant is this case in your unit? What can be done to make it the predominant case?

* - Leaders (stature).

p. 168. "In so far as his ability to mold the character of troops is concerned, the qualifying test of an officer is the judgment placed upon his soldierly abilities by those who serve under him. If they do not deem him fit to command, he cannot train them to obey. Thus when slackness

is tolerated in officership, it is a direct invitation to disobedience, and as disobedience multiplies, all discipline disappears."

pp. 186-187. "Manners and appearance continue to command respect for the individual only when he is capable of carrying his proportionate part of the burden. The criterion of command is the ability to think clearly and work hard rather than to strike attitudes or accept disproportionate risks. The small unit commander who practices self-exposure to danger in the hope of having a good moral effect on men, instead, frays the nerves of troops and most frequently succeeds in getting himself killed under conditions which do no earthly good to the army. Troops expect to see their officers working and moving with them; morale is impaired when they see that their leaders are shirking danger."

- These excerpts speak volumes toward the ideals officers are obligated to pursue. Other works in this guide address leadership stature, but few so directly. What leader in your experience best typified these ideals? Why do you think so? Which of your subordinate leaders does so? Why do you think so? What in yourself do you need to improve to attain these ideals?

* - Morale.

p. 67. "Among fighting men morale endures only so long as the chance remains that ultimately their weapons will deal greater death or fear of death to the enemy. When that chance dies, morale dies and defeat occurs."

- And hence the importance of training to build in soldiers confidence in their equipment and tactics and the importance of leaders to develop the competence and courage to lead the way. How well prepared are your soldiers to absorb the strain of battle and persevere? What can you do as leader in peacetime to prepare yourself and your soldiers to maintain their morale in the face of battle? When did "the chance" mentioned above die for the Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War?

p. 115. "The fundamental cause of the breakdown of morale and discipline within the Army usually comes of this, that a commander or his subordinates transgresses by treating men as if they were children or serfs instead of showing respect for their adulthood."

- Listen to the common complaints of soldiers with "low morale" and these comments are common: "The platoon

leader never listens to us" and "The First Sergeant thinks all we are good for is police call and latrine detail, and he watches us like a hawk even when we are doing that." These reflect a chain of command similar to that of this excerpt. It takes a great leap of faith to treat soldiers as they should be treated, but once done and once the leader becomes comfortable with the physics of the relationship, its results will reward the brave leader many times over. Is there such a thing as soldiers who can never be treated as adults? If so, have you any as subordinates? What is your plan to "recover" them?

pp. 157-158. "'...(morale is) the body of thought of a person or persons, as to whether it disposes the thinker to high endeavor or toward failure...'"

p. 158. "Morale is the thinking of an army. It is the whole complex body of an army's thought: The way it feels about the soil and about the people from which it springs. The way that it feels about their cause and their politics as compared with other causes and other politics. The way that it feels about its friends and allies, as well as its enemies. About its commanders and goldbricks. About food and shelter. Duty and leisure. Payday and sex. Militarism and civilianism. Freedom and slavery. Work and want. Weapons and comradeship. Bunk fatigue and drill. Discipline and disorder. Life and death. God and the devil."

- Is there a better example of the negative side of this thought than that provided by the collapse of the Iraqi army in the Persian Gulf War? Despite being the fourth largest military force in the world, it collapsed like a deck of cards under the allied coalition's advance, largely because of "low morale." On the other side of the coin, the Confederate forces of the Civil War had "high morale" despite being an underdog in many key military factors. How can you contribute to the "high morale" of your unit? In what areas are improvements required? What can your senior do to influence your unit's morale?

* - Moral Forces.

p. 165. "Chief among these essentials (of combat moral incentive) is some knowledge of the national cause and a maximum knowledge of the forfeits in the battle which is being fought; in war or elsewhere the risks which the majority of men will accept are in proportion to what they know of the importance of the undertaking. Next comes faith in the power of the company and the higher tactical commands; this last should be supported by as much knowledge of

the strength of other elements as can be provided. And last, these things must combine with confidence in leadership and with an acceptance of the basic philosophy governing human relationships within an army."

p. 170. "When men become fearful in combat, the moral incentive can restore them and stimulate them to action. But when they become hopeless, it is because all moral incentive is gone."

- Described in these excerpts are the ingredients which, when embodied in the being of a military force, create in that force the tremendous advantage of the impetus of moral forces. Clausewitz addressed the positive impact of such moral forces, and they are mentioned in other works of this guide. Who in your unit is primarily responsible for inculcating moral forces into your unit? How does the Soviet use of a political officer in each of their units address this phenomenon? Do we need "political officers" or "moral force officers" in our units?

* - Philosophy of Command.

pp. 162-163. Listed on these two pages are six items worthy of consideration for inclusion in any leader's personal philosophy. Taken with the other such lists mentioned in other works of this guide, a leader would have a good start in formalizing such a philosophy.

* - Sports.

p. 170. "...participation in sport may help turn a mild bookkeeper into a warrior if it has conditioned his mind so that he relishes the contest. The act of teaching one man to participate with other men in any training endeavor is frequently the first step in the development of new traits of receptiveness and outward giving in his character. It is from the acquiring of the habit of working with the group and of feeling responsible to the group that his thoughts are apt to turn ultimately to the welfare of the group when tactical disintegration occurs in battle; the more deeply this is impressed into his consciousness, the quicker will he revert under pressure to thinking and action on behalf of the group."

- The value of sports is discussed in other works in this guide, and the ultimate decision about it rests with each individual leader. Here is another voice heard to say that the value of sports rests in the teamwork, comradeship, and group ethic they promote. Sports should not be considered a substitute for training, but rather an extension

of that training which prepares soldiers for the extreme interpersonal factors existent on the battlefield. How do you integrate sports into your unit training plan? How have you expressed your philosophy on sports to your subordinates?

* - Staffs.

p. 96. "Unless there is a constant boring toward the battle line by representatives of the higher command, it is most unlikely that the relative tactical situation - the state of pressure against one portion of the front as compared with another - can be truly clarified by wire or radio communication."

p. 99. "It is not always possible to lead from behind."

p. 101. "The ever-growing tendency on the part of staff to use the wire or radio for all purposes, thereby avoiding danger and making certain of being at hand when the 'old man' wants comfort, is a great block to information."

- The need for habitual staff interaction with subordinate units is addressed in other pieces under this same topic. Staffs must become so familiar with this process of coordination and assistance that it becomes second nature. It will have to be second nature to work under battlefield pressures. Do you see the staff from your higher headquarters enough in garrison? In the field? What can you do to improve the situation? What kind of help do you need from them and do not receive?

* - Synchronization.

p. 68. "For the Infantry soldier the great lesson of minor tactics in our time, which is at the same time the outstanding moral to be drawn from study of the 'small picture' in (World War II), is the overpowering effect of relatively small amounts of fire when delivered from the right ground at the right hour."

- As one of the tenets of Airland Battle, synchronization is defined as the coordinated conduct of battlefield activities (in terms of time, space, and purpose) so as to employ maximum relative combat power at the decisive time and place on the battlefield. While this implies the great scope of synchronization, it must be emphasized that synchronization applies to the effective operations of every unit, regardless of unit equipment or number of assigned personnel. In your leadership position, what assets do you have available for this synchronization

effort? How do you practice it? How can your senior leader help you do it better? How do you train your "second in command" to execute these synchronization efforts in your absence?

* - Training.

p. 36. "...The mind of the Infantry soldier should be conditioned to an understanding of (the battlefield's) reality through all stages of his training...One of the purposes of training should be to remove these false ideas (from fictional novels and movies) of battle from his mind."

p. 38. "The heart of the matter is to relate the man to his fellow soldier as he will find him on the field of combat, to condition him to human nature as he will learn to depend on it when the ground offers him no comfort and weapons fail."

p. 49. "'It is of first importance that the soldier, high or low, should not have to encounter in war things which, seen for the first time, set him in terror or perplexity.'"

p. 108. "It is not within the ingenuity of man ever to fully close the gap between training and combat."

p. 124. "(The establishment of combat discipline) is simply the reflection of the growth of unit confidence which comes of increased awareness and utilization of one's own resources under conditions which at first seem extraordinary but gradually become familiar."

p. 181. "...It might be well to consider the paradox that troops are truly prepared to establish order on the battlefield only when, in the course of intelligent training, they have been well forewarned of the kind of disorder they may expect there."

- The normal emphasis on hard, tough, realistic training is intensified by these excerpts in their advocacy to trainers to concentrate on the effects of human nature under conditions of extreme stress; to create for soldiers in training the range of emotion common on the battlefield. A graduate of Ranger School will attest that human nature certainly comes into play during that training because students are habitually wet, cold, hungry, and tired. Even without the threat of deadly enemy fire, the leadership challenges and the impact of comradeship become intensely personal lessons which will hold the student in good stead on a future battlefield. But since all soldiers cannot

enjoy experiences like Ranger School, it is important for soldiers to experience in unit training similar challenges and emotional strains, such as the numbing fear when taken under fire from an ambush and having the rifle bolts frozen solid; the soul-wrenching strength required to order comrades into night action after an exhausting 36-hour foot march; and the heartfelt tears of gratitude when a comrade offers half of his last cracker in the midst of a chilling downpour when neither of you have eaten for 24 hours. How well are leaders in your unit exposed to the challenges they are expected to face on the battlefield? How intensely does your unit training challenge human nature?

* - War.

p. 19. "In the hour when decision is made possible through the attainment of a superiority in the striking (fire) power of the heavy weapons of war, (the masses of men who fight on foot) must go forward to claim the victory and beat down the surviving elements of resistance. There is no other way out. The society which looks for an easier way is building its hope on sand."

p. 27. "...It may occur in the struggle between nations that such a preponderance of power will be achieved by one side or the other, or such destruction will be worked on one body or the other either by the weapons of the air or by naval blockade, as to virtually predetermine the results of the battlefield. Even so, the contest between land armies will continue to be the concluding act in war. Without this conclusion, military victory will not be achieved."

p. 35. "Air power is essential to national survival. But air power unsupported by the forces of the battlefield is a military means without an end."

- Recall the debate and dialogue in the early days of the Persian Gulf War about whether or not the air component of the campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraq could independently achieve that result. These excerpts, written over 40 years in advance of the event, argue that it could not, that some form of a ground assault would be required. That judgment certainly seems valid in today's context, and, if the future conforms to the future depicted by Heinlein, it will probably remain valid for a long time to come.

Numerical order of pages with topics:

19 - War.	22 - Initiative.
27,35 - War.	36,38 - Training.
42,43 - Comradeship.	48 - Leaders (courage).
49 - Training.	54 - Discipline.
62 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	68 - Synchronization.
67 - Morale.	87,88,92,94 - Coordination.
75 - Discipline.	
96,99,101 - Staff.	
102,103,104,105 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
106 - Center of Gravity.	108 - Training.
108 - Leaders (intelligence).	115 - Morale.
116 - Education (military).	
116,117 - Leaders (intelligence).	124 - Comradeship.
124 - Training.	139 - Communication (of mission).
148 - Battle Buddies.	150,155 - Comradeship.
157,158 - Morale.	
159 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
161 - Comradeship.	162 - Philosophy of Command.
165 - Moral Forces.	168 - Leaders (stature).
170 - Moral Forces.	170 - Sports.
171 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
173 - Fitness.	181 - Training.
186 - Leaders (stature).	187 - Leaders (courage).
189 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	

ONCE AN EAGLE. Myrer, Anton. New York, New York: Berkeley Medallion Books, 1976 (originally published by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., New York, 1968).

This is a timeless leadership study. Sam Damon is the classic warrior, bred to war and service to his country very much like LT Hodges of Webb's Fields of Fire. Juxtaposed with Damon is Courtney Massengale, the political animal, one who "will never make an enemy and never have a friend" (page 342), and who represents all things foreign to "good." The tale of their Army careers is woven through 50 years of American military history. Realistically portrayed are the depiction of how technology (in the form of barbed wire and machineguns) and general officer leadership anchored in the 19th century doomed World War I to the genocide of trench warfare; the flawed Armistice setting the stage for World War II; the despondent military life of the interwar years; the terrible cost extracted by unpreparedness at the opening of World War II; the brutal Pacific campaign; and the tragically misguided strategy in Southeast Asia. But through it all courses the unswerving loyalty and inexhaustible endurance of soldiers inspired by an able leader.

* - Comradeship.

p. 102. "They were going to be all right; he knew it with a hard, fierce certainty alien to him till this moment. They were going to make it back to their own lines and nobody, not even the whole German Seventh Army lined up shoulder to shoulder, was going to stop them."

p. 148. "And Damon, trudging wearily beside them, felt the same hot rush of affection he'd known that night going up to the line above Brigny, under the flare - but now it was fused with a fierce, possessive pride: they knew the platoon was more than the mere sum of their numbers - they had imbued themselves with this knowledge and made it theirs. They were great, they were magnificent; he was proud to be their leader..."

p. 625. "...they've been pulled together by the hikes and battle courses."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

p. 200. "'Remember the time he filled his canteen with van blonk on the night march to Solssons and puked all over Ferguson's pack?'"

- Comradeship is often expressed in the way soldiers recall shared actions by event rather than date. This is one reason new soldiers often have difficulty working themselves into the comradeship of a unit; until the unit accomplishes something of worth, the new soldiers have no basis of credibility in a shared challenge or hardship. How well does your unit adopt new soldiers? Are challenges offered often enough to provide the periodic new soldier plenty of opportunity to become a comrade?

* - Death.

p. 662. If a leader stays in the Army for 20 years, or even substantially less time, the death of a subordinate is almost inevitable. It may happen because of an accident or during combat with a hostile force, but it will almost surely occur. For that reason, it is best to consider that reality and its implications in advance. The letter in this excerpt is a good one to use as a reference for communication with relatives. Unfortunately, there are no similarly useful references for the leader who must console the bereaved. Have you witnessed other leaders as they handled the deaths of subordinates? What did they do that was effective and worth emulation?

* - Death (randomness).

p. 206. "It was pure blind chance, that kid could see all of us coming up over the rise: luck of the crazy draw."

p. 217. "'...if there's one with your name on it, it'll find you if it has to turn the latch and open the door.'"

- Many veterans will say, "When it's your time to go, it's your time to go." That may seem to be fitting in some cases, but is it in all "random" cases? How can training and discipline affect the apparent randomness? How do exhaustion, hunger, and physical discomfort affect "randomness"?

Notice from the Index of Topics that this "random death" phenomenon is common to several of the books in this guide; the observations and discussion points above apply to most of them.

* - Discipline.

p. 79. "'All right. I'm going to give you one more chance, Raebyrne. I'm going to let you off.'"

- There are occasions when leniency is the proper course and occasions where it is not. It is up to the leader to establish the course; but regardless of the course, consistency must be its guiding light. If a leader "lets someone off," it must be consistent with his/her philosophy of leadership and consistent with precedents set in other similar cases. If it is not consistent, those soldiers out there watching the leader's every move will realize it, the leader's credibility will be damaged, and discipline will fail. And for discipline to stick, it must be administered so as to create a "significant emotional event" for the soldier involved; without such a reaction, the significance of the discipline will be lost and the chances of repetition of the indiscipline improved. How do you ensure consistency in the administration of discipline? Maintain a log of discipline? Count on an NCO's memory? How does your administration of punishment create a "significant emotional event"? How is consistency likewise important in the administration of awards?

p. 74. "...we got us a stomp down, fire-eating sergeant. Kind that just loves to sort wilddcats before breakfast...He hands me one of the catafalks I'm going to learn to shoot it if all it takes is glass aggies in a hopper...'"

- This excerpt caps a description of old fashioned "NCO counselling" behind the latrines with a recalcitrant soldier. Compare this with the "discipline" inflicted on

seniors in the fragging incidents described in Fields of Fire or The Village. What do you think about this kind of "counselling"? How would you react if one of your NCO's undertook such measures with a subordinate? What are the alternatives to this "counselling" for those individuals?

* - Duty.

p.298. "Sir, I refuse to carry out that order."

- At some point in time during military service a subordinate leader is going to experience this situation and be forced to consider disobedience. These cases arise from the unlawful order or the dumb order (compare this with a similar situation in West). What are some instances you have experienced or witnessed where the subordinate leader was correct in disobeying orders? How about incorrect in doing so? What was the difference? Should a subordinate first appeal to a senior to gain relief from the order in question or is it more effective to just disobey it ("what the old man doesn't know won't hurt him")? What was a case where you have been disobeyed by subordinates? Was it justified? How did you handle it?

* - Education (military).

p. 24. Related on this page is the effort of one man to learn the most possible from history. It reinforces one proposition of this guide: learn from history and the experiences of others. This excerpt also highlights the point that the truest and most enduring learning occurs when thoughts are written out; it is as if the effort to make the pen produce the coherent written thought indelibly plants the thought in memory ("I don't know what I really think until I write it down."). This second point gets at professional development programs: how could writing a short paper on a key point in a book improve the discussion at an officers' call and bring greater benefit to both the group as a whole and also the author?

* - Families.

pp. 622-623. "A soldier never gets to know his kids well enough: you should be able to but you don't - military life is too unsettled, confused, full of external artificialities to permit it."

- A leader is in the crucial position to affect the sad perception depicted in this excerpt. While unaccompanied overseas tours, training exercises, and other routine duties may cause occasional family separations, a

leader can create an environment where soldiers at least have an opportunity to participate in the lives of their families. While we all have an obligation to the present in accomplishing our duties with professional diligence, we also have an obligation to the future. That future is represented by the children of the soldiers of each and every unit, and if the soldiers do not have an opportunity to ingrain into their children the values of discipline and loyalty they espouse, then someone else will ingrain into them other values. How well does your unit accomplish this obligation the families? How could it be done better?

p. 768. "They were good girls. They had done what they could, had skimped and saved during the lean years, worried over their men's careers and brought up the kids, helped one another out with food and dishes on the evenings they entertained the CO and his wife...and all it it meant for them now was separation and dogged cheerfulness and incessant strain."

- This excerpt is testimony to the unheralded service that spouses contribute. How well does your unit recognize their considerable contributions?

p. 285. "'Do they honestly expect two human beings to live in this?'"

- Housing for families these days may be better than that described here, but an important point is underscored by this excerpt: "You don't reenlist the soldier, you reenlist the spouse." Care and concern for the families of subordinates goes a long way toward ensuring the positive morale of the soldiers. We have come quite a distance from the days of, "If the Army wanted you to have a wife, it would issue you one." How well does your unit look out for the welfare of families? Do you know the housing officer in charge of the post quarters where your soldiers live? How about the patient representative at the post hospital? Or the Commissary Manager? Or the Post Exchange Manager? Or the Army Community Service Officer? How could the unit's support group be improved? Do you know the names of the spouses and number of children in the families of your immediate subordinates? Are there any significant family medical or other hardship conditions preying on the minds of any of your immediate subordinates?

* - Initiative.

p. 84. "...above all encourage the greatest possible use of individual initiative by the men of your commands."

- Initiative is a critical fundamental of war, whether at the strategic and operational levels or at the individual soldier level. Despite the level of its presence, the adversary who employs it invariably enjoys a great advantage. Is there a fundamental of war more important than initiative? If so, what is it and why?

p. 106. "Ten men. Eight effectives - two of them mighty reluctant - one walking wounded, one stretcher case. Six Springfields, two Mausers, one Colt .45. Roughly twenty rounds per man. No food, no water. He thought of Major Caldwell in the narrow room without a ceiling, the clear, unhurried voice. 'Above all encourage the greatest possible use of individual initiative.' He smiled humorlessly. They'd be a trifle lean on initiative."

- Here is the classic leadership problem with that steely, nerve-testing question, "What are your actions and orders at this time?" It tests that very initiative we all say makes the American soldier indomitable. Do your seniors provide you the opportunity to use your initiative by issuing you mission-type orders? How do you develop the initiative of soldiers in your unit? How do you keep initiative from turning into anarchy? How does a subordinate with initiative threaten the stature of a leader who has little or no initiative? What examples of this initiative juxtaposition have you witnessed and what was their result?

p. 166. "...Victory is a matter of opportunities clearly seen and swiftly exploited."

p. 169. "'Opportunity once forsaken is opportunity lost forever.'"

- And it is initiative that allows us to take advantage of opportunities on the road to victory.

* - Insurgency.

p. 439. "'Never fight a losing battle...that is guerrilla warfare.'"

p. 440. "'The people are our hope and our mainstay, the water through which we guerrillas swim - and where the foreigner drowns.'"

pp. 456-457. "No one had fallen behind him; no one had straggled. Sixty-eight men had marched 38 miles and fought a battle in 16 hours, and not one had fallen by the wayside. Not one...How had they done it! - every last man of them...It was fantastic. They were underfed, underclothed,

underarmed - but they had something no other troops he'd ever known had, that was for sure."

p. 457. "'Hope, and dignity. Hope for a new China, a China free of foreign armies, foreign concessions, free of famine and ignorance and misery; and the dignity of equality.'"

- These passages concisely summarize the difficulties any major power has had and will have in fighting an insurgency. The insurgents, driven by a deep desire to win and adopting tactics absolutely favorable to their situation, are a tenacious and slippery foe. Even if your unit has no specific counterinsurgency contingency, you still must be prepared to fight insurgents who might support your opposition. How prepared are you, your unit, and your subordinates to fight such an opponent?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 750. "My God, he was tough; even when Brand himself had sunk into a brief, fitful, nap around three he'd wakened to find the Old Man gazing out into the jungle and talking to someone on the phone and giving the word to a runner. But now, he looked all through: his eyes had receded under his brows to sharp, white points, and the heavy gray stubble on his cheeks made him look old and sad. But he was still functioning."

- This excerpt aptly describes the ultimate courage that a leader must possess, the courage to continue. It may sound trite to recall the old saying, "When the going gets tough, the tough get going," but that is how it must be with every leader.

p.117. "He felt all at once unutterably tired; there seemed to be no end to this day of stealth and worry and decisions...He was weary from carrying the weight of their apathy, their fear, their unfocused resentment."

- In many cases the action that requires of a leader the greatest courage is that of just making a decision. And a decision will often be required in a crisis when all the factors from this excerpt are weighing heavy on the leader. Physical fitness and self-confidence are key in these moments, but training for those tough situations is also helpful. One of the real benefits of Ranger School is the experience soldiers receive in leading subordinates who are wet, cold, hungry and tired while the leader is wet, cold, hungry, and tired, too. How does your training harden

you in preparation for these crisis situations? Is there more your training can do to make you and your peers ready?

p. 579. "He had violated all the rules...but there were times when you had to throw the book away. Maybe you could do something like this only once in a war: maybe you shouldn't ever do it. But they hadn't had much choice."

-The bard writes that, "Many come forward, but few are chosen." Commanders are chosen from among their peers to lead soldiers. They are so chosen for this immense responsibility because of their demonstrated potential to courageously use good judgment, exercise authority, and accept responsibility under all extremes of conditions. There are times, as evidenced in this excerpt, when the conditions are desperate indeed and risks must be taken. Leaders should not quake at these times, but stand resolute and lead. How does your training stress your leadership talents now? Which leaders in your unit appear best ready and able to react as demonstrated here? Why do they seem that way? What attributes do they have that others could emulate?

p. 553. "'The higher your rank the calmer you must be. You must instill confidence.'"

- The testimony of this excerpt is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evident in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

This excerpt reflects on why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let

things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 650. "...and what happened to them tomorrow, whether they ate or went hungry, fought or rested, lived or died, was up to you..."

- This passage reflects the literal life and death importance that a leader's competence and judgment have on subordinates. It is an awesome responsibility, and one for which we are obligated to prepare ourselves.

pp. 431-432. "Nothing ever changed in war. It was always, monotonously, cruelly, the same; one man telling another that a mission was important, that his chances were good, more than good really, they were excellent, and so forth and so on; and the subordinate listening stolidly, realizing that it was going to be done, that perhaps it had to be done, but hoping nevertheless against all faint, fond hope that the whole operation could be postponed, avoided, forgotten. An avalanche, say, or an earthquake or flood or even a tidal wave."

- This is a mighty leadership challenge: creating on one hand the trust of subordinates so that they know that their lives would never be callously risked and on the other hand maintaining the self-confidence to know when an order is just and necessary and the courage to stand with subordinates to execute it. Is such an environment existent in your unit? Do your subordinates so trust you that they would follow you "to the gates of hell and back"? Would you so follow your senior leader? If not, how can the situation be changed to create such an environment?

p. 106. "And the little guy knew German: why hadn't (the squad leader) found that out before - why hadn't anyone in the company found it out?"

- To lead well, the leader must know the led. The most common aids to this knowledge process are two in number: first, the time devoted mentoring, counselling, and "BSing" with subordinates; and second, the leader's notebook wherein is kept key information about subordinates.

Weaknesses and strengths, talents and shortcomings, fears and beliefs, loves and hates, opinions and prejudices; they are all important to a leader and every subordinate has them. How well do you know your subordinates? What are successful techniques to get "up close and personal" with subordinates? What are the key talents a leader must possess to learn this vital information about subordinates? In your organization, at what echelon does a leader cease to need to know all of this detailed information about each and every subordinate?

p. 652. "The essence of leadership was an unerring ability to winnow the essential from the trivial or extraneous."

p. 738. "That was the trouble with war - there was never enough time for what you had to do..."

- The first excerpt is so simply stated, yet so difficult to accomplish. It is difficult because the essential and the extraneous are sometimes so intermeshed as to be indistinguishable and other times so entangled with others' hidden agendas or private ambitions as to be inviolate. One aid in this winnowing process is to have firmly established goals and objectives. With those in mind, it becomes much easier to determine what must be done. A second aid is to have the imagination, intuition, and experience to ask the right questions. This last aspect is one often overlooked by leaders who feel it necessary to provide specific guidance all the time. Insightful leaders understand that this approach hoggies subordinates and often stifles creative thinking. So these leaders will first analyze the situation, assess the objectives and contingencies, and then guide subordinates through all contingencies to a good solution by asking the right questions, a Socratic approach to leadership. Do all of this well in peacetime and it will make a difference in the ability to prioritize under the time constraints of war reflected in the second excerpt. What leaders in your unit are talented at separating the essential from the extraneous? What makes them effective? What other methods do you have for accomplishing this major feat?

p. 699. "...deferential, genial, and possessing to a marked degree that unique ability to dissolve his own personality in the desires and attitudes of a superior...What was abundantly clear was that Massengale was going to be his own Chief of Staff."

p.724. "A perfectly prosaic, pedestrian mind, incapable of creative impulsion; but an extraordinary memory, and a

workhorse. And utterly loyal, which was the paramount thing."

- While it is comfortable to have subordinates loyal and true, accepting "yes-men" or subjugating a subordinate's position is not healthy for the organization. No leader is correct all the time and no leader has the monopoly on good ideas; accordingly, no decent, clear-thinking leader will tolerate among subordinates the "yes-man" attitude reflected in these excerpts; nor will that leader knowingly create an atmosphere in which the "yes-man" attitude is perceived by subordinates to be the expected attitude. How healthy is your unit in this regard? Have you established the means for feedback from subordinates? Have your seniors made it possible for you to offer feedback? Are good ideas tried and tested freely? Do subordinates feel free to tell you bad news as well as good?

p. 299. "But to read a man off in front of troops-!"

- A cardinal rule in the management of discipline is that subordinates, especially those in leadership positions, should never be "counselled" in front of other soldiers, especially their own subordinates. How do you feel about that? Is that also your personal philosophy? Are there exceptions? Are there times when you might want to purposely "counsel" a soldier in front of others? If so, for what purpose?

p. 66. "'The American soldier has always wanted to know why, Sergeant. Baron von Steuben remarked on it at Valley Forge. Don't discourage it - it's a good thing. It's what distinguishes him from any other private soldier the world over - this feeling that it's his right to know why he's doing something. And why shouldn't he know? It's his life he's risking, isn't it?'"

p. 458. "'When you ask men to die, to endure great hardship, they have the right to know the purpose that demands that sacrifice...They have the right to be treated like men - with all the honor due them - all honor due their inextinguishable souls...'"

- Communication and mentoring are two requirements for a leader, especially one in the leadership of American soldiers. Why is it important for a leader to spend time "explaining" to subordinates? How do you as a leader set aside time to talk with your subordinates? How have you included in your leadership style mentoring for and communication with subordinates?

p. 378. "The best way to delegate authority...was to delegate it directly."

- This excerpt states the matter succinctly enough. Although you as the senior leader always hold the ultimate responsibility, how do you allocate responsibility to subordinates? And how do you grant the appropriate authority? Who are the best examples for delegation of these factors in your unit? What can other leaders emulate from them?

* - Leaders (reputation).

p. 17. "'Cool as a cucumber in deep shade. Couldn't nothing faze him That was his greatness...the critical moment. He could feel it the way you can feel weather breaking. And he never flinched, even after he was hit. Just to look at him was to have all your courage back again.'"

p. 89. "'We got the best platoon leader in the whole Ass End First.'"

p. 753. "...there wasn't a thing the Old Man couldn't cope with: artillery, demolitions, tactics, first aid - he knew his trade from muzzle to butt plate."

- Few leaders can naturally accrue this type of respect from subordinates, but all leaders, through effort and practice, can develop leadership skills which nurture this type of respect in their subordinates over time. It also requires some thought about how to achieve that respect with inherent personality traits. Which is more important to you: To be liked? To be feared? To be respected? Which relationship is best in peace time? In war? How is it possible to be liked and respected simultaneously?

* - Leaders (stature).

p. 105. "...but he, Damon, owed a debt to the men he had loved with and trained for battle. He mastered his fear and made himself go back..."

p. 361. "'There are times when nothing is as important as loyalty.'"

- Driving loyalty to subordinates is what builds the stature of a leader. Most would argue that one is really not a true leader unless his/her stature measures up to the standards exemplified in these excerpts. What does

your ledger show on this account? Who are some leaders in your experience who measure up? Some that did not?

p. 388. "What was it that made them all so insolent, so ruthless? Proximity to personal degradation? the occupational hazards of the trade? He hated MP's."

- There is also an example of disrespect for military policemen in Sajer. Leaders must also be cautious of subordinate leaders who may emerge from achievements of a stature unknown to them before with an inflated sense of ego (graduates from Ranger School are infamous for this type of response). How could leaders establish among their peers a "power abuse" watch to counsel each other in this regard? What is a recent example of the abuse of power by a leader that you have observed? And its results?

p. 903. "...he was one hell of a combat leader. But that isn't everything - there's a lot more to being a first-rate officer than that."

- Is this true? We often hear things like, "He may not be much in garrison, but he's a great field soldier," as if it is okay to be less than great in garrison so long as field performance is top-notch. Who in your unit is allowed a little latitude in garrison because of great field prowess? If this is occurring, how does it reflect on the consistency of discipline in the unit? What effect does this soldier's allowed laxness have on the performance of other soldiers in garrison? Or does it really matter so long as the unit is "good-to-go" in the field?

p. 363. "Anybody can accuse anybody of anything. There's no action on earth, from Adam on down, that can't be misconstrued, if the beholder has the inclination."

- There is no better way to say it than this excerpt has: a leader, and especially a commander of soldiers, is under intense scrutiny at all times, day and night, on duty and off. And if a leader is to be at all credible, he/she must by his/her every single action be consistent with the standards of discipline expected of subordinates. Once a chink in the armor is observed, especially by a subordinate aching for revenge after non-judicial punishment or by a peer jealous about relative performance, that leader is vulnerable to the basest of human retribution, and the collapse of credibility and failure in command will shortly follow. Or do you agree? Do subordinates forgive commanders of indiscretions or poor judgment in personal affairs? What examples of indiscretions

this sort have you observed which either support or refute this opinion?

* - Loyalty.

p. 606. "'I will be pleased to inform the men. They did it.'"

- This excerpt reflects one of the greatest attributes a true leader possesses, loyalty to subordinates, the ability to side-step the glory of great achievement and pass it on to the subordinates who made the achievement possible. That attribute enshrines a leader in the hearts of soldiers. What leaders of your experience are best able to demonstrate this utmost example of loyalty? How did they do it?

p. 719. "'You can think (what a bastard the commander is) all you want to. But you can't say it out loud. I won't permit it in my command.'"

- Most leaders insist on this type of "loyalty up." It not only preserves the integrity of the chain of command, but it also provides an admirable characteristic for subordinates to emulate. How healthy is "loyalty up" in your unit? Is gossip and grumblings about senior leaders more prevalent than discussions about their admirable traits? How would the situation be improved? But while "loyalty up" is laudable, where does the obligation to be loyal to seniors end?

* - Military Service.

pp. 368-369. "'Sam Damon? Oh sure, a regular fire-eater with the AEF in France - they named the plot in front of the town hall for him. Used to be smart as a button, too. What in hell is he doing roaming around army camps for, now it's over? About time he stopped fooling around and settled down to business, isn't it? Can't bear to take off that uniform, I suppose. Well: no accounting for some folks'..."

- This excerpt presents an attitude prevalent in most any age in the United States, including today, and is probably derived from our British heritage, as seen in similar excerpts from Keegan and Heinlein; how else to explain the way the Army is drawn down after wars to almost insignificant levels? And have we not all been asked by friends, family, or other casually interested civilians at one time or another, "When are you going to get out and make something of yourself?" How do you answer that question? Why are you in the service and why do you plan to stay when college or high school friends are doing "more meaningful"

things in business, science, or academia? Why is the service a more attractive alternative to a "regular civilian job"?

* - Moral Forces.

p. 145. "Successful armies were built on esprit, on conviction in the face of those clouds of great uncertainty in which Clausewitz said three-quarters of all military endeavor was hidden..."

- It is argued that moral factors (such as the military virtues of an army and the intuition and determination of the army's leaders) are the ultimate determinants of war and that the synchronized chemistry of these factors in the face of the "fog of war" and battlefield friction is critical for success. Do you agree? Can a superior leader overcome the disadvantages of a spiritless army? Can a spirited army win despite a leader of little moral strength? How do you nurture a unit to create the spirit described here? Can a leader train to become determined or intuitive, or are these precious natural attributes?

* - Philosophy of Command.

p. 43. "Inflexibility - it was the worst human failing: you could learn to check impetuosity, you could overcome fear through confidence and laziness through discipline, but rigidity of mind allowed for no antidote. It carried the seeds of its own destruction."

p. 46. "...It is ceremony that ennobles our everyday lives. We salute as a ceremony of respect, not to the man, but the rank which he wears and of which he aspires to make himself worthy; at colors we salute, not the flag itself, but that fluttering symbol of this great nation, one and indivisible...We are a family...A select and honorable family. We work hard and play hard, but at all times we practice good fellowship, personal honor and fair play. We are the vanguard of the nation. We must be worthy of it."

p. 382. "...It was not money or advancement or fear or vainglory, but a sense of the fitness of the thing - the essential rightness in doing a job conscientiously and well, bringing order out of chaos."

- These excerpts express the most basic attributes which should be contained in a philosophy of command (note that similar sentiments are expressed in Sajer and Forester). All leaders should have such a philosophy, and

In most command positions we are expected to publish it. This expectation reflects the importance of such a philosophy and, more critically, the need for that philosophy to be known to subordinates. Although officers disagree about the depth of dissemination of this philosophy, most agree that every subordinate should hear it or read it. It is said that an officer needs to tell subordinates not only what he/she stands for, but also what he/she will not stand for. This encourages consistency in the leaders and brings comfort to the subordinates. Have you developed a personal philosophy? How have you expressed it to subordinates? Have you asked of peers, mentors, or subordinates their opinions concerning your philosophy? Under what conditions do you think your philosophy might change?

* - Regulations.

p. 291. "'If I'm ordered to abide by some regulations I'll do it; but if I'm given any latitude I'm going to go my own way. Go by what I think is right.'"

- This excerpt forwards the interesting thought that Army regulations should be for guidance only (note a similar thought in Fuller). This further implies that a commander may exercise his/her judgment (judgment which must be significant because he/she was chosen for his/her post over several worthy competitors) in commanding his/her unit, perhaps even "bending" a regulation or two in the process. In many units, such "liberties" are unheard of. In others, they are routine. The climate of command in either type unit is probably parallel to the relative freedom enjoyed by the commander to exercise his/her judgment in this regard. How do you feel about it? Are regulations to be rigidly obeyed? Or can a commander use them for guidance and command as he judges best? Or are there some regulations that can be "bent" and others that should not be?

* - Religion.

p. 627. "'God, help me. Help me to be wise and full of courage and sound judgment. Harden my heart to the sights that I must see so soon again, grant me only the power to think clearly, boldly, resolutely, no matter how unnerving the peril. Let me not fail them.'"

- An old soldier said that there are no atheists in a foxhole. True or not, it reflects the fact that the proximity of danger will bring forth in some soldiers religious expression. Wise leaders recognize this. Wise leaders are courageous enough to display their own religious

conviction if it is their wont. Then Lieutenant Colonel Wes Taylor led his Ranger battalion in prayer in a hangar at Pope AFB just before they loaded onto the C-130 aircraft taking them for their 1983 air assault onto Grenada. Only a few words need be added to the above prayer to make it an excellent prayer for all commanders: "Thy will be done." How do you handle religious conviction in your unit? What examples are there in your experience of either poor or excellent acknowledgment by leaders of religious convictions?

* - Simplicity.

p. 699-700. "The whole deal was needlessly elaborate ... This was an operation conceived by a man who had never knelt in water up to his waist, who had never peered wildly through the wet murk of jungle, straining to see until the eyeballs ached, or sweated a five-gallon expeditionary can of water up a mud-slick trail, wincing at the raucous cries of birds and praying it wasn't Nip snipers signaling to each other."

- This excerpt speaks to the heart of simplicity. Soldiers, as human beings, are faulty creatures who succeed best where there are fewer opportunities to foul up. That is why simple plans are best. And the leaders and staff officers who usually appreciate this more are the leaders and staff officers experienced "on the line," another argument for all staff officers and NCO's to first serve "on the street" with soldiers. Is that policy in effect in your unit? If so, how does it work? If not, how would it improve unit operations?

* - Soldiers in War (description of life).

p. 661. This excerpt realistically portrays the soldiers' living conditions in the Pacific theater in World War II. The reasonable reader suddenly doubts that war, and certainly this war, is a romantic endeavor.

* - Soldiers in War (psyche).

pp. 90-91. This excerpt relates the "stream of consciousness" thought of a terrified soldier, a routine state of mind on the battlefield. It is the challenge of commanders to so train soldiers as to toughen them to resist the debilitating effects of this terror. This training and a solid sense of cohesion and comradeship in the unit will contribute immeasurably to mission accomplishment.

* - Staffs.

pp. 193-194. "...I would merely like to say what I think of a staff that would send men out into this muck, leave them for days on end in positions commanded by an enemy-held mountain - and then coolly expect the survivors to attack once more!...'...Back at Chaumont men in spanking fresh uniforms went smartly from room to room, passed their pencils over situation maps and scratched their clean, dry foreheads and toyed with alternatives; but here, in the mud and rain and thunderous hell of high explosive, there were no alternatives at all."

- 343. "'That's in the nature of things. A few (of the staff) are unselfish and devoted, some are brilliant and ambitious in a broad sort of way, most of them are self-serving and ambitious in a narrow sort of way. You can't blame Pershing. His job was to get on with the business, using what material he had at hand.'"

- The staff is often empowered to speak for the commander. When the staff and commander speak as one and the staff enjoys the credibility which can only be gained from demonstrated competence and wisdom, the commander, staff, and unit all prosper. But no matter how perfect a commander might be, an incompetent staff can undo his/her best efforts as completely as a swarm of locust feasting on a wheat field. A staff must be groomed by the commander to mirror his/her concern, caring, and competence, and a major step in this direction is to assign to the staff officers and NCO's who have served successfully in the type units subordinate to the staff. This one qualification does wonders for their credibility in the eyes of the subordinates. How credible is the staff senior to your unit? What about your own staff? Are they a "high performing staff" or one for whom a long line of "admirers" wait patiently with noose in hand? If things are not well with the staff, how can matters be improved?

p. 629. "Now he could see that (the staff) didn't know much more than the squad leader...and they had to sit here and wonder, and worry, and pray they wouldn't guess wrong...There on the wall was the map, with the beach designations and phase lines neatly stroked on the overlay in grease crayon, the probable enemy concentrations and the airstrip and the slender threads of trails - and it didn't mean anything: there was no correlation between this room and the beach a thousand yards away."

- This is where the "fog of war" reaps its greatest vengeance. The commander of a unit large enough to have a staff is also a commander who has access to support, to combat multipliers which can be apportioned to subordinate

units in contact with the enemy. But to wisely apportion what are inevitably precious and few assets, this commander must receive from those subordinate units accurate and timely situation reports. Subordinate unit commanders must be so cognizant of this requirement as to realize that they must periodically tear themselves away from the considerable demands of the conflict to make these reports before the fog of war enshrouds the entire unit with disaster. How well do communications work in crisis situations in your unit? What procedures or training could be instituted to improve it?

* - Training.

p. 66. "'...there's going to come a time - and it's not too far away, either - when you're going to be where all hell's breaking loose. Where you won't be able to hear yourself think, and where the temptation will be to do nothing and care less... and if you've learned to obey commands, to move without having to think about it, it'll make all the difference in the world.'"

p. 611. "...replacements, kids...who couldn't crawl noiselessly for two hundred feet or strip a weapon in the dark..."

p. 536. "'(The soldiers) had no training for this kind of thing, no really adequate training...Christ, I never thought anything like this'..."

- Teams and squads and platoons practice drills continually to prepare them for the routine execution of actions in various situations. The first excerpt speaks to the wisdom of this approach, so long as the drills are practiced in the harsh environment of the battlefield. The second excerpt highlights the fact that the drills are meaningless unless they are designed to practice the most likely actions the soldiers are to accomplish on the battlefield. And the third excerpt emphasizes the leaders' responsibility to consider every possible contingency and then prepare soldiers for each. If all contingencies cannot be covered, leaders can make up for it by making hard and tough whatever training is done; the hardness and the toughness will at least prepare the soldiers mentally and physically for that overwhelmingly real part of any warfare. How successful is your unit in this endeavor? Has the commander's vision of the battlefield produced an accurate assessment of what each soldier should be trained to do? Are the drills practiced in a realistic battlefield environment? What are the shortcomings that need to be addressed?

pp. 688-689. "I like them hard because it's the best conditioner there is...And the majority who do measure up own the confidence that they can outmarch any other outfit in the Army. I know it's unfashionable to think so in certain circles, but group esprit can mean the difference between getting up and running, and staying where you're supposed to...As for the combat training: what are you going to do? You can't take a boy off a nice, neat, tree-lined Ohio street and say to him, Cut that man's throat from ear to ear...Yes, I'm hard on them. On my staff officers, too. Too hard, maybe. But I don't see any other way."

- It is argued in this excerpt and widely among leaders that true preparation for the battlefield occurs only when training closely approximates the harsh conditions of the battlefield. The attainment of this challenge is a burden for the leaders to prepare and a trial to those participating in the training, but the benefits are great. Consider only the rigors and resultant benefits of Ranger School and Airborne School and the training at the Combat Training Centers. General Patton stated, "Sweat more in peace and bleed less in war." Can you look at your unit and confidently state that you and your soldiers are ready to go to war? How would you improve the training in your unit to attain the benefits of this wisdom?

p. 69. "...I'm going to strip this weapon once, then you'll all do it; and then I'll do it once more."

- The classic descriptor of the value of hands-on training goes like this: "Tell me and I will forget; show me and I will remember; involve me and I will understand." This excerpt also underscores the guiding principle of all training: it should be conducted by the first-line leader of the soldiers. How well does your unit accomplish hands-on training? How could it be improved? Do first-line leaders train their subordinates? When is "county fair" or "round robin" station training better?

* - War (crimes).

p. 158. "Somewhere there was a Senegalese platoon sergeant who...tapped at a curious collection of (human ears)...strung on a piece of wire around his neck..."

p. 159. "'Those prisoners you had'...'They made a break for it'...Of course, because of Ferg."

p. 174. "'Know what I do with prisoners, Damon? I line them up in little stacks of three, like dominoes, and then

zip-zip-zip! - and they're paying their respects to Valhalla'..."

- When one side perpetrates crimes such as these, it seems inevitable that the opposition will commit other crimes in retribution. How can you as a leader affect this inevitability? Are rules of engagement effective in this regard? Are there even such things as war crimes in the first place? Will you encourage or discourage the reporting of alleged war crimes by your subordinates?

* - War (nobility).

p. 244. "...War was not an oriflamme-adventure filled with noble deeds and tilts with destiny, as he had believed, but a vast, uncaring universe of butchery and attrition, in which the imaginative, the sensitive were crippled and corrupted, the vulgar and tough-fibered were augmented - and the lucky were lucky and survived, and they alone..."

- War is often described in literature as man's most noble and tragic undertaking. This excerpt certainly emphasizes the latter. But since many career soldiers state that their most rewarding experience was leading soldiers in combat, there must be some sense of nobility to it, also.

Numerical order of pages with topics:

17 - Leaders (reputation). 24 - Education (military).
43,46 - Philosophy of Command.
66 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
66,69 - Training. 74,79 - Discipline.
84 - Initiative. 89 - Leaders (reputation).
90 - Soldiers in War (psyche). 102 - Comradeship.
105 - Leaders (stature). 106 - Initiative.
106 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
117 - Leaders (courage). 145 - Moral Forces.
148 - Comradeship. 156,159 - War (crimes).
166,169 - Initiative. 174 - War (crimes).
193 - Staffs. 200 - Comradeship.
206,217 - Death (randomness). 244 - War (nobility).
285 - Families. 291 - Regulations.
298 - Duty. 299 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
343 - Staffs. 361,363 - Leaders (stature).
368 - Military Service.
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382 - Philosophy of Command. 388 - Leaders (stature).
431 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
439,440,456,457 - Insurgency.
458 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
536 - Training. 553,579 - Leaders (courage).
606 - Loyalty. 611 - Training.
622 - Families. 625 - Comradeship.
627 - Religion. 629 - Staffs.
650,652 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
661 - Soldiers in War (description of life).
662 - Death. 688 - Training.
699 - Simplicity.
699 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
719 - Loyalty.
724,738 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).
750 - Leaders (courage). 753 - Leaders (reputation).
768 - Families. 903 - Leaders (stature).

THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE. Crane, Stephen. New York, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1990 (originally published by D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1895)

Young Henry Fleming experiences battle from every perspective during two days of conflict in an unnamed Civil War battle. Initially a deserter in the face of fear, Fleming gains a warrior's fortitude after inadvertently receiving a minor injury, his red badge of courage. Stephen Crane, never a soldier himself, writes perceptively of the psychological trauma of war and its effects on soldiers. There is much for a leader to observe and learn here.

(NOTE: Other books in this guide which also deal with the Civil War include The Killer Angels [Shaara], Battle Cry of Freedom [McPherson], and The Mask of Command [Keegan].)

* - Challenge.

p. 3. "...there seemed to be much glory in them. He had read of marches, sieges, conflicts, and he had longed to see it all. His busy mind had drawn for him large pictures extravagant in color, lurid with breathless deeds...The newspapers, the gossip of the village, his own picturings, had aroused him to an uncheckable degree."

- It is said that brushes with death, as in war, introduce the young to their mortality, a mortality that the young do not otherwise recognize. It is also said that the arrogance of youth is the result of the lack of experience with consequences, as in the story about the turkey who blindly trusts the farmer who feeds him - why should he not, for the turkey does not know about Thanksgiving. Given this youthful psyche, the truth of the matter is that the young often enlist simply for the adventure and challenge of it. The swell in enlistments following the Grenada and Panama operations seems to confirm this magnetic attraction of adventure. The insightful leader realizes this situation and attempts by all reasonable means to ensure that this thirst for adventure is satisfied. That course of action contributes to a more satisfied soldier and a unit more prepared for the challenges of combat. How would you inject challenge into your unit's training? Which is the more important ingredient in training - safety or challenge?

* - Commendation.

p. 89. "But despite these youthful scoffings and embarrassments, they knew that their faces were deeply flushing from thrills of pleasure. They exchanged a secret glance of joy and congratulation. They speedily forgot many

things. The past held no pictures of error and disappointment. They were very happy, and their hearts swelled with grateful affection for the colonel and the youthful lieutenant."

- Positive reinforcement by leaders of proper actions by soldiers prepares the ground for many more successes than does the absence of that praise. In this case, even indirect praise is enough to motivate soldiers to greater deeds of glory. Leaders should take every single chance they can find to praise soldiers, verbally and in print, in private and in public. How do you provide praise to your soldiers? Is it accomplished haphazardly or in recurring activities? How should the families in your unit share in the glory of these positive moments?

* - Communication (of mission).

p. 1. "...the army awakened, and began to tremble with eagerness at the noise of rumors...(he) had heard (the tale) from a reliable friend, who had heard it from a truthful cavalryman, who had heard it from his trustworthy brother, one of the orderlies at division headquarters."

p. 10. "In his great anxiety his heart was continually clamoring at what he considered the intolerable slowness of the generals. They seemed content to perch tranquilly on the river bank, and leave him bowed down by the weight of a great problem...Sometimes his anger at the commanders reached an acute stage..."

p. 19. "'I can't stand this much longer,' he cried. 'I don't see what good it does to make us wear out our legs for nothin'...'...The strain of present circumstances he felt to be intolerable."

p. 67. "...among the men in the rifle pits rumors again flew, like birds, but they were now for the most part black creatures who spread their wings drearily near to the ground and refused to rise on any wings of hope. The men's faces grew doleful from the interpreting of omens. Tales of hesitation and uncertainty on the part of those high in place and responsibility came to their ears. Stories of disaster were borne into their minds with many proofs."

p. 69. "'Nobody seems to know where we go or why we go. We just get fired around from pillar to post and get licked here and get licked there, and nobody knows what it's done for. It makes a man feel like a damn' kitten in a bag.'"

- Rumors about unit operations are as old as the Army and will continue for as long as the Army exists. Wise leaders realize that most rumors are innocent and that they keep lubricated the informal communications channels so important to a healthy unit. But at some point the leader must effectively communicate the unit's mission to the soldiers. A soldier's understanding of the mission and how he fits into its successful accomplishment is key to his hearty involvement in its execution. How do you determine just how much the soldiers need to know? Is it important for all soldiers to know every aspect of how and why they are to do what you tell them to do? What is the best form of communication used by leaders in your unit? Is this form applicable at all echelons, or must the form vary from echelon to echelon? Is communication tougher or easier at higher echelons? Why? Do you agree that the commander's intent on operations should be communicated to two echelons below? Why or why not?

* - Comradeship.

p. 39. "His homely face was suffused with a light of love for the army which was to him all things beautiful and powerful."

p. 40. "At times he regarded the wounded soldiers in an envious way. He conceived persons with torn bodies to be peculiarly happy. He wished that he, too, had a wound, a red badge of courage."

p. 85. "The impetus of enthusiasm was theirs again. They gazed about them with looks of uplifted pride, feeling new trust in the grim, always confident weapons in their hands. And they were men."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who

are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Discipline.

p. 15. "After a time they began to shed their knapsacks. Some tossed them unconcernedly down; others hid them carefully, asserting their plans to return for them at some convenient time. Men extricated themselves from thick shirts. Presently few carried anything but their necessary clothing, blankets, haversacks, canteens, and arms and ammunition."

- It is said that the discipline of a unit can be determined from the refuse in its wake. At the most basic level, unit leaders must ensure that soldiers carry on their backs or in their vehicles only what is needed. That accomplished, the task left to leaders is to ensure that all soldiers retain that gear in anticipation of having to use it at a critical time. Who determines the individual load for each soldier and the vehicle loading plans in your unit? How would you improve them? Is it necessary for these plans to be the same for each soldier and vehicle with like missions? Why or why not? How do you determine who carries "community gear"?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 8. "'But if everybody was a-standing and a-fighting, why, I'd stand and fight. Be jiminey, I would. I'll bet on it.'"

- The testimony of this excerpt is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evident in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

This excerpt shows why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can

imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (reputation).

p. 21. "'That young Hasbrouck, he makes a good off'cer. He ain't afraid 'a nothin'."

p. 99. "'Hasbrouck? He's th' best off'cer in this here reg'ment. He's a whale.'"

- Some leaders are a "natural," and this type of respect just "happens." But most leaders have to apply effort to gaining subordinates' respect. It also helps to think about how to best apply inherent personality traits, because it is best that a leader in most cases just be him/herself. Which is more important to you: To be liked? To be feared? To be respected? Which relationship is best in peace time? In war? How is it possible to be liked and respected simultaneously?

* - Soldiers in War (psyche).

p. 25. Described in the last half of this page is the state of mind of a soldier in battle. This "terrorized incoherency" may be a natural result of the conditions of war, common on all battlefields (compare with Myrer, Webb, and Sajer), but it is still something that must be overcome so that soldiers can concentrate on the task at hand. Leaders must encourage confidence in self, comrades, and

unit leadership and provide solid training, knowledge of the mission and situation, and comradeship to overcome the debilitating effects of this terror.

* - War (nobility).

p. 48. "Swift pictures of himself, apart, yet in himself, came to him - a blue desperate figure leading lurid charges with one knee forward and a broken blade high - a blue, determined figure standing before a crimson and steel assault, getting calmly killed on a high place before the eyes of all. He thought of the magnificent pathos of his dead body."

- Literature often romanticizes war as being both noble and tragic, as is seen in this excerpt. These sentiments alone may not popularize war, but they do partially reveal the perceptiveness of this passage: "So long as there is man, there will be war" (Jomini, The Art of War).

Numerical order of pages with topics:

1 - Communication (of mission).	3 - Challenge.
8 - Leaders (courage).	10 - Communication (of mission).
15 - Discipline.	19 - Communication (of mission).
21 - Leaders (reputation).	25 - Soldiers in War (psyche).
39 - Comradeship.	40 - Comradeship.
48 - War (nobility).	67 - Communication (of mission).
69 - Communication (of mission).	85 - Comradeship.
89 - Commendation.	99 - Leaders (reputation).

RIFLEMAN DODD. Forester, C.S. Baltimore, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America. 1989.

Rifleman Matthew Dodd, a British soldier "cut off from his unit by the fortune of war" during the Duke of Wellington's retreat from Torres Vedras during the Peninsular Campaign in Portugal, is a remarkable soldier. His story of courage and natural leadership abilities weaves lessons about how a sense of duty and a natural spark of initiative lead to remarkable achievements. Our challenge is to mold every single one of our soldiers into a Rifleman Dodd.

(NOTE: This Peninsular Campaign is also discussed in this guide in European Diplomatic History [Ross].)

* - Comradeship.

p. 150. "As for Dodd, he might as well have been in heaven. He was back in the regiment, in the old atmosphere of comradeship and good-fellowship."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, such expressions of comradeship as those in this excerpt are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Duty.

p. 38. "The regiment had taught him that he must do his duty or die in the attempt; a simple enough religion fit for his simple mind. As long as there was breath in his body or a thought in his mind he must struggle on; as long as he went on trying there was no need to meditate on success or failure. The only reward for the doing of his duty would be the knowledge that his duty was being done. That was how honour called..."

p. 46. "For the Captain went the rounds three times that night, to see that the sentries were alert and at their posts."

p. 121. "... (Dodd) judged it to be his duty to risk his life without orders on an objective chosen by himself rather than preserve it like the one talent to be given back unprofitably to the regiment when the great day should come when he could rejoin."

p. 149. "...In those days there were no medals or crosses for the men in the ranks. There was only honour and duty..."

- Sense of duty is different for different people. For example, there are soldiers in your unit who have little or no sense of duty as portrayed by these excerpts; they simply joined the service to escape home or get a job or obtain financial help for college after they get out. On the other hand, there are soldiers in your unit who epitomize a sense of duty very much like that of Rifleman Dodd and the Captain. Where do you stand on our sense of duty as soldiers? Must you ensure that your subordinates share Dodd's appraisal of duty? How do you define to your soldiers your sense of duty and what you expect of them? When did you last do it? How often must you do it?

p. 125. "Perhaps the fact that (Dodd) did not think about (his discomfort and misadventures) proves he was happy. He was a soldier carrying out his duty as well as he knew how. He would have been the first to admit that under the wise direction of an officer what he had done and what he proposed to do might be more successful, but as it was he felt (or rather he would have felt if he had thought about it) he had nothing with which to reproach himself. And that condition is not at all far from true happiness."

- And a soldier's "true happiness" lies at the end of the trail to a job well done, or mission accomplished, or duty performed. How happy is your unit?

* - Initiative.

p. 9. "As soon as (Dodd) was safe from immediate pursuit he sat down in the cover of a whin-bush to reload his rifle - reloading took so long that it was always advisable to do it in the first available moment of leisure, lest one should encounter danger calling for instant use of the rifle."

- One old adage offers that "It is best to do almost anything right away than the right thing too late." But better yet is to have the intelligence and initiative to do the right thing at the right time. Rifleman Dodd does so in this passage, and the fact that he does it is a credit not only to his intelligence, but also to the training which provided him the insight and diligence to do it. What in your training program develops this initiative in your subordinates? How valuable are drills in this regard? Are drills a "be all and end all" or can they sometimes inhibit the development of initiative? How do you structure drills to prevent this?

p. 116. "... (Dodd) had been thoroughly imbued with the army tradition of looking for orders and doing nothing more than those orders dictated. That was all a private soldier was expected to do; indeed, to go beyond that usually meant trouble. Even in those days the usual retort of a non-commissioned officer was 'You thought? You're not paid to think. You're paid to obey orders' - a speech which has endured word for word even down to our day."

- Is this true in your unit? How free are soldiers to employ initiative? Do they know how free they are to employ initiative? Do they have too much or too little freedom in this regard? Is it true that the employment of initiative by the individual soldier is a great American advantage? If so, are there great quantities of this advantage among your soldiers? How do you instill initiative in them without creating anarchy in the unit, an atmosphere wherein there is so much freedom to employ initiative that there is no control?

* - Insurgency.

p. 97. "It had taken a thousand men in the end to guard those waggon against three enemies."

- Stated here is the very essence of insurgency warfare and the tremendous challenge which faces a counterinsurgency. And if the soldiers of the insurgent cause are driven by conviction and bravery, then a counterinsurgent effort is even more challenged. Many, if not most, of our future challenges may lie in this

environment and, even if your unit has no such specific contingency now, it may well be called upon to execute such a mission. How well prepared are you and your unit to do so successfully?

* - Leaders (courage).

pp. 4-5. "The Frenchmen had ceased their pursuit and had drawn together to go back down to the road. Dodd's jaws clenched hard together. He threw himself down among the heather and pushed his rifle forward; an outcrop or rock provided a convenient rest. He cocked the rifle...He pressed the trigger...Through the smoke he saw one of the Frenchmen down the slope lurch forward and fall, rolling down the incline a little way before he lay still."

- All soldiers, seniors and subordinates, officers and enlisted, should have the innate determination and courage displayed by Rifleman Dodd in this passage. Though tired, frightened, and in some danger, he retains the coolness to properly assess that he can still hurt the enemy, and he does so. What have you included in your training program to develop this sort of tenacity and courage in your soldiers? Who in your unit provides the best role model for these virtues and how can he/she be used to the best advantage in your training program?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 51. "(The soldiers) were all very happy eating and drinking and revelling in the warmth."

- Once exposed to hardships, the wants and needs of a soldier become very basic. The leader who realizes his/her obligation to fulfill these and does his/her best to do so will enjoy the boundless loyalty and respect of subordinates. How well do you do in this regard? How well does your senior leader and the unit support structure and SOP's assist you in fulfilling this responsibility? How could things be improved to help you?

p. 45. "... (The Captain) refused (the meat) sadly... he could not eat meat unless all his men had at least a taste of it."

- Here is a classic case of a leader not indulging himself before his subordinates have had equal treatment. The knowledge of this type of empathy for soldiers spreads like wildfire through a unit and will help create a healthy command climate in any type of organization. How extensive is such empathy in your unit? How can it be improved?

* - Leaders (reputation).

p. 2. "The dozen riflemen standing awaiting the Lieutenant's decision on the top of the hill showed no signs of agitation. They knew their officer and trusted him, despite the fact that he was not yet nineteen years old."

p. 99. "Neither of Dodd's followers questioned his decision: their faith in him was profound."

- A caring leader is one who has a personal relationship with subordinates, and the subordinates know it and respond with respect and loyalty. They, leader and subordinates together, then form a team which knows each other and successfully responds to challenge. Subordinates are quick to sense out a "hireling," a leader in it only for himself/herself, to "punch a ticket," and little of positive note will result from that relationship. Which is more important to you: To be liked? To be feared? To be respected? Which relationship is best in peace time? In war? How is it possible to be liked and respected simultaneously?

* - Loyalty.

p. 45. "'...Those are the orders.' The Captain knew that it was a bad disciplinary move to blame the hardship the men had to suffer upon higher authority, but he had to excuse himself."

- While loyalty to one's senior officers is encouraged for the more obvious reason of maintaining the chain of command, a less obvious benefit of such loyalty is created: that subordinates, when they observe this admirable "loyalty up" characteristic in their leaders, will tend to mirror it. Consequently, they are loyal to their leader as a logical extension of the fine example set for them. How healthy is "loyalty up" in your unit? Is gossip and grumblings about senior leaders more prevalent than discussions about their admirable traits? How would the situation be improved? But while "loyalty up" is laudable, where does the obligation to be loyal to seniors end?

p. 81. "If he could only join them he would be back in his regiment almost at once - the regiment, his home. Every good soldier must rally to his regiment."

- The sense of belonging exhibited here is what every leader should try to instill in subordinates. In the "Old Army," when all soldiers lived in a barrack with the NCO's, all social life revolved around the activities of the

unit, and it took a pass to leave this close-knit environment, creating such bonds was relatively easy. Today, it takes a deployment to create such fertile conditions for bonding. With most soldiers married and better paid, living off-post and enjoying many varied interests, creating in all soldiers a bond to the unit is a tough proposition. But the need for it still exists. The accomplishment of unit missions requires it. And the recent success of family support groups as an emotional anchor during the Persian Gulf War dramatically testifies to the value of such a bond to the unit. How well are your soldiers bonded to their unit? What can make it better?

* - Training.

p. 9. "As soon as (Dodd) was safe from immediate pursuit he sat down in the cover of a whin-bush to reload his rifle - reloading took so long that it was always advisable to do it in the first available moment of leisure, lest one should encounter danger calling for instant use of the rifle."

p. 10. "Months and months of drill had been devoted to making (Dodd) mechanically perfect in loading, so that he would not in a moment of excitement put the bullet in before the powder, or omit to prime, or fire the ramrod out along with the bullet, or make any other of the fifty mistakes to which recruits were prone."

p. 16. "...the iron discipline of the Light Division had accustomed (Dodd) to dispense almost entirely with water during the heat of the day, but at the same time had given him the habit of drinking immense quantities at nightfall."

p. 19. "The shrieking of owls and the barking of a fox were natural noises which the mechanism of (Dodd's) brain filtered out and did not permit to interfere with his sleep. He was a veteran soldier."

p. 22. "...soon (Dodd) was soaked to the skin, but still he lay, with the inexhaustible, terrible patience acquired in years of campaigning."

p. 35. "Dodd alone produced a practicable plan - he had fought in so many skirmishes by now that his reactions were instinctive."

- The best training is that which is gained by the experience of actual combat conditions. In the absence of actual combat, the best training is that training which best duplicates combat conditions. Whatever its environment,

training must evoke in soldiers the responses and habits which will best serve them in actual combat. What improvements can you make to your training which will develop in subordinates the experience to routinely deal with the mentally and physically grueling situations they will most probably face in combat?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

2 - Leaders (reputation).	4 - Leaders (courage).
9 - Initiative.	9,10,16,19,22,35 - Training.
38 - Duty.	45 - Loyalty.
45 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
46 - Duty.	
51 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
81 - Loyalty.	97 - Insurgency.
99 - Leaders (reputation).	116 - Initiative.
121,125, 149 - Duty.	150 - Comradeship.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Keegan, John. New York, New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1989.

World War II was truly a world war. John Keegan masterfully handles the daunting task of telling its tale, from the diplomatic dealings to the bitter combat, from the sorrowful tragedies to the estatic triumphs. Detailing five "type" battles in different theaters of the war, Keegan traverses the entire spectrum of conflict to carve out lessons for the interested professional soldier. Even if we never see its like again, there are still things for us to learn from the telling of World War II.

(NOTE: Other books in this guide which cover World War II include The Mask of Command [Keegan], Once an Eagle [Myrer], Men Against Fire [Marshall], and The Forgotten Soldier [Sajer].)

* - What factors contributed to the probability of a world at war unknown to generations before the twentieth century? Consider these factors:

- Population increases, in part driven by improvements in health and medical science.
- Larger armies.
- Economic prosperity.
- Improvements in transportation and communications systems.
- Steam power.
- The firepower revolution.
- The citizen soldier.
- Political activism.
- Increasing reliance by the major powers on the import of food for increasing populations and key raw materials to feed the increasingly sophisticated Industrial Revolution.

* - What was "appeasement" and, given the military balance, the economic conditions, and the political leadership in Europe in the late 1930's, were there any alternatives to the appeasement of Germany? Consider these items:

- The League of Nations' failure to discipline Japan (Manchuria, 1931, and China, 1937) and Italy (Ethiopia, 1936), setting the precedent for the appeasement of Germany.

- The rearmament and enlargement of the German army, air force, and navy, all in violation of the Versailles settlement.

- Occupation of the Rhineland, 1936.

- The Axis agreements, 1936-37.

- Occupation of the Sudetenland, 1938.

- Occupation of Austria, 1938.

- The Munich Conference of 1939.

- Occupation of Czechoslovakia, 1939.

- Italian annexation of Albania, 1939.

- The German-Russian non-aggression pact, 1939.

- The economic terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

- Invasion of Poland, 1939.

- Alternatives to appeasement:

- + Generally none, without reverting to force.

- + A slight possibility rested with a stronger argument by Chamberlain on behalf of Czechoslovakia during the Munich Conference. But when Britain chose appeasement, it surrendered the moral high ground.

* - What domestic issues constrained U.S. strategists and policy makers in the 1930's? Given the impact of these of issues, what military measures were taken to prepare the military for possible war? Consider these items:

- The financial desire to maintain prosperous trade (including access to the expanding arsenals of Europe and Japan).

- The Depression and its calamitous budgetary effects.

- The isolationist opinions of a majority of the population and Congress.

- The competing desires of special interest groups in the U.S. with cultural and heritage ties to Europe and Japan.

- The discretionary power built into the Neutrality Acts by the President, allowing him to progress the nation from appeasement to arsenal access to ensuring survival of Britain and restraining Japanese expansion (actually, in Europe from neutrality to "destroyers for bases" to "cash and carry" to "lend/lease" to "convoy escort" and in the Pacific from free trade with Japan through stages of partial embargo to complete embargo).

- Military measures which were important to later success:

- + U.S. Marine Corps development of amphibious warfare doctrine and equipment requirements.

- + General Mitchell's designs for the air force.

- + Naval War College games on Pacific warfare.

- + General Marshall's rapid promotion of the "best and the brightest" field grade officers to general officer.

* - How did British, French, and German military doctrine and strategic theory prepare their military services for war?

- Consider these thoughts for Britain:

- + Reverting to the quest of "splendid isolation," Britain failed to build or maintain a military instrument or national policy capable of achieving national aims or defending continental interests.

- + Britain favored a World War I status quo, but that possibility was nullified by the effects of the Depression and social concerns; no military alternative was pursued.

- + Britain could not offer a limited war solution when Poland was invaded in 1939.

- + Britain learned the lessons of strategic bombing, but economic constraints limited the number of bombers built.

+ Britain learned the lessons of armored warfare, but built armored forces too late to affect the Battle of France.

- Consider these thoughts for France:

+ France emphasized alliances, a fortified eastern border, and conscription.

+ Mechanization and motorization were subordinated to systematic, centralized command and control (Maginot Line); the mechanization and motorization that did occur were deployed piecemeal.

+ French air forces were not funded because they did not fit this defensive mold.

+ The French navy was also defensively minded.

- Consider these thoughts for Germany:

+ The German air force became a part of blitzkrieg tactics and made some steps toward formulation of strategic bombing doctrine (but virtually no heavy bombers were built, leaving a doctrine useless without the needed weapons system).

+ Great emphasis was placed on the ground forces and the speed thereof.

+ There was little balance of emphasis among the services because Germany's continental existence required emphasis on the army.

+ The German navy was ill prepared to contest Britain; it was battleship heavy initially despite the World War I lessons learned about submarine warfare.

+ Germany was well suited for limited war, but not total war.

* - What were the main concepts in American, British, and Russian strategic planning as related to the Alliance? What problems existed relative to the U.S. aims?

- Consider these objectives for America:

+ Maintain solidarity of the Alliance into the post-war period, especially with Britain.

+ Defeat Germany first.

- + Keep Russia in the fight with aid until Japan was defeated.

- + Require unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany.

- + Keep China in the war so it could emerge as a post-war power.

- + Create a post-war organization with U.S. participation and great powers' domination (to obtain self-determination, expand free trade, and achieve freedom of the seas and freedom of religion).

- Consider these objectives for Britain:

- + Maintain Britain's great power role.

- + Survive and win the war by whatever means available (naval blockade, strategic bombing, resistance forces, amphibious operations on Germany's periphery).

- + Retain colonies and trade priorities.

- + Restore the balance of power in Europe (destroy economic and political conditions leading to totalitarianism).

- + Achieve Roosevelt's enduring peace aims, but claim exemption from the precepts of freedom of the seas and self-determination.

- Consider these objectives for Russia:

- + Survive Germany's drives deep into Russia.

- + Convince the Allies to put pressure on Germany by opening a second front in the west.

- + Defeat Germany, first by weakening Germany in the Russian land mass and then counterattacking.

- + Fuse alliances to lessen the pressure from Japan.

- + Obtain lands taken with Hitler's offensives.

- + Regain traditional Russian lands.

- + Ensure that Germany paid for the war with tributes.

+ Create a security zone for herself in eastern Europe.

- Conflicts with American aims:

+ Roosevelt saw agreement among the Allies on the aims to defeat Germany first, keep Russia in the fight, and force unconditional surrender; he sought to postpone conflict on the other issues until after the war in order to preserve the alliance.

+ American aims in the post-war world were in conflict with Britain's desire for continued imperialism, particularly in the Pacific.

+ Russia would disagree regarding to the post-war world, especially about China's role in it.

+ Given the Italian and Japanese occupation precedents (the U.S. was the occupying force there, so the U.S. had managed these occupations), Roosevelt relented to Russian desires to manage eastern European occupation; but Roosevelt had underestimated U.S. economic influence on Russia, overestimated his personal bargaining effect on Stalin, and thereby lost his opportunity to press for a more favorable position.

* - What were the foreign policies and strategies of Hitler during the period 1938-41? Consider these items:

- Reverse the verdict of World War I and destroy the Versailles settlement.

- Subjugate Russia.

- Eradicate the "Jewish archenemy."

- Establish Germany as the master of the European continent to the exclusion of the Anglo-Saxon powers.

- Establish for Germany a power base in Europe and Africa.

- Begin the war on the eastern front, preferably in alliance with Britain, but at least waging one war at a time (this was not realized because the other nations did not stand by and appease Germany indefinitely).

- When the alliance with Britain was not realized, the Axis was created to first defeat France and then attempt to eliminate British influence before attacking Russia.

* - What was "blitzkrieg" and what were its principal components? Consider these items:

- A sudden, violent, massive penetration of the enemy's front line by high-speed armored forces to destroy an enemy's communications, support, and reserve structure.

- Well coordinated land and air joint operations, especially the ground-to-air coordination of close air support.

- The absence or misplacement of strong enemy anti-armor defenses or counterattack forces.

- By-passed enemy forces systematically encircled and destroyed by follow-on forces.

- The use of high-speed armor formations characterized by these tenets:

- + Mobility and shock used to overcome the disadvantage of small numbers.

- + Armored vehicles providing this mobility (in place of the horse).

- + Using the armor of a tank as a more valuable asset in the offense than in the defense.

- + Using tanks in massed formations distinct from other arms.

* - Assess the accomplishments of Allied air power against the Axis. Consider these items:

- Largely eliminated the German fighter threat and achieved air superiority over France prior to D-Day.

- Damaged significantly oil production facilities and the critical (to the Germans) transportation network in France.

- Diverted fighters from close support missions in the eastern and Mediterranean fronts to the defense of the homeland.

- Caused the construction of extensive air defense systems at the expense of war machine production.

- Accelerated the development of the V1/V2 missile systems at the expense of war machine production.

- Caused communication difficulties, enhancing the success of ULTRA against resulting "clear" communications.

* - What were the main concepts in American and Japanese strategic Pacific planning?

- Consider these objectives for America:

- + Maintain Far Eastern trade.
- + Secure U.S. interests (Philippines).
- + Curb Japanese expansion.

- Consider these objectives for Japan:

- + Establish a Japanese-led Asian sphere of influence in the Pacific, free of Western presence and influence.
- + Expand to secure access for Japan to key raw materials and productive regions.
- + Decisively defeat the U.S. fleet and end the war quickly.

* - What were the industrial and military characteristics of Japan as World War II neared and what were the fatal flaws that caused her defeat? Consider these factors:

- Lacked sufficient surge capacity, especially because of the war in China.
- Lacked critical raw materials (oil, iron ore, coal, bauxite).
- Possessed less than 10% of the industrial capacity of the U.S.
- Enjoyed naval superiority in the Pacific, in part because of Allied dispersion, but also because of :
 - + Better torpedoes.
 - + Better carrier-based aviation (Zero) and aviators.
 - + Better ability of sailors to operate at night.
 - + Tenacious infantry.

- Believed that Japanese moral strength would triumph over American willpower.

- Did not coordinate efforts with Germany.

- Fatal flaws:

- + Vulnerable to MAGIC.

- + Logistics (too many combatants and not enough support structure).

- + Political and strategic leadership.

- + Failure to mobilize economy.

- + Rivalry between the army and navy.

* - Evaluate the Japanese view of a naval war with the U.S.
Consider these thoughts:

- Conduct a surprise first strike to eliminate or at least greatly damage the U.S. Pacific fleet (especially the aircraft carriers), then conduct interceptive operations to reduce the follow-on American fleet by submarine operations, and finally seek out decisive encounters with the remainder of the U.S. fleet as it moved west in the Pacific.

- The plan was short-sighted because it anticipated only a short war; Japan was not structurally prepared for a long war in which the U.S. had the production advantage.

* - Why did the U.S. adopt a two-pronged strategy in the Pacific, what were its negative aspects, and what were Japan's alternatives?

- Consider these as reasons for the two-pronged strategy:

- + The Army/Navy rivalry in the Pacific theater.

- + The political popularity of MacArthur.

- + The need to comfort Australia while also attacking along the most direct route toward Japan.

- + The route through China was too difficult.

- + The Dutch East Indies route was too close to Japan's real vital interests in 1942 (an attack there resulting in a savage Japanese counterstroke).

- Consider these as negative aspects:

+ It created duplication of effort and competition for means between the two commanders.

+ It placed pressure on the War Department to mediate disputes.

+ It created the inability to completely concentrate forces.

- Consider these as Japanese alternatives:

+ Withdraw to a tighter ring of defense.

+ Use submarines against tenuous sea lines of communications rather than against the combatants.

+ Concentrate on one axis at a time rather than both simultaneously.

+ Better protect shipping against U.S. submarines.

* - How did the U.S. benefit from its insistence on Japanese unconditional surrender? Consider these thoughts:

- Japan wanted a limited war, so the resultant pursuit of unlimited war caught Japan unprepared.

- It channeled the Allies' efforts away from differences in war aims.

- It provided a public rallying point.

- It added desperation to the Axis' actions since it left them little room for political maneuver.

* - What were the key U.S. strategic decisions of World War II? Consider these items:

- Demand unconditional surrender.

- Defeat Germany first.

- Invade North Africa before Europe in 1942 (since a cross-channel invasion was not possible and forces had to be employed somewhere to maintain morale and relieve the German pressure on Russia).

- Pursue the strategic bombing of Germany (the "second front" in lieu of a ground campaign).

- Launch the offensive in the Pacific in 1942 (public demand; use of forces which could not yet be used in Europe).

- Pursue the parallel Pacific offensives.

- Launch the Normandy invasion.

- Drop the atomic bombs on Japan rather than invade.

* - What were the "significant moments" in World War II?

- Consider these instances and assess whether or not they were true turning points in Europe:

- + ULTRA in the corner of the Allies.

- + The Battle of France in 1940.

- + The British evacuation at Dunkirk in 1940.

- + The Battle of Britain in 1940.

- + The Battle of the Atlantic in 1940-43.

- + The Russian defense before Moscow in December, 1941.

- + The Russian eastward relocation of much of its industrial plant before it could be destroyed in western Russia by German forces in 1941.

- + The surge of American industrial war production and the Lend-Lease Act.

- + German declaration of war against the U.S. in 1941.

- + The Battle of Alamein in 1942.

- + The Battle of Kursk in 1942.

- + The Normandy invasion of 1944.

- + The German counteroffensive in 1944.

- Consider these instances and assess whether or not they were true turning points in the Pacific:

- + MAGIC in the corner of the Allies.

- + The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
- + The Japanese decision to attack the Philippines instead of the East Indies in 1941.
- + The surrender of Singapore in 1942.
- + The Doolittle raid of 1942.
- + The Battle of Coral Sea in 1942.
- + The Battle of Midway in 1942.
- + The Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942.
- + The Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944.
- + The Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944.
- + The Battle of Okinawa in 1945.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR. Stokesbury, James L.
New York, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1988.

When the Korean War began in 1950, many (if not most Americans) did not know where Korea was or why the United States would even fight there. From that uncertain beginning evolved a conflict that was never officially pronounced a war; a conflict which called U.S. service members to fight and die for a cause not clearly enunciated nor understood; a conflict which brought the world's democratic nations into confrontation with totalitarianism in an obscure region of the world; a conflict which, in short, foreshadowed most all of the violent confrontations the world would see in the last half of the twentieth century. Professor Stokesbury's short history paints the conflicts within this confrontation with simple strokes so that the strategy-policy mismatches, the rocky road of civilian-military leader relationships, the vast differences between democracy and totalitarianism, and the resultingly tragic human toll are clear for our investigation and understanding. And there is much we must understand and take from this reading. With the "revival of the United Nations" during the Persian Gulf War, are we not in line for more of this type of conflict in the future?

* - Why did the United States Intervene in Korea? Consider these as reasons:

- The invasion of South Korea was a direct challenge to America's assumed role as the world's defender against communism ("don't give in to the Russians") and to the United Nation's collective strategy concept.

- There was a common belief that failure to intervene would initiate a chain of interrelated defeats (the domino theory).

- The Democratic administration which had "lost China" was concerned to not also "lose Korea."

- The democracies of the world did not want to repeat the "appeasement" mistake of the 1930's.

* - Assess the forces in opposition in the Korean theater and why Professor Stokesbury says that "(Korea) was a war of 1950 fought by armies of 1945 using tactics of 1916."
Consider these factors for North Korea, South Korea, and the United States:

- Equipment.

- Force structure (army, air force, navy) and personnel (availability, training, motivation).
- Tactical orientation (offense, defense).
- Limited versus unlimited war.

* - What factors created the "shock" and resultant collapse in the face of the Chinese intervention? Consider these items:

- Unclear aims of the military action as stated by United Nations and U.S. political leaders to military commanders.
- An inability to assess Soviet and Chinese intentions, especially in light of no official contact with China.
- Mixed signals transmitted in public statements by U.S. and UN military and civilian leaders.
- The "split" rather than the subordination of the forces of Generals Almond and Walker.

* - How did the evolving military strategy in Korea match the national policy? Consider these factors:

- The policy: end the war on terms favorable to the U.S.
- The strategy after 1951: use airpower and limited offensives to maintain stature in the negotiations.
- The effect of the strategy: It surrendered initiative and momentum.
- Alternatives:
 - + General Van Fleet: achieve key high ground at the narrow waist of North Korea.
 - + General MacArthur: seize all of North Korea and unite Korea under President Rhee.
- Factors which impacted on the decision to choose the limited course:
 - + Unreliable intelligence as to the intentions of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union.

+ Eroding U.S. national will and the fear of the higher casualties required to achieve a weakened North Korea.

+ The European focus of U.S. foreign policy (would the Soviet Union attack Europe while the U.S. was involved in Korea?).

- Additional note: the JCS used a World War II Pacific island campaign model in fighting Korea when a World War II Italy model might have been better.

* - Discuss the role of air power during the Korean War.
Consider these factors:

- Attainment of air superiority and supremacy.
- Air rules of engagement.
- Decisive role (or not) in determining the outcome of the war.
- Employment roles:
 - + Supply and logistics.
 - + Close air support.
 - + Strategic bombing.
 - + Air interdiction.
 - + Air superiority.

* - What were some of the peculiar characteristics of the Korean War? Consider these thoughts as possibilities:

- A military trial of the containment policy.
- A civil war with foreign backing.
- An undeclared foreign war.
- The first twentieth century limited war.
- A proxy war (North Korea on behalf of the Soviet Union).
- The first war with United Nations sponsorship of forces.

- The first war with a nuclear backdrop.
- A war featuring the exploitation of prisoners.
- A war in which negotiations were conducted over a long period simultaneous with warfare.
- The use by an enemy of a politically sensitive, and thus largely secure, sanctuary (Chinese Manchuria).

* - What were the "significant moments" of the Korean War?
Consider these instances and assess whether or not they were true turning points:

- The decision to intervene with U.S. forces in June 1950.
- The defense of the Pusan perimeter in August and September 1950.
- The Inchon landing of September 1950.
- The breakout from the Pusan perimeter in September 1950.
- The Chinese intervention in November 1950.
- The relief of General MacArthur in April 1951.
- The publication of NSC 48/4 in April 1951.
- The UN defeat of the Chinese "fifth phase offensive" in May 1951.
- The negotiations (1951-1953).

* - What were some "lessons learned" from the Korean War?
Consider these requirements which cover shortfalls during the war:

- Maintain an ammunition stockpile.
- Given the possible need to battle inferior navies, maintain a mine warfare and defense capability.
- Provide definitive aims and strategic policy guidance to military commanders.
- Consider carefully great military drawdowns (as after World War II - 12 million service members cut to 2 million

in two years) while simultaneously maintaining a world leadership role.

- Understand that air power is critical to success, but not necessarily the decisive factor in success.

A SHORT HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I. Stokesbury, James L. New York, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1981.

World War I had immense effects on Western civilization, the way it wages war, and how it conducts its peace. Professor Stokesbury recounts how the terrible stalemate of trench warfare, the unanticipated impact of technological change on the battlefield and on military leaders unwilling or unable to deal with it, and the diplomatic warfare which created the foundation for the post-war world set the stage for World War II and aggravated tensions in the Middle East. This "war to end all wars" certainly was not that; consequently, an understanding of World War I is important to gaining an appreciation for what follows it in world history and how it affected military doctrine.

(NOTE: Books in this guide that cover World War I are The General [Forester], Generalship [Fuller], All Quiet on the Western Front [Remarque], Once an Eagle [Myrer], The Face of Battle [Keegan], and The Mask of Command [Keegan].)

* - What are commonly held to be the most probable causes of World War I? Consider these factors:

- European population increases.
- Productivity increases in some countries as a result of the technological and industrial revolution and a resulting increase in the chasm between the "haves" and the "have-nots."
- Conflicting political doctrines, aggravated by egocentrism, ethnocentrism, and nationalism.
- Militarism and the widespread belief that war was a purifying and strengthening social mechanism.
- Economic imperialism.
- Interlocking and secret alliances.
- An assassination in Serbia and the sensationalist efforts of the newspaper press.
- Austrian desperation to correct perceived political, diplomatic, and economic problems.

* - Were there any conditions under which either the German Schlieffen Plan or the French Plan XVII could have succeed-

ed? Assess this question in light of these tenets, as a minimum:

- Agility (transportation network; mobility of armies).
- Synchronization (Eastern and Western fronts; coordinated combined operations; capabilities of the communications systems).
- Depth (capture or destruction of centers of gravity prior to juncture of operations with their culminating points; defense in depth).
- Initiative (intelligence collection and ability to react; achieving surprise).

* - Was the Gallipoli campaign a viable alternative to continuing land operations on the stalemated Western Front as THE major strategic effort for Britain and France?

Consider in this assessment how the Gallipoli effort was designed to:

- End the isolation of Russia (marry Western technology with Russian manpower).
- Influence Turkey to drop out of the war.
- Establish a base in the Balkans for operations into Germany.
- Lure new allies (Balkan countries).
- Take advantage of superiority in naval power.
- Sustain the morale of the home front with some success.
- Improve the post-war bargaining position.

* - What were the "significant moments" in World War I?
Consider these instances and assess whether or not they were true turning points:

- The failure in 1914 of the German western pincer to penetrate far enough into France to capture or isolate Paris.
- The failure of the British effort in the Dardanelles in 1915.
- The British "victory" at Jutland in 1916.

- The failure of President Wilson's mediation efforts in 1916.
- The German adoption of Brusilov's "new tactics" in 1917.
- The German initiation of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917.
- The Russian revolution in 1917.
- American intervention in 1917.
- German preoccupation with maximum gain from the Russian capitulation in 1917-1918.
- British adoption of maritime convoys in 1917.
- The mutiny of the French army in 1917.
- The establishment in 1917 of the Allies' Supreme War Council.
- The German long-range artillery shelling of Paris in 1918.
- The infusion of American forces into Europe in 1918.
- The mutiny of the German Fleet in 1918.

* - How did the concept of the culminating point affect the offensives of World War I? Consider these instances when assessing the effect of this key concept in operational design:

- Brusilov's 1914 attack into Galicia on the Eastern Front.
- von Below's 1917 attack into Italy.
- Ludendorff's 1918 offensive on the Somme.
- Ludendorff's 1918 offensive to the Marne.

* - Evaluate the ability of the belligerents to adapt to technological change. Address these items:

- Communications (telegraph; wireless [to include the intercept thereof]).
- Submarines.

- Tanks.
- Machine guns.
- Chemical warfare.
- Aircraft (strike and reconnaissance).
- Barbed wire.
- Indirect fire weapons (especially in relationship to the ability to flexibly control fires).

* - Joint operations in a maritime theater involve the extensive use of naval power. What are some theories in regards to naval power which were applicable in World War I? Consider these items:

- A navy gives a nation an edge in competitive rivalries (commerce and power projection).
- Colonies and allies create the capacity for world-wide presence through calling stations for naval forces.
- A maritime strategy and overseas economic and diplomatic growth go hand-in-hand with a strong navy.
- Requirements for naval power:
 - + Geography.
 - + Climate.
 - + National drive.
- Uses of naval power:
 - + Influence ground operations (amphibious and flanking operations).
 - + Maintain peripheral pressure.
 - + Global command of the sea is not required; local control of the sea is.

* - What were the characteristics and role of sea power in World War I? Address these topics:

- The requirements of steam power required periodic withdrawals for coal resupply.

- The advent of submarines, torpedoes, minefields and long-range coastal ordnance kept the British fleet away from Germany.

- The German navy was outnumbered, was too expensive to lose, and was needed as a post-war bargaining chip, so a naval stalemate developed as it stayed "at home."

- German submarine operations against freighters forced Britain into convoy operations.

- The British blockade of Germany was effective.

- Stalemated naval conditions stipulated that the war would be decided on land.

* - Although the inverse is preferable, what were examples of how an opponent's military strategy drove the formulation of one's own government policy? Consider these items:

- Unrestricted German submarine warfare caused a reversal of U.S. neutrality.

- The eventual need to encircle Germany changed the Entente's policy of avoiding the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

- The Russian attack against Germany reversed German plans to conduct only a limited war against Russia.

* - How might Germany have better achieved its political goals? Consider these possibilities:

- Better coordination between army and navy operations.

- Better coordination of major operations with Austria.

- Repudiation of the war policy of total annihilation.

- Not secreting Lenin into Russia (it is interesting to note that Germany's political solution [Lenin] to a political-military problem [security of her eastern borders and desire for eastern lands] led to immediate gains [the Russian Revolution and the withdrawal of Russia from World War I allowing Germany to turn full attention westward] and long-term problems [the growth of a communist and expansionist government operating in opposition to Germany's best interests]).

* - Evaluate the Versailles settlement from the point of view of French, British, German, and U.S. war aims.

Consider these thoughts:

- France achieved dominance on the continent by encircling Germany with the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; but the absence of Russian acknowledgement and the intactness of German industrial and military might made that dominance shaky.

- Britain achieved an end of the German naval threat, but lost her role as world naval and economic leader to the U.S.; also, she achieved favorable status in the Near East, but at a time when nationalism in that area would make that status largely meaningless.

- Germany survived well, with the foundation to regain strength and with her eastern threat significantly reduced.

- The U.S. saved Europe and achieved a dominant world status.

STARSHIP TROOPERS. Heinlein, Robert A. New York, New York: Berkley Publishing Group (Ace Books), 1987 (originally published by G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1959).

This book was labeled controversial when it was first published. The controversy may have been generated by the liberal establishment because of the author's views on capital punishment, the justice and educational systems, the conduct and necessity of war, and the nature and form of government. But what is not controversial are its leadership lessons and vivid illustration of how warfare and the implements of war may change, but not the tasks and challenges of a leader. Many military leaders scoff at the notion that fiction, let alone science fiction, can offer anything in the way of productive benefit to junior leaders in the study of the conduct of their profession; but here is an example to the contrary. Understand from this book that change is coming. Any veteran of 20 to 25 years can describe change in the service over the years; the challenge before young leaders of any age is to understand that change is inevitable and anticipate the changes and their implications. But also understand that as far as leadership is concerned, the more things change, the more they stay the same. In the words of a soldier of mobile infantry in the Federation of the distant future, junior leaders need to "stay on the bounce."

* - Comradeship.

pp. 18-19. "But you don't walk away on another cap trooper, not while there's a chance he's still alive - not in Rasczak's Roughnecks. Not in any outfit of the Mobile Infantry."

pp. 104-105. "It took a little while to discover that this comparatively gentle treatment simply meant that we were nobody, hardly worth chewing out, until we had proved in a drop - a real drop - that we might possibly replace real Wildcats who had fought and bought it and whose bunks we now occupied."

p. 111. "But, less than a week later when we had made one combat drop with them, we were full-fledged Roughnecks, members of the family, called by our first names..."

p. 129. "...the M.I. was my gang, I belonged. They were all the family I had left; they were the brothers I had never had, closer than Carl had ever been. If I left them, I'd be lost."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in these excerpts are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

* - Discipline.

p. 58. "'You...struck...your...commander?'"

- Described in pages 58-63 is the epitomy of swift, and, in the context of the time, fair discipline. The point to be stressed here is the need for discipline to be swift and fair to be effective. In the pursuit of "swift," most commanders attempt to make a determination on their course of action quickly, usually within 24 to 48 hours of learning of a offense, so as to present the offender with the fruits of indiscipline in as compact a time frame as possible. Delays in this process tend to disassociate the punishment from the offense, thereby lessening the punishment's desired emotional impact and usually causing other members of the unit to wonder if the command is really serious about discipline in the first place. In the pursuit of "fair," most commanders succeed in the fairness of the consideration of the punishment of the individual offenders, but fall in two other regards. The first failure involves consistency of punishment, wherein they fail to properly log punishments administered and consequently give subsequent offenders noticeably different and disturbingly (to other unit

members) inconsistent punishment for similar offenses under similar circumstances. The second failure involves the purpose of punishment, wherein commanders mistake the most important value of punishment as being the rehabilitation or chastisement of the offender rather than being the absolutely critical matter of reinforcing to good soldiers the value of and respect for their good and proper behavior. When the offender is the commander's primary consideration, the sometimes overwhelming desire to be the "compassionate despot" leads to a lenient punishment which will cause some good soldiers to wonder why they should continue to "bust their butts" to be good soldiers if "that is all that happens if I'm a bad soldier." Disaster awaits a unit populated with soldiers plagued by such thoughts. Are there other precepts of the discipline process that are important to your philosophy of leadership? How have you communicated this philosophy of discipline to your subordinates? What things about the climate and process of discipline in your unit could be improved? And how? Of what value is posting on unit bulletin boards the results of UCMJ actions?

p. 87. "The only record (of the punishment) is one where it counts most. You don't forget (the punishment)."

- A key to successful discipline, especially that of the first-time offender, is making sure that the offender does not repeat the offense. It is achieved, not only here with Johnnie, but in almost in every situation, by creating in the punishment process an emotional event so significant that the offender has no desire to repeat it, while simultaneously reestablishing a "clean slate" relationship between the leaders and the offender. This last step is usually more difficult than the first, because it is hard for some leaders to subsequently deal with miscreants in as forward and caring a manner as that which preceded the "foul deed"; but it is that "clean slate" relationship which assures the offender that no grudge is held by the leaders for the offense and that if he/she can reestablish trust and confidence through good soldiering, complete retribution is possible. How do you administer punishment to achieve a significant emotional event for the offender? What current disciplinary procedures in your unit could be changed to improve the possibility of rehabilitating offenders? Do you agree with "clean slate" relationship with the offender? If so, how do you apply it? If not, why not? How does posting on unit bulletin boards the results of UCMJ actions affect the "emotional event" process?

* - Duty.

p. 96. "...a juvenile becomes an adult when, and only when, he acquires a knowledge of duty and embraces it as dearer than the self-love he was born with."

- How does this thought parallel our sense of duty as soldiers? Must we ensure such appreciation of the sense of duty in ourselves and our subordinates? How do you define our sense of duty to your subordinates?

* - Fitness.

pp. 173-174. "...you've got to keep a sense of proportion. You have two prime duties. First is to see that your platoon's equipment is ready - you're doing that. You don't have to worry about the platoon itself (because the platoon sergeant is doing that)...The second - and just as important - you've got to be ready to fight. You're muffing that...You're getting no exercise and losing sleep. Is that how to train for a drop?...you'll never get anywhere if you don't learn to keep first things first. Go to bed!"

- Examples of the loss of the "sense of proportion" by leaders are commonplace: leaders try to stay awake for all 96 hours of an exercise and, along with their subordinates who feel obligated to follow the lead, end up ineffective; leaders disregard the need for rest as an extended alert proceeds so that when H-hour arrives they are stressed out, tired, and mentally dull; and leaders preparing for big exercises cancel physical training in the last weeks before their deployment to "make time for more important things," in so doing unwittingly depriving subordinates of the invaluable means to stay strong and healthy, reduce stress, induce sleep, and remain mentally alert as they prepare for a challenge where success will be achieved only by strong, healthy, relaxed, well-rested, mentally alert soldiers. For a related thought to consider, let's go back to the example of the leaders staying up for the entire time during an exercise. It may not be intended, but could not the message sent to subordinates be that they are not trusted to do their jobs, and that the leaders think they have to be on duty at all times to make sure that the subordinates do not foul things up? What effect does this have on the self-confidence of subordinates? On the freedom these subordinates think they enjoy to exercise that precious commodity, initiative, we all want them to employ? On their trust in these leaders, some of whom have probably preached long and hard on initiative, trust, the freedom to make mistakes and learn, and responsibility? How well do the leaders of your unit "keep things in proportion"? How effective is the unit sleep plan on exercises? What

measures can you take as a subordinate leader to exercise your judgment in this regard?

* - Initiative.

p.17. "As they keep telling you in Basic, doing something constructive at once is better than figuring out the best thing to do hours later."

- Many of us have been similarly admonished after performances which lacked initiative with the adage, "Almost anything, even the wrong thing, done immediately is usually better than the right thing done too late." How do you get this point about taking the initiative across to your subordinates? Would your leaders want you to adhere to the adage above? If not, what is the guidance that your leaders have given you? Under what conditions are you willing to back a subordinate's timely, not-so-good decision when a later, more considered decision would have succeeded better?

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 8. "I wondered if those old-timers got the shakes as they climbed into the Trojan Horse? Or was it just me?...The top closed on me and I was alone...I began to shake uncontrollably."

- Very, very few soldiers truly have "ice water in their veins" to the extent that no fear ever exists for them. Leaders must understand that fear is inevitable in crisis situations, learn to control their own fears, and demonstrate courage to subordinates to assuage their doubts. Be the crisis a combat action, a parachute jump, an air assault, a night river-crossing, a live-fire exercise, or an inspection by the CG, the demonstrative courage of a leader and his/her ability to impart confidence to subordinates will contribute to the success which training and preparation have led the unit to deserve. How do you control your fears? What do you do to alleviate the fears of subordinates and impart confidence before a tough challenge?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

pp. 5-6. "...the acting platoon sergeant had gone over us carefully after he mustered us, and now Jelly went over us again, his face mean, his eyes missing nothing."

- There are several philosophies regarding the supervision of soldiers, but two of them in particular are competing and very different approaches. One requires the

chain of command to inspect soldiers and is derived from the thought that, "The unit does well what the boss checks." The second frees the leaders from such checks and reflects the thinking that, "Soldiers today are good enough to look out for themselves." Granted, these two philosophies are at the extremes of the scale and are not universally applied in any one unit. And, granted, leaders probably apply some of each philosophy in different cases with different soldiers or units. But, given these qualifiers, this excerpt matches which of the two philosophies most closely? With which philosophy are you the most comfortable? What are circumstances in your unit when one philosophy might be best and other circumstances when the other philosophy should be applied? Which of these philosophies would you prefer to have applied to you by your leader? Why?

p. 113. "But Jelly didn't have to maintain discipline among privates because he maintained discipline among his non-coms and expected them to do likewise."

- Many leaders fail in command because they do not understand that for the chain of command to work UP to them, it must first work DOWN from them. This means that instructions and orders, praise and discipline, and training requirements and social obligations should pass down through the chain of command to all the soldiers so that each leader is able to practice his/her appropriate authority. How well does this work in your unit? Do you enjoy all of the leadership prerogatives you believe you should? Do your subordinates? If not, how can the leadership climate be changed?

p. 137. "(A leader must be) a one-man catastrophe ...while keeping track of fifty other men, nursing them, loving them, leading them, saving them - but never babying them."

- How does this match your personal concept of your responsibilities as a leader? If your concept differs greatly, define yours and determine why there are differences and if they are significant. What leader in your experience best exemplified your concept of leadership? What did he/she do to so impress you?

p. 155. "'(Your senior non-commissioned officer is) probably older than you are, more drops under his belt, and he certainly knows his team better than you do. Since he isn't carrying that dreadful, numbing load of top command, he may be thinking more clearly than you are. Ask his advice."

pp.167-168. "I took my job very seriously, for it was my platoon...But I had not yet learned to delegate authority and, for about a week, I was around troopers' country much more than is good for a team...(The company commander recognized this and offered counsel.)...'Why the deuce do you think I turned over to you the best sergeant in the Fleet? If you will go to your stateroom, hang yourself on a hook, and stay there!...until Prepare for Action is sounded, he'll hand that platoon over to you tuned like a violin.'

- These excerpts offer sage advice for almost all circumstances, but certainly for the command environment at the company level. This judgment reflects the "old Army" thinking that the best trainers and counselors for platoon leaders are their platoon sergeants, for company commanders their first sergeants, and for section leaders their section sergeants. Are you comfortable with this precedent or do you think that officers must "do their own thing"? What NCO's in your experience best handled this unspoken "responsibility"? What did they do to make it work? What do you do if your NCO does not measure up to this standard?

* - Leaders (reputation).

p. 112. "The Lieutenant was father to us and loved us and spoiled us...you wouldn't think that an officer could worry about every man of a platoon spread over a hundred square miles of terrain. But he can. He can worry himself sick over each one of them...you knew with utter and absolute certainty that, as long as you were still alive, the Lieutenant would not get into the retrieval boat without you."

- This kind of respect for a leader is not earned easily, but it is what is sought by every leader. Who in your experience enjoys this kind of reputation? How did he/she earn it? Maintain it? Is it "natural" for some leaders to attain this level of respect? If it is "natural" for some leaders, can the others of us not so fortunately blessed be taught how to do it?

* - Military Service.

p. 23. "'So what is this so-called Federal Service? Parasitism, pure and simple. A functionless organ, utterly obsolete, living on the taxpayers. A decidedly expensive way for inferior people who otherwise would be unemployed to live at public expense for a term of years, then give themselves airs for the rest of their lives. Is that what you want to do?'"

- This excerpt is similar to those from Myrer and Keegan. It reflects much of our society's view of military service, especially in peacetime, when we are considered as the ugly watchdog best kept out of sight and mind under the porch. And have we not all been asked by friends, family, or other casually interested civilians at one time or another, "When are you going to get out and make something of yourself?" How do you answer that question? Why are you in the service and why do you plan to stay when college or high school friends are doing "more meaningful" things in business, science, or academia? Why is the service a more attractive alternative to a "regular civilian job"?

p. 24. "'The difference (between soldier and civilian)...lies in the field of civic virtue. A soldier accepts personal responsibility for the safety of the body politic of which he is a member, defending it, if need be, with his life. The civilian does not.'

p. 74. "The noblest fate that a man can endure is to place his own mortal body between his loved home and the war's desolation."

- If you agree with the thoughts behind these excerpts, then you agree that military service has a very exalted nature. If you disagree, how would you define the difference between soldier and civilian?

p. 76. "'The best things in life are beyond money; their price is agony and sweat and devotion...and the price demanded for the most precious of all things in life is life itself - ultimate cost for perfect value.'

p. 96. "'Liberty is never unalienable; it must be redeemed regularly with the blood of patriots or it always vanishes. Of all the so-called natural human rights that have ever been invented, liberty is least likely to be cheap and is never free of cost.'

- These thoughts echo the sentiment of Thomas Jefferson: "The Tree of Liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots." And many have expressed the opinion that for a democracy to survive and flourish, every generation must pay the price to preserve it. This should strike close to home for any member of the military service. How do you feel about being on the front line in the defense of our democracy for your generation? How do you feel about those who avoid "the front"?

* - Morale.

p. 137. "Yet somehow I don't remember being unhappy. Too busy, I guess."

- An old saying warns, "The idle mind is the devil's workshop," and it definitely applies to soldiers. One of the destructive, morale-busting factors in any unit is idleness. A leader who keeps subordinates busy with meaningful work or training will enjoy the benefits of leading a unit with high morale. Unfortunately, keeping soldiers constantly, meaningfully busy is a significant challenge. It takes imagination, hard work, and tremendous amounts of the leader's time; and it is that last factor, time, which often is the deciding factor in a leader failing in this challenge. That failure is driven by the leader's perception that if he/she is busy, then the subordinates must also be busy. That may be the case, but a trip to the work area will often find the subordinates of busy leaders reading magazines, talking, and clock-watching - you can almost hear the second hand on the clock ripping the morale out of the unit. Leaders must realize that their charter as leaders is to be busy with soldiers during the duty day and then, after the soldiers go home at 1630, be busy by themselves until their preparation for the next day is done. That is tough when leaders have many of the same outside interests as subordinates, but that type of devotion is a leader's obligation to subordinates. Of course, an ability to organize and use time wisely also helps. Where does your unit stand on the idleness curve? What are the improvements necessary to get the leaders of your unit "on the bounce"? How does the philosophy to "train to standard" rather than "train for a time period" fit into this challenge?

* - Philosophy of Command.

p. 66. "Because he has to be flogged; neither you nor I can take it for him, even though the fault was ours."

- This excerpt depicts a command failure, one which cannot always be avoided, but one which a solid, well-communicated philosophy of command can do much to avert. An often overlooked purpose of such of a philosophy is to describe clearly what the commander will not stand for. Describing what the commander stands for is usually easy, but little else does so much for consistency in leadership and followship than a mutual understanding of where all the lines are drawn. Then all that is left is for the chain of command to be ever vigilant to praise success (for the receipt of praise is never forgotten by the beneficiary) and correct deficiencies (for once a leader passes by a deficiency, despite what the written words evoke, that physical passage automatically sets in the minds of

subordinates a new standard, a lower one). How confident are you that all of your subordinates understand all of the standards of discipline for which they are held accountable? Is there any chance that you might end up punishing a soldier for something that is really your fault as a result of a lack of communication or action on your part?

* - Staffs.

p. 163. "If you have 10,000 soldiers, how many fight? And how many just peel potatoes, drive lorries, count graves, and shuffle papers? In the M.I., 10,000 fight. In the mass wars of the XXth century it sometimes took 70,000 men (fact!) to enable 10,000 to fight."

p. 166. "But what do 'officers' do who do not command fighting men? Fiddlework, apparently - officers' club officer, morale officer, athletics officer, public information officer, recreation officer, PX officer, transportation officer, legal officer, chaplain, assistant chaplain, junior assistant chaplain, officer-in-charge of anything anybody can think of - even nursery officer!"

- A persuasive argument could be made in support of either side of this issue; either in favor of a lean, mean fighting machine almost void of support "weenies" (reasoning that if staff work needs to be done, it can be done by a few leaders when they have the time, thereby increasing the benefit of this approach since the little time available for staff work means that whatever distracting staff work comes out will be so negligible as to be of little interference to the more critically important task of combat leadership) or in favor of staffs large enough to fully support units with their every desire (reasoning that such staff support frees leaders to lead soldiers). Which of these arguments do you favor? Or is there a workable middle ground? How effective is your unit in achieving a balance? See a discussion of the impact of staffs on subordinate commanders under this topic in Myrer.

* - Training.

p. 46. "But much more important than the purpose of carving away the fat quickly and saving the government the training costs of those who would never cut it, was the prime purpose (of the training) of making as sure as was humanly possible that no cap trooper ever climbed into a capsule for a combat drop unless he was prepared for it - fit, resolute, disciplined and skilled. If he is not, it's not fair to the Federation, it's certainly not fair to his teammates, and worst of all it's not fair to him. But was

boot camp more cruelly hard than was necessary? All I can say to that is this: The next time I have to make a combat drop, I want the men on my flanks to be graduates of Camp Currie or its Siberian equivalent. Otherwise I'll refuse to enter the capsule."

- Clearly stated here is the precious value of tough, hard training. The survival of the individual soldier and the unit depend on it. Who is responsible in your unit for ensuring that individual and unit training is "tough enough"? If the training falls short on the "tough enough" scale, what can you do about it to bring it up to standard?

p. 53. "The rifles used to simulate aimed weapons were loaded with blanks except one in five hundred rounds at random, which was a real bullet."

- But how far must you (or can you) go to make training tough and realistic. It is reported that the Soviet Union routinely uses real chemical agents and liberal live fire policies in training exercises, and, as a result, suffer higher training casualty rates than we do; all done in search of battlefield realism. How would our units profit from such reality? What would be the reaction from civilian leaders, the media, and families of soldiers to such hazards? Is it important for the military in a democracy to weigh these factors before adopting such realistic training measures? Do you see us ever going to the "random bullet" mentioned in this excerpt?

* - War.

p. 24. "Violence, naked force, has settled more issues in history than has any other factor, and the contrary opinion is wishful thinking at its worst. Breeds that forget this basic truth have always paid for it with their lives and freedoms."

- This excerpt is similar to one from Fuller wherein he offers that a nation is often more threatened from within during peace than from without during war. Is your service a reflection of your agreement with this excerpt or does your service reflect some other philosophy? Can mankind ever do away with war or is it something inevitable for which we must ever be ready? Is it then our readiness for war and the resultant ease of employing force that makes war inevitable, or does a lack of readiness make a nation so vulnerable to opponents as to make war of aggression inevitable?

p. 52. "The purpose of war is to support your government's decisions by force. The purpose is never to kill the enemy just to be killing him...but to make him do what you want him to do...It's never a soldier's business to decide when or where or how - or why - he fights; that belongs to the statesmen and the generals."

- These thoughts certainly parallel those of Clausewitz (see Howard). But do you agree? The first part of this excerpt contains the thought which was perhaps taken too literally in World War I when the Armistice was accepted while the German military still existed in a viable and prideful form. Many historians argue that had that military been destroyed, World War II could have been averted - so there may be times when the government should let its military loose to just destroy. Is the existence in the volatile Middle East of an overly aggressive Iraqi armed force such a case? The second part of this excerpt deals with a question from our recent history: what does the military do when the government so controls its violence as to make the war unwinnable, as was arguably the case in Vietnam? What would you have done as the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), under these circumstances? Must the military's loyalty to its democratic government be unswerving? Does such loyalty demand not only obedience, but silent obedience?

* - Women in Combat.

pp. 8-9. "...I know (women) make better pilots than men do; their reactions are faster, and they can tolerate more gee. They can get in faster, get out faster, and thereby improve everybody's chances, yours as well as theirs."

- Here is a question which bedevils our generation and may continue to cause consternation for years to come: should women be assigned to combat specialties? What do you think? How important is strength and stature? Is chivalry toward women so inherent in men that a desire on their part to protect women may endanger them all and their unit mission? Are there some combat roles where women, because of fine muscle control or psychological differences, are more effective than men? Is it fair for women to be deprived of career opportunities and benefits because of exclusion from combat roles? How would the society back home where you grew up react to the often used example of "women coming home in body bags"? How does that reaction match with the predominant feelings in the country? Under what circumstances would you go into combat with female soldiers? If women were assigned to combat specialties, are there some appropriate sanctions (i.e., no pregnancies) or

conditions (i.e., lessened physical standards), or should it be under the exact same conditions which men must meet?

Numerical order of pages with topics:

5 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
8 - Leaders (courage).	8 - Women in Combat.
17 - Initiative.	18 - Comradeship.
23,24 - Military Service.	24 - War.
46 - Training.	52 - War.
53 - Training.	58 - Discipline.
66 - Philosophy of Command.	74,76 - Military Service.
87 - Discipline.	96 - Military Service.
96 - Duty.	104,111 - Comradeship.
112 - Leaders (reputation).	
113 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
129 - Comradeship.	137 - Morale.
137,155 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
163,166 - Staffs.	
167 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
173 - Fitness.	

TOUGH-MINDED MANAGEMENT. Batten, Joe D. New York, New York: American Management Associations, 1978 (first published in 1963).

The more skeptical soldier will wonder why this book is included in this guide. After all, a common conception is that "management" has very little to do with steely-eyed, lean and mean, fighting machines. But there is something different about this author and this book, for on page 5 he defines management as the development of people, not the direction of things; this definition makes what he is addressing sound a lot like leadership. But the best aspect is that it is tough-minded leadership, that kind of leadership most applicable to the soldier. The emphasis in this book is on the need for leaders to seek continuous self-improvement and pursue improvement in the ability to project confidence, excitement, and vitality, both in themselves and in subordinates. By freely discussing the importance of values, wisdom, warmth, candor, and dignity in leadership, the author attempts to provide the willing leader with the perspective, philosophy, and tools with which to develop and motivate people and achieve worthwhile goals and objectives. There is plenty to learn here because "...the assignment of any leader is... to get large numbers of people to work in harmony and productivity, and the extent to which he gets the job done determines his mettle" (p. 132).

* - Challenge.

p. 2. "...activity and bustle should not be confused with vitality. The vital life is one in which the whole person is challenged. He or she must be called upon by tough-minded top management to stretch."

p. 11. "Most managers, surprising as it seems, do not expect enough from their people."

- These thoughts parallel excerpts from West and Crane wherein soldiers express a desire to be challenged; in fact, the quest for challenge is often given as the primary motivation for enlistment. So the leader who most challenges subordinates, both physically and mentally, is the leader who will enjoy the benefits of satisfied soldiers and of a unit made healthy and proficient by soldiers who express that satisfaction by performing at a high level. Are your subordinates challenged, kept occupied with "busy work," or languishing in the dayroom and motor pool? Does challenging training only mean rappelling, night river-crossing, and hand-to-hand combat, or does it entail something else in your unit?

* - Communication (of mission).

p. 67. "When the communicatee does not understand exactly what the communicator intended, the responsibility remains that of the communicator."

- One of the greatest challenges for any leader is communication, how best to tell subordinates what needs to be done, by when, and why. It is challenging because each soldier, each listener, has an individual frame of reference for every communication; the leader must empathize with that frame of reference to get the point across. And the challenge becomes even more maddening when a leader is promoted to a higher grade. Now the number of subordinates grows, and the style or method of communication which was successful at the lower level with fewer subordinates may not work as well. A new style and method have to be developed, ones which ensure understanding of the leader's intent at the lowest level and consistency with the professed philosophy of command. Do your subordinates understand all you tell them? Do you understand all your senior leader tells you? What is your best communicative means? How well would it work for your senior? Could your subordinate use the same means?

* - Discipline.

p. 18. "...does he know the what, where, when, who, how, and why of his job?...If you can answer yes to all these questions, you are not only justified in holding him accountable for real accomplishment but obligated to do so."

p. 25. "(It is fair to dismiss) the person who - after suitable counseling - still is not contributing properly to the accomplishment of company objectives. Tough-minded subordinates want it this way."

p. 77. "Discipline - particularly self-discipline - is wholesome and essential, provided that it is exercised in the direction of positive accomplishment."

- Holding soldiers accountable for their actions is the bedrock of discipline. It is certainly the leader's responsibility to train subordinates and establish and communicate standards of job performance and personal conduct. But once that is done, each individual soldier is responsible to do his/her part to accomplish the tasks at hand to standard and behave properly. Tough-minded soldiers expect to be held accountable. A leader who does not hold a subordinate accountable for performance below the standard automatically and, unwittingly, sets a new standard - a

lower one; a lower standard not only for that particular soldier, but for all subordinate soldiers. It is important to note that the opposite end of the scale also applies - a subordinate who exceeds the standard should be held accountable for that performance and recognized appropriately. Holding soldiers accountable takes courage and doggedly consistent persistence. A unit without such a courageous and consistent leader is doomed to failure because the unit will have no standards or soldiers who seek to meet standards. Do all of the soldiers in your unit understand this accountability principle? If there are shortfalls, how can they be corrected?

* - Duty.

p. 31. "Performance (of duty) means the total performance of the person and includes as much emphasis on qualitative indices of performance as on the quantitative. For instance, real and satisfying quantitative results will simply not take place without a high, even excellent, measure of qualitative indices like commitment, confidence, courage, integrity, loyalty, hard work, fairness, judgment, and uncommonly good common sense."

- It is occasionally easy for leaders of low personal or moral standards to disguise shortcomings from seniors. This is, of course, dereliction of duty because no matter how good the numbers or the results, the damage done to the organization because of this inherent dishonesty breeds failure in the future. Subordinates are poisoned by the course of events, and, if offered an acid test on the battlefield, the true status of the unit will be revealed in a tragic mission failure. How do you ensure that your subordinates qualitatively match their high quantitative results? What examples (and their result) have you observed where commanders courageously admitted true "less than max" results in pursuit of qualitative standards of conduct?

* - Fitness.

p. 35. "So look for the clear-eyed, flat-bellied person. Many top executives agree that the relatively young person who carries a roll of suet around his middle probably won't stand up to the requirements of long hours and split-second thinking as well as his fit and hard counterpart. Moreover, he will very likely prefer the easier course of action, regardless of performance criteria."

pp. 126-127. "... (the leader's) first duty is to his good health. He must keep himself in perfect shape - or as

close to perfect as possible...He must be not merely okay, not better, thanks, not getting along. He must be robust, alert, vigorous, cheerful, and optimistic...Rely not on the executive who suffers from chronic fatigue. He will postpone until tomorrow because today all he can think of is the rest he needs."

p. 127. "Healthy, orderly, and vigorous objectives are conceived by healthy, orderly, and vigorous people. And it is often a waste of time and money to concentrate on middle and lower management levels if the top person is out of phase emotionally, mentally, spiritually, or physically."

- Is it not interesting to see these assessments by an author addressing a largely civilian audience? Does this not readily match the precept that mental fitness and physical fitness go hand in hand? There are many reasons beyond surviving hand-to-hand combat and meeting the requirements of the weight standard chart to maintain physical fitness, but how do you convince subordinates of this?

* - Goals.

p. 4. "...there is no reason for being on the payroll other than contribution to organization objectives through the accomplishment of departmental and individual objectives. These must be wedded and welded together in a manner that is meaningful to the individual; else his dignity will be impaired."

p. 11. "People want a hand in determining the direction to be taken in their jobs..."

p. 47. "Don't wait to start your planning program. If you hold back until you are meticulously prepared in every detail for the establishment of magnificent objectives - let's face it! You never will get started."

p. 50. "To energize the team, every key player must know the direction of the goal, the plays needed to get there, his role in each play, and the people, money, materials, time, and space required. It is crucial too that each team member feels identified with something bigger and more important than self."

p. 62. "People approach their optimum motivation only when they see a realistic blending of personal, departmental, and company goals."

- It is vital that every unit and organization have specific goals and objectives, milestones by which to accomplish them, and specific people charged with their execution. And they must have them now. It all goes back to the old saw that "you can't get to where you want to go unless you know how to get there." These excerpts further emphasize that members of the organization should be aware of what these goals and objectives are and how they as individuals fit into the plan to accomplish them. Dignity has something to do with that, but so does comradeship and teamwork. Who sets the goals and objectives for your unit or organization? How often are they reviewed? Are specific soldiers charged with specific responsibilities in the accomplishment of these goals and objectives? Do all objectives have a soldier responsible for their accomplishment? How are these responsibilities transmitted to the soldiers? Do all soldiers feel they are a meaningful cog in the pursuit of success for the unit? How could this process be improved?

* - Initiative.

p. 10. "The motivational climate encourages mistakes within reason. It recognizes that ambition and high productivity must result in a certain number of them. It recognizes that the only way to avoid mistakes completely is to do nothing...The wings of the young eagle who never exercises them become ineffectual appendages; ultimately he fears even to attempt to fly."

p. 92. "An executive who wants more ideas from his organization first has to create a feeling of safety - of freedom to fail."

- A command climate which allows subordinates the freedom to learn and to occasionally fail is a healthy command climate. Subordinates in that climate are truly learning to be the leaders of tomorrow, developing the will to exercise the initiative that is the elixir of victory on the battlefield. Leaders who nurture such a climate can be satisfied that they are doing their duty well. Many young eagles are testing their wings in such units. Is your unit "zero defect" oriented or more in line with the climate described above? Are there areas or times or places where the "zero defect" approach is better or even required?

* - Leaders (courage).

pp. 7-8. "Positive leadership need not be clothed in any complex terms or abstract concepts. Positive leadership, simply defined, means the kind of direction

which assumes that the job can be done, the problem solved, and the negative attitudes overcome until proven otherwise...The positive leader asks this question often: 'All right, now that we know what the problem is, what do we do about it?' The positive leader must have confidence; he must believe fundamentally in himself...The positive leader trusts himself. He knows, following adequate research, what has to be done and does it. He is impatient with people who want only to tell him what the problem is, who simply want to talk about what is wrong. He is sometimes considered almost abrupt and even abrasive in his insistence upon determining what the end results should be and what should, in fact, be done."

- Positive leadership requires courage because there are so many negative obstacles in its path: lazy subordinates, unresponsive support staffs, time crunches, jealous peers, and naysayers in general. But successful leaders are courageous and positive natured - can you imagine what would have happened with the European invasion if General Eisenhower had not been so positive about that mission? Very few of us will ever be faced with so monumental a task, so we all should be able to emulate Ike's courage. What are the barriers to a positive leader in your unit? How can they be broached? Who is the most positive leader of your experience and what did you learn from him/her?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

pp.14-15. Listed on these pages as "do's and don'ts" are ideal suggestions for leaders striving for successful relationships with subordinates. Consistent application of these ideas will produce an absolutely positive climate. In which of these are you particularly weak and need to improve? Which are your strengths and need continuing attention? Are there any that have absolutely no applicability to you in your leadership position? If so, why?

p. 36. "Performance-appraisal counseling is one way to bring about development of the whole person. Focusing on accomplishments, hidden strengths, and unrealized potential is an approach which has a high yield. Focusing on weaknesses compresses the individual and seldom results in 'stretch.' The tough-minded manager permeates his whole philosophy with an emphasis on strengths and attainable results, on the opportunity to stretch and grow."

- Almost all leaders conduct periodic, regular counselling of subordinates. This excerpt properly

acknowledges the great value of the emphasis on potential and positive performance in that counselling. How often are you required to counsel subordinates? How often should it be? How do you record the result of those counselling sessions? How do you prepare for them? How do you require subordinates to prepare for these sessions? How are ongoing projects, milestones, and that subordinate's part in the goals and objectives of the unit addressed in the counselling session? Do you keep a running file of notes during the time leading up to counselling session to use with the soldier to ensure that the counselling period leaves no stone unturned? Of what value are the counselling sessions your senior conducts with you? What personal attributes make a leader an effective counsellor? How can these talents be developed? Note on pages 37-38 the descriptors of high performers (guts, vision, force, creativity) and on page 47 the qualities of the "top people"; it is toward these characteristics that our counselling should guide subordinates.

pp. 55-56. On these pages are a five-part checklist on the delegation process and this excerpt on page 56: "Responsibility is the obligation of a person to carry out the assignments and functions given him by a person or persons of higher authority. Authority is the right to demand and expect, to issue requests which must be followed."

- The leader who effectively delegates tasks to subordinates, giving them the authority, time, and resources to accomplish the tasks, while simultaneously exercising discreet supervision and accepting the ultimate responsibility for the tasks' completion, not only benefits from the exploitation of talent and initiative among subordinates, but also cements a motivated team. What tasks do you routinely delegate to subordinates? Why? What tasks do you routinely do yourself? Why? What is the difference between the tasks which drive your decision? Are there any tasks that you do that cannot be done by subordinates? Does a senior have to have some tasks to do to keep busy? To justify his/her existence? Or can a senior simply delegate and supervise almost all tasks almost all the time, saving some time for being with the troops or just thinking?

p. 78. "(Feedback) means, simply, that you request the subordinate to give you back the essence of what you have said so that you may verify that it is understood, or modify and amplify your instructions to insure understanding."

- In the operational arena, it is a common technique that subordinate commanders, after they receive

from higher headquarters an operations order and have devised their own plan, provide that higher headquarters a "briefback" of their order to ensure that the operation does in fact meet the intent of the commander and satisfy their intended part in the higher operation. It is so valuable a process that no matter how short the planning time is, this briefback almost always occurs. Is this process useful in only operational cases or can you apply it to other projects? If so, to which of your projects and how? Given your most common requirement to which briefbacks to your senior leader would apply, what other support staff, subordinates, or adjacent units should be present at the briefback to make it a fully useful coordination tool?

* - Leaders (stature).

p. 107. One of the characteristics of an effective leader is a sense of dignity which draws its strength from a solid value system. Listed here are some of the traits of such a dignified leader.

pp. 172-176. And listed on these pages are the characteristics and tendencies of a solid leader. Are any not applicable to military leaders? If not, why? On which ones do you need to improve personally?

* - Meetings.

p. 26. On this page are listed nine items which contribute to the efficient management of information and time at a meeting. These are important to consider because meetings are mentioned often as being catastrophic time-wasters for leaders. But since meetings are a necessary evil, it is best to learn how to use them effectively. Add to this list a tenth item, that of establishing the end time for the meeting at its opening, and it is a valuable guide. What critique would you offer of this list? What items would you add or delete?

* - Military Service.

p. 6. "...Individuality, a generous expenditure of midnight oil, and tough-minded follow-through...(are) the only way(s) to get there (to success)...and it can, and should, be fun."

- Service to our country requires dedication to duty and the characteristics mentioned in this excerpt. But it should also be fun, because these characteristics are much easier to employ if a soldier is satisfied with his/her work (all of this applies to you, also). This is not to say

that "every day should be a holiday and every meal a feast" or that every soldier should feel compelled to jump out of bed every day with a gleam in the eye, but it is to say that if your soldiers do not enjoy putting on the uniform and doing their part for the unit and their country, then they should find another line of work. It should also be emphasized that having fun does not mean making sure that there is volleyball time every day or that there are weekly unit parties (although there should certainly be a fair share of each). Soldiers will have fun if they are provided the professional challenge for which they enlisted, a fair and just climate created by leaders who honestly care about them, and a disciplined learning and operational environment in which they feel that they can contribute. How do you counsel soldiers that are obviously "marking time"? What successful unit in your experience seemed blessed with soldiers enjoying their duty and what contributed to this atmosphere? If you are not having fun in your unit right now, what can be done to turn things around?

* - Motivation.

p. 39. "You cannot motivate a person, I repeat. You can only provide the environment, climate, or atmosphere that will help him supply and seek his own motives."

p. 150. "We must make it clear by our everyday actions and reactions that we believe in the dignity of the individual and that the positive approach is not a catch phrase or a passing fad but a vital way of life."

- Think about how you get subordinates to "get into the task at hand." Are you actually affecting the unit atmosphere to make things happen, as is addressed here, or are you doing something else? What motivates you to do a good job? How can this method of motivation be applied to your subordinates?

* - Philosophy of Command.

p. 210. "Philosophy should be carefully thought through, discussed thoroughly, and then communicated at all levels of the organization."

- This excerpt reiterates the importance of a philosophy of command or leadership which is emphasized in other pieces in this guide under this same topic. It is crucial that subordinates know what a leader stands for and what he/she will not stand for. And all subordinates need to know it. It is a common misconception that such a philosophy is appropriate only for commanders; but any

soldier in any leadership position is a wise leader if he/she takes the time and effort to publish such a philosophy.

pp. 62-63. On these pages are 22 items which would serve as an excellent starting point in the formulation of a philosophy of leadership or command. Depending on your individual style, some of these may be techniques you wish to privately exercise, others you may wish to espouse publicly. All of them are worthy of your consideration. Are there any with which you disagree? If so, why? In which of these can your unit improve and how?

* - Procedures.

p. 96. "A procedure is defined...as 'a series of related tasks that make up the chronological sequence and the established way of performing the work to be accomplished'...Many companies have feared that policy and procedures manuals might rigidify their operations, that the initiative of lower echelons might be lessened along with imagination and innovation. This very thing can happen - but only when the real purposes of the guidelines are not understood, when they are poorly prepared and/or a climate of apathy exists."

- Most all units and organizations have standard operating procedures (SOP's). Some have them solely because they are required to by some inspection standard (apathy); some have them, but they are "organized" so that no one can find them all or at least the one needed at the moment (poorly prepared and organized); and some have them, but only the custodian, the one who will be checked by the inspectors, knows that they exist or what they say (misunderstood). All of these cases ignore the real need for SOP's to furnish institutional memory ("you may know how to do this task, but what happens if you get hit by a truck on the way home tonight?"); ensure compliance to a standard (documentation confirms that a requirement or format for a task actually exists); save time and energy by ensuring that better ways to do things are recorded; and provide consistent, accurate training bases for soldiers new to the task (every soldier thereby knows the why, what, when, and how of the job). Putting SOP's together from scratch is a time-consuming headache (a fact that short-sighted leaders use to rationalize their failure to prepare them), but their worth in the long run is inestimable; that is if they are prepared in an easily understood form by the soldier that knows the most about the task, if they are maintained in a readily accessible location, and if they are religiously updated. How current are your SOP's? Which SOP's need to

be eliminated? Added? Do the right people maintain the SOP's? Which SOP's exist at higher headquarters that impact on your operation?

* - Staffs.

pp. 69-70. On these pages are seven steps valuable in the staff coordination process. One factor in this process that must be emphasized is that while a leader must be prepared to make a decision, that leader should use the system so that this responsibility does not isolate him/her. To alleviate this systematic tendency, each subordinate should understand that presenting the leader with a problem is okay only so long as along with the problem and its background comes at least one reasonable recommendation on how to solve the problem. How efficient is problem-solving in your unit? Do all appropriate members participate in the problem-solving process or are there those who only present problems?

* - Training.

p. 40. "Have you noticed that really confident people take their work seriously but not themselves? They get more done and have more fun."

- One of our real challenges as leaders is to develop in subordinates through training and our personal example a sense of confidence in themselves that they can do their job under any and all conditions. This requires not only specific training in the skills of the job, but also tough challenges which strengthen personal attributes. Is it a coincidence that graduates of Flight school, Ranger school, Airborne school, Special Forces school, Air Assault school, and others exhibit a cool self-confidence or is it a result of the tough training? Is it coincidence that members of "elite" Ranger and Special Forces units have seemingly higher confidence and morale, or is it a result of their tough training and standards? What units in your experience achieved such levels of confidence and what training did they conduct to contribute to it?

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10 - Initiative.	11 - Goals.
11 - Challenge.	
14 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
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36 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
39 - Motivation.	40 - Training.
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92 - Initiative.	96 - Procedures.
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210 - Philosophy of Command.	

THE VILLAGE. West, F.J., Jr. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985 (first published by Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., New York, 1972).

This is "the true story of 17 months in the life of a Vietnamese village, where a handful of American volunteers and Vietnamese militia lived and died together trying to defend it." There may have been no strategy which would have "won" the Vietnam War for the U.S., but described herein is a strategy which, if employed on a larger scale, may have contributed to that lost victory. Described herein are employment of forces and combat of a nature atypical to the norm in Vietnam; that they were atypical speaks of the lost chance for success that they may have provided. Described herein are Marines who respected the Vietnamese people and their customs, understood that the Vietnamese were willing to protect what was theirs, and were determined to work side-by-side with the Vietnamese to produce success. The reader should consider how this effort might have been combined with efforts to create an honest South Vietnamese government, dedicated interdiction of supplies from the north, and relentless bombing of North Vietnam to produce a South Vietnamese victory.

(NOTE: Books in this guide which also deal with the Vietnam war are Fields of Fire [Webb] and Once an Eagle [Myrer].)

* - Careerism.

p. 194. "Company relayed the message to battalion, where no one was willing to accept responsibility for ordering a move under such circumstances. Instead, as a career hedge in case of a later disaster, Charlie Company was told to inform McGowan that battalion had wanted him to move while there was still time."

- This excerpt describes the perception that subordinates had of an action by senior leaders, and it was a negative perception. A "career hedge" may not have been the intent, but since it was the intent perceived by subordinates, that is all that matters. Since "perceptions are reality," this gives ample evidence why a leader must be forever aware that his/her every action is under scrutiny by subordinates. Consistency with a stated command or leadership philosophy is key to leadership of willing followers. What experience have you had where a leader's actions or words gave subordinates an incorrect or damaging perception of intent or motive? Once so compromised, how can a leader recover lost credibility?

* - Challenge.

p. 20. "These men knew the results of firefights - the splayed bodies, the sobbing cries, the gritted curses - but they would rather face the chance of death than fill sandbags all the dull day long."

p. 51. "'The reason,' he said, 'most of the Marines volunteered to come down here - well, not most of them - all of them - is the excitement.'"

- Even under threat of death, soldiers undertake dangerous missions in preference to the drudgery of monotonous garrison tasks. This is a common characteristic of soldiers in peace as well. Few things add a more positive tone to a unit's morale than adventure, daring, and challenge in training. How well does your unit's training schedule satisfy this innate desire? How could it be improved?

* - Comradeship.

p. 101. "The Americans were driven by a group ethic. They were judged by their peers and each knew what was expected of him and what he expected from the others...on patrol no man dared let down, or suggest that the enemy be purposely avoided. That would finish him in the eyes of the others."

- Comradeship and military service are inseparable entities; consequently, expressions of comradeship as those in this excerpt are common in literature and are found in many of the books in this guide. That prevalence is demonstrated by the number of listings for "Comradeship" in the guide's Index of Topics. The observations and discussion points below are used for all of them.

Comradeship is a sense of brotherhood, unity, and cohesion among soldiers of a unit. It is sought by almost every unit, but comradeship cannot be decreed or listed as a training objective on the unit training schedule. It is largely developed after the soldiers share experiences together (the tougher the experience, the deeper the sense of comradeship) and develop a respect for each other's professional performance. Friendship, on the other hand, is an amicable relationship developed among acquaintances who are fond of each other and enjoy each other's company. Is comradeship or friendship more important in a unit? What comes first in a relationship among soldiers, friendship or comradeship? Were you first a comrade with your best friend or best friends from the start? How do athletics and civic action projects fit into the development of comradeship in a unit? Why is it necessary for leaders to feel comradeship with their subordinates (and vice versa)? Or is it

necessary? Are there "discipline problems" in your unit that may be expressions of comradeship that need to be better channeled?

p. 134. "(SGT White) looked at them carefully and they stared flatly back, not accepting but not rejecting him, an acknowledgment that he might fit in, knowing who he was and what he had done."

- This excerpt reflects a common expression of comradeship. The Marines of the unit, closely bonded by their common experiences, are reluctant to automatically "admit" a newcomer; but they are not hostile either, because they recognize that he is a possible "comrade" as a result of his similar, if not coincidental, experiences. The need to bond newcomers to units in our fluid service is a considerable challenge to leaders. How does your unit get newcomers involved with the unit? How could it be improved?

* - Duty.

p. 178. "The colonel also insisted upon his troops' wearing flak jackets and helmets at all times and had limited ammunition to one hundred rounds per man. Sergeant White had considered both orders absurd."

- It is inevitable over the span of a career that a soldier will receive a dumb or unlawful order and be forced to make this decision: obey or disobey. Compare this situation with a like situation in Myrer. What are some instances you have experienced or witnessed where a soldier was correct in disobeying orders? How about incorrect in doing so? What was the difference? Should a subordinate first appeal to a senior to gain relief from the order in question or is it more effective to just disobey it ("what the old man doesn't know won't hurt him")? What was a case where you have been disobeyed by subordinates? Was it justified? How did you handle it?

* - Fragging.

p. 179. "'Sarge,' he said, 'you remember how the grunts got rid of that platoon commander?'...One afternoon the lieutenant set out with a squad on an armored reconnaissance. They ran into some light sniper fire and somehow the lieutenant ended up with a hole in the back of his leg. He was medevaced out with a Purple Heart, and the company never heard of him again."

- While this is not exactly a "fragging," it is still an instance of soldiers eliminating a leader whose

incompetence threatened their safety. Compare this with a like incident in Webb. Under what circumstances would you condone such "field discipline"? How different is it from an NCO taking an insubordinate enlisted soldier behind the barrack for some "physical counselling?" Or an officer shooting a soldier who disobeys an order in battle and becomes a danger to the unit and to mission accomplishment?

* - The Front.

p. 215. "The luxury of simple modernity had drawbacks...The anxieties of the two leaders grew, and they came to look on the generator as a symbol of complacency and an invitation to disaster. Four weeks after it arrived, they decided to get rid of it."

- On the one hand, a leader should do for subordinates whatever can be done to make life comfortable, but, as this excerpt demonstrates, "luxury" does lessen the hardness in soldiers that some hard situations demand of them. It also demonstrates the wisdom of the old saying that "the more things you own, the more the things own you." How well does your unit do in balancing the need for Spartan training conditions and the desire for comfort? How well does this balance prepare soldiers for the rigors of war?

* - Insurgency.

pp. xi-xii. "...the theory was (that) the Government of South Vietnam could reassert control in the villages and strengthen its rural roots, while U.S. and South Vietnamese regular forces pushed the North Vietnamese divisions into the mountains or back into North Vietnam."

- This is part, only part, of what might have succeeded in that counterinsurgency. Another part, perhaps even a more important part, would have been the institution of a government in South Vietnam "of the people, by the people, and for the people" instead of the corrupt, unrepresentative government which existed. As it was, success in the villages, at the grass roots, meant little when the people could not and did not support the government because the government had so little empathy for them (p. 6. "...the Saigon government was never popular in Lam's province.").

p. 102. "... (The Marines) were providing at the obvious risk of death a service of protection. This had won them open admiration and stature within the Vietnamese village society in which they were working..."

p. 36. "The rifle - not the cannon or the jet - was to be the primary weapon of the Americans in Binh Nghia."

p. 187. "There was never an air strike called in the war for that village. It was a battle fought with rifles and grenades at such close quarters that both sides used their senses of smell and hearing as much as their eyesight."

- These excerpts reflect a nature of the war not common in most of the conflict, a conflict which the U.S. tried to win with firepower and technology. A successful counterinsurgency requires success at the insurgents' tactics.

* - Leaders (courage).

p. 85. "'Let's wait a couple of hours for those guerrillas to settle down,' O'Rourke said, 'and then go out after them.'"

p. 131. "'But we couldn't leave. What would we have said to the PFs after the way we pushed them to fight the Cong? We had to stay. There wasn't one of us who wanted to leave.'"

- The testimony of these excerpts is common since a leader's courage (or lack of it) is evident in all times of stress. The prevalence of interest in this trait is reflected in the number of excerpts noted in the Index of Topics of this guide; the observations and discussion points below are similar in all of them.

These excerpts show why a leader must seem visibly courageous to subordinates in times of stress. Courage will affect all who witness it, and its effect will multiply many times over. The physical and moral courage of a leader can imbue in subordinates a spirit and a will which can be imparted by no other means. Do you agree? How else can a leader imbue this spirit and will? What is the greatest example of physical courage in a leader you can remember and how did it affect subordinates? How about an act of moral courage? How often must a leader exhibit courage to subordinates?

But beyond the mere aspect of courage, it is the insight of the leader to recognize where and when to be present to demonstrate this courage, to exercise the "personal" factor of command, that is critical. It is said that battles and events are turned by a leader "being at the right place at the right time." This is applicable equally in battles, in training exercises, and in command inspections by higher headquarters, for it is easy for commanders to hide and let

things run their due course in all these cases. How does a leader determine when and where to best exert this courageous "personal factor"? Have you set up a means of communication in your unit to help you determine this point in time and place where you as a leader can exert the crucial leadership factor and create success? How much does study ahead of the situation affect a leader's ability to make this key choice?

* - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).

p. 158. "(The squad leader) was due for relief in December, but he did not want to leave until the unit had a new leader. He had chosen nobody from within it. The men had lived together too long to accept the sudden elevation of one of their own to the position of final authority."

- This excerpt presents a tremendous leadership dilemma: how to handle the assignment of a soldier newly promoted to sergeant. The dilemma is occasionally mitigated by the personality of the new NCO, a personality which can cope with the new position of authority over friends and former peers. And the dilemma is occasionally unbroachable except by direct assault since no reassignment option is possible. But those occasions are less predominant, leaving leaders in most units the more attractive alternative: reassignment of the new NCO to a new squad or team or section. An effective way to introduce new NCO's and their units to their altered relationship is organizing the agenda for the promotion ceremony to include the reading by the new NCO of the NCO creed and then providing the new NCO the opportunity while the unit is still in ranks to "shake hands goodbye" with his/her former peers (that is, all soldiers E4 and below) in the unit. That simple process formalizes the relationship change and takes the burden of how otherwise to do it off the new NCO. Why should the relationship between NCO's and enlisted soldiers be different than that between enlisted soldiers? What problems have you witnessed with newly promoted NCO's who stay with their former peers? In cases where it worked out okay, what did the new NCO do to make it work? How can the way your unit handles this situation be improved?

* - Leaders (stature).

p. 176. "Thievery of military items such as compasses or grenades occurred from time to time and was tolerated by the Marines, as they in turn would steal from any unit richer than themselves. It was part of the Marine code of 'scrounging.'"

p. 177. "It was not just the PFs who stole. When an American battalion commander came to inspect the fort one day, he saw some U.S. AID material stored in the courtyard. Among the various items was a bolt of oilcloth. "Who's that for?" the lieutenant colonel asked. 'The villagers, sir,' McGowan replied...(the officer stated) 'I could use that for backing for my mapboards. Put it in the jeep.'"

p. 186. "In return for the liquor, Blunk got his shopping list filled..."

p. 207. "The sergeants split up and individually peeked and poked around until each found a bag containing one of the new weapons. Then each made his swap, one battered M-16 for one brand-new XM-1332A."

- How does "scrounging" affect the stature of a leader who "looks the other way" while espousing honesty and integrity? How is "scrounging" dealt with in your unit? Do you agree with your unit's philosophy? Is "scrounging" for some purposes more justified than "midnight requisitions" for others? Why do you think the first excerpt differentiates between thievery of personal and government property? Why should there be a difference? Is this "scrounging" different from the process whereby government pens, pencils, paper clips, and notepads end up at home?

* - Shirking.

p. 213. "His team had been assigned an ambush position two miles to the north, but he had not felt like walking that far. When the patrol was halfway across the dunes, the sergeant had radioed his company that he was in the assigned position. Then he had his men flop down in the soft, empty sand, set out claymore mines to their front and rear, and go to sleep, rotating one man awake."

- A leader's obligation to his/her responsibilities is continuous, on duty and off. When subordinates observe one instance of a leader favoring personal considerations over this professional obligation, those subordinates learn a fateful lesson: it is okay to shirk. Shirking is an insidiously contagious disease, and the leader who is responsible for its inception will sow many mission failures in the future.

* - Training.

p. 132. "A summer of growing success had spoiled them. They had been too cocky, too sure. Once they had learned how to patrol, they had not thought of how the enemy might

be force to change. They had let down for the sake of sleep."

- A soldier's training is never done. It is for the good of the soldier and the good of the unit, even in a war zone. The challenges for leaders are to realize the very real need to sharpen individual and unit skills during lulls in combat, to exercise the courage and judgment to convince subordinates of this need, and to balance this need for training with the equally real need for rest and relaxation. Compare this with a like excerpt in Sajer. Do your soldiers complain about some of the "concurrent" training they receive in the field? Do these complaints originate from the pitiful nature of the training or from your failure to depict the real need for the training? How can you make it better?

* - War (crimes).

p. 42. "In 1964, Quan Vlet's name had become known throughout the district when he captured the final five government-supporting hamlet chiefs on his side of the river. For a week he displayed his captives in a series of hamlets, and then one noon in the main marketplace of the Phu Longs he beheaded all five."

p. 61. "As were some of his Viet Cong counterparts, Thanh was a fanatic...To him torture was a methodological problem, not a moral dilemma."

- These excerpts describe atrocities perpetrated by the enemy in the Vietnam war. Given these crimes and the frustration and exhaustion common to any battlefield, it seems inevitable that other crimes will be committed by friendly forces in retribution. How can you as a leader affect this inevitability? Are rules of engagement effective in this regard? Are there even such things as war crimes in the first place?

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85 - Leaders (courage).	101 - Comradeship.
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132 - Training.	134 - Comradeship.
158 - Leaders (relationship with subordinates).	
176,177 - Leaders (stature).	
178 - Duty.	179 - Fragging.
186 - Leaders (stature).	187 - Insurgency.
194 - Careerism.	207 - Leaders (stature).
213 - Shirking.	215 - The Front.

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